The Kerala High Court has reaffirmed a foundational principle of administrative law: when a statutory appellate mechanism exists, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked as a first resort. This judgment clarifies that litigants challenging electricity tariff assessments must first exhaust their statutory remedies before approaching the High Court, reinforcing the separation between administrative appeals and constitutional remedies.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, P.G. Abhilash, contested a final assessment order (Ext.P10) issued by the Kerala State Electricity Board under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003, alleging improper calculation of electricity tariffs for commercial premises. The demand of ₹79,572.03 was based on alleged tariff misuse over a period of several months. The petitioner claimed he received the order only on 7 January 2026 via email, long after its issuance date.
Procedural History
The case unfolded through the following steps:
- 28 November 2025: Final assessment order (Ext.P9) issued against the landlord (4th respondent), who then passed it to the petitioner.
- 7 January 2026: Petitioner received Ext.P10 via email, which reiterated the same demand.
- 13 January 2026: Petitioner filed this writ petition (WP(C) No. 1356 of 2026) seeking quashing of Ext.P10.
- 13 January 2026: Court issued an interim order directing the petitioner to file a statutory appeal under Section 127 within ten days and deferring coercive action for two weeks.
- 22 - 23 January 2026: Petitioner deposited 50% of the demanded amount (Exts.P11 and P12) and filed a statutory appeal before the Kerala State Electricity Appellate Authority.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of Ext.P10 on grounds of procedural irregularity, lack of notice, and erroneous tariff application. He also sought stay on recovery proceedings pending adjudication.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable to challenge a tariff assessment order under Section 126 of the Electricity Act when an effective statutory appeal mechanism exists under Section 127.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner contended that the assessment order was issued without proper notice and based on flawed calculations. He relied on State of U.P. v. Mohammad Jaffar to argue that where an order is mala fide or violates natural justice, the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction. He emphasized that the email delivery of Ext.P10 on 7 January 2026 rendered the statutory appeal period ineffective.
For the Respondent
The State contended that Section 127 provides a comprehensive appellate framework with powers to set aside, modify, or confirm assessment orders. Citing S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, the State argued that writ jurisdiction must be exercised with restraint where statutory remedies are available and adequate. The delay in filing the writ petition, coupled with the petitioner’s subsequent filing of an appeal, demonstrated that the statutory route was both accessible and appropriate.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the structure of the Electricity Act, 2003, particularly the interplay between Section 126 (assessment) and Section 127 (appeal). It noted that Section 127 empowers the Appellate Authority to examine the legality, propriety, and correctness of the assessment order - including allegations of procedural defects, mala fides, and calculation errors. The Court held that the existence of such a robust statutory remedy precludes the invocation of writ jurisdiction unless the remedy is illusory or ineffective.
"The petitioner has an effective statutory remedy against Ext.P10 order. The petitioner may file an appeal against the same under Section 127 of the Act raising all available contentions."
The Court further observed that the petitioner had, in fact, availed of the statutory remedy within the time frame granted by the Court’s interim order. This conduct confirmed that the remedy was neither inadequate nor inaccessible. The Court distinguished Jaffar by noting that the alleged irregularities - delayed email delivery and calculation errors - were precisely the kind of issues Section 127 was designed to address. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction is not a substitute for appellate review.
The Verdict
The petitioner prevailed on procedural grounds. The Court dismissed the writ petition but directed the Appellate Authority to hear the statutory appeal on merits within three months and to refrain from any coercive action until then. The core holding is that statutory appeal under Section 127 must be exhausted before invoking writ jurisdiction.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Statutory Remedies Are Not Illusory
- Practitioners must first file appeals under Section 127 before approaching the High Court under Article 226.
- Allegations of delayed notice or procedural lapses must be raised before the Appellate Authority, not in writ petitions.
- Courts will not entertain writ petitions merely because the appellant prefers a faster forum.
Writ Jurisdiction Is a Last Resort
- The burden is on the petitioner to prove that the statutory remedy is ineffective, vexatious, or barred by law.
- Merely asserting that the appellate process is slow or cumbersome is insufficient to bypass it.
- This principle applies equally to disputes under the Telecom Act, Water Act, and other regulatory statutes with built-in appellate mechanisms.
Delayed Receipt Does Not Invalidate Appeal Period
- Receipt of an order via email constitutes valid service unless proven otherwise.
- If a party receives an order late, they may seek extension of the appeal period under Section 127(3), not bypass the process entirely.
- Courts will not grant writ relief simply because the petitioner claims ignorance of the order’s issuance date.
