The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed a foundational principle of administrative law: once a recruitment process is publicly advertised, the terms governing eligibility cannot be changed retroactively to disqualify applicants who relied on the original conditions. This judgment reinforces procedural fairness in public employment and sets a clear boundary against arbitrary rule changes.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, qualified Ayurvedic/Homeopathy/Unani medical practitioners, applied for the post of Contractual Ayush Medical Officer under an advertisement issued on 08-06-2013 by the Ayush Department of Madhya Pradesh. At the time of application, the applicable M.P. Ayurvedic/Homeopathy/Unani Contract Servant (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 2012 prescribed an upper age limit of 60 years as per Rule 6. All petitioners were below this age threshold. Subsequently, on 09-07-2013, a Gazette Notification amended Rule 6, reducing the upper age limit to 40 years. The respondents then rejected the petitioners’ applications on the ground that they exceeded the new age limit.
Procedural History
- 08-06-2013: Advertisement issued under unamended Rules, 2012, specifying 60-year age limit
- Before 09-07-2013: Petitioners submitted applications in good faith
- 09-07-2013: Gazette Notification amending Rule 6 to impose 40-year age limit
- 2013: Petitioners filed Writ Petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the amended condition
- 03-07-2013: Court granted interim relief permitting petitioners to appear in selection process, subject to final outcome
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought quashing of the amended age condition, direction to consider their applications under the original rules, and consequential appointment if found eligible.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the State can unilaterally alter eligibility criteria after issuing a public advertisement and after candidates have applied, thereby undermining legitimate expectations and fair procedure.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. to argue that altering selection criteria mid-process violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the principle of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution. They emphasized that the advertisement was issued under the original Rule 6, and applicants had no notice of the impending amendment. The change, they contended, was retrospective in effect and discriminatory.
For the Respondent
The State argued that the amendment was a valid exercise of rule-making power under the parent statute and applied to all pending applications. It claimed that the last date for applications was extended, and therefore, all candidates were bound by the latest rules in force at the time of final processing. The State further asserted that the amendment was made in public interest to ensure younger, more energetic personnel in the health sector.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a rigorous analysis of the sequence of events and the legal doctrine of legitimate expectation. It held that the advertisement dated 08-06-2013 constituted a public promise governed by the rules then in force. The amendment introduced on 09-07-2013, though procedurally valid, could not be applied retroactively to disqualify applicants who had already acted in reliance on the original terms.
"But what could not have been done was the second change, by introduction of the criterion of minimum marks for the interview... introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process... was completed, would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game was played which is clearly impermissible."
The Court explicitly adopted the reasoning from K. Manjusree and its progeny, including P.K. Ramachandra Iyer, Umesh Chandra Shukla, and Durgacharan Misra. It observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation arises when a public authority makes a clear, unambiguous representation upon which individuals reasonably rely. The petitioners had no reason to anticipate a reduction in the age limit after applying. The Court rejected the State’s argument that extension of the application deadline equated to a reset of the rules, noting that the amendment was not published until after applications were closed and the selection process had commenced.
The Court further emphasized that procedural fairness under Article 14 demands consistency in public recruitment. Arbitrary changes after applications are submitted create an uneven playing field and erode public trust in administrative processes.
The Verdict
The petitioners won. The Court held that the State cannot alter eligibility criteria after issuing an advertisement and after candidates have applied, and directed the respondents to declare the results of the petitioners under the original Rule 6 of the 2012 Rules. If found eligible, they are to be appointed as Contractual Ayush Medical Officers.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Rules Must Be Applied As Advertised
- Practitioners must challenge any post-application change in eligibility criteria, including age, educational qualifications, or experience requirements
- Public authorities must ensure that advertisements reflect the rules in force on the date of issuance
- Any amendment must be prospective only, applying to future recruitment cycles
Legitimate Expectation Is a Justiciable Right
- Candidates who act in reliance on published recruitment terms have enforceable rights under Article 14
- Courts will intervene where authorities attempt to impose new conditions retroactively, even if the amendment is procedurally valid
- This principle applies across all public sector recruitment - from teaching posts to police constables to contractual medical roles
Delay in Processing Does Not Validate Retroactive Changes
- Extension of application deadlines does not nullify the original terms of the advertisement
- The critical date is the date of advertisement issuance, not the date of final selection or result declaration
- Authorities cannot use administrative convenience as a shield for violating fair procedure
