Saturday, 12 September 2026

The dispute. The Income Tax Department sought to recover Rs 240.08 lakh of outstanding tax dues of a public limited company from its erstwhile director. The assessing officer treated mere directorship and shareholding as sufficient to impute vicarious liability. The director challenged the Section 179 recovery order before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The reasoning. The High Court held that Section 179 requires specific proof of gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty causing non-recovery. Holding directorship or equity shares cannot automatically shift corporate tax burden to individuals.

For your practice. Revenue notices against company directors under Section 179 are vulnerable to quashing absent positive evidence of personal misconduct.

The order. Writ petition allowed; impugned Section 179 order and demand notices against the director quashed with no order as to costs.

Section 179, Income Tax Act, 1961

Case

AJAY SURENDRA PATEL Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Citation

Gujarat High Court · R/SCA/6580/2016 · 2026:GUJHC:57301-DB · 11.09.2026

Bench

A.S. Supehia, Vaibhavi D. Nanavati

The dispute. An adult interfaith couple who solemnized their marriage faced persistent violent threats from family members opposing the union. They approached the police for protection and filed a writ petition upon receiving no assistance. The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking mandamus for police protection under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The reasoning. The High Court held that major citizens have a fundamental right to choose life partners free from familial coercion. Under Lata Singh principles and Uniform Civil Code rules, the state is obligated to provide effective personal security.

In that view of the matter, and in view of the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L ata Singh Vs State of U.P. and another, (2006) 5 SCC 475, the petitioners have made out a case for grant of protection.

For your practice. Practitioners can now seek preventive police protection for clients in interfaith marriages where family opposition creates a credible threat to life and liberty, citing Article 21 and UCC registration as basis.

The order. The Court directed the Station House Officer, Police Station Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar to assess threats to the petitioners and provide necessary protection if found, and to summon private respondents for counselling. No monetary relief or dates of compliance were specified beyond the protective direction.

Rule 7(1)(g), Uniform Civil Code

Case

F. J. And Anr v. State Of Uttarakhand

Citation

Uttarakhand High Court · WPCRL/1845/2026 · 10.09.2026

Bench

Alok Mahra

The dispute. In an ongoing custody dispute between estranged parents over their ten-year-old son, the Family Court allowed the father's application to examine the minor child as a formal witness. The mother challenged the order asserting severe psychological harm. The mother approached the High Court in a writ petition challenging the Family Court's witness summons order.

The reasoning. The High Court held that subjecting a minor child to examination in custody litigation damages emotional development. Section 17(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act restricts courts to informal chamber interactions to ascertain preferences.

For your practice. Trial lawyers cannot summon minor children as witnesses in custody disputes; inquiries are strictly confined to judicial chamber interactions.

The order. Writ petition allowed; Family Court order set aside with direction to ascertain child's preference solely through chamber interaction.

Section 17(3), Guardians and Wards Act, 1890

Case

Preeti Mishra v. Gaurav Mishra

Citation

Uttarakhand High Court · AO/330/2026 · 2026:UHC:8136-DB · 10.09.2026

Bench

Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Pankaj Purohit

The dispute. The decree-holder obtained a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. During execution, a pendente lite purchaser obstructed possession claiming title under a separate proceeding that did not touch the underlying agreement. The executing court recalled the delivery warrant under Section 47 CPC; the decree-holder preferred a civil revision.

The reasoning. The High Court held that an executing court cannot look behind the decree or examine validity of the underlying contract. A purchaser pendente lite has no independent locus under Section 47 CPC to obstruct delivery.

For your practice. Objections by subsequent transferees must be summarily rejected by executing courts without reopening the original decree.

The order. Civil revision allowed; executing court directed to restore the execution petition and deliver vacant possession within three months.

Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Case

S.SUNDARAMOORTHY vs BALUSAMI

Citation

Madras High Court · CRP.2269/2023 · 11.09.2026

Bench

P.B. Balaji

The dispute. A trial court referred a civil dispute to Lok Adalat, which passed an order disposing of claims without an executed joint compromise petition. The trial court later reopened the original suit. The petitioner challenged the trial court's order reopening the suit in writ proceedings under Article 227.

The reasoning. The High Court held that Lok Adalats have purely conciliatory jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate or pass hybrid orders. In the absence of a signed joint memo evidencing actual settlement, no binding award exists.

When the Lok Adalat records the minutes of a proceeding referring to certain terms and directs the parties to draw a compromise deed or a memorandum of settlement and file it before the court, it means that there is no final or concluded settlement and the Lok Adalat is only making tentative suggestions for settlement.

For your practice. Practitioners must ensure any settlement contemplated before Lok Adalat is reduced to writing and executed by parties as a Joint Memo; otherwise, the Lok Adalat order permitting withdrawal with liberty to reopen is not final and recallable under Section 151 CPC if the contingency fails.

The order. Writ petitions WP Nos. 4306, 7083, 7093, 7097, 7098, 7102, 7127, 7130, 7160 of 2026 dismissed; pending applications stand closed; Trial Court's orders dated 19.01.2026 permitting reopening of suits affirmed; no costs awarded.

Section 20, Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

Case

BOWRING INSTITUTE vs J GIRIDHAR

Citation

Karnataka High Court · WP/4306/2026 · 2026:KHC:49326 · 10.09.2026

Bench

Tara Vitasta Ganju

The dispute. The importer was sanctioned a Special Additional Duty refund under the Customs Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) withheld the sanctioned amount and adjusted it against a contentious duty drawback demand that was actively sub-judice in appeal. The importer preferred an appeal before CESTAT challenging the unilateral adjustment of its refund.

The reasoning. The Tribunal held that Section 142 of the Customs Act does not authorize revenue authorities to adjust legally due refunds against demands under active appellate challenge. Such adjustment violates statutory process and natural justice.

For your practice. Customs practitioners can restrain departmental set-offs of sanctioned refunds where underlying tax or drawback demands remain sub-judice.

The order. Appeal allowed; impugned adjustment set aside and Revenue directed to disburse refund of Rs 17,96,125 with interest under Section 11BB.

Section 142, Customs Act, 1962

Case

Johnson & ors. vs Commissioner Of Customs-Nhava Sheva - ...

Citation

Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal · Customs Appeal No. 86961 of 2022 and Customs Appeal No. 86962 of 2022 · 11.09.2026

Bench

Suvendu Kumar Pati

The dispute. Complainants filed a consumer case in 2014 under the 1986 Consumer Protection Act against an aviation training institute for refund of course fees. Following the dismissal of their statutory appeal, they filed a review application invoking Section 50 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 alleging an error apparent on the face of the record. They moved a review application before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, West Bengal seeking recall of its appellate order under Section 50 of the 2019 Act.

The reasoning. The State Commission held that the review power conferred by Section 50 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is substantive rather than procedural. In the absence of an express legislative mandate giving retrospective effect, Section 50 cannot be invoked to review or recall orders arising from complaints instituted under the erstwhile 1986 Act.

Section 50 of C.P. Act, 2019 reads as follows : “50. Review by State Commission in certain cases. – The State Commission shall have the power to review any of the order passed by it if there is an error apparent on the face of the record, either of its own motion or on an application made by any of the parties within thirty days of such order.”

For your practice. Practitioners must now verify that the statutory provision they invoke for review belongs to the same enactment as the original proceedings, preventing jurisdictional errors when dealing with transitional cases between the 1986 and 2019 Consumer Protection Acts.

The order. The revision application was dismissed.

Section 50, Consumer Protection Act, 2019

Case

Santosh Kr. Gupta and Sunny Gupta v. Skylark Aviation Training School & ors.

Citation

State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · SC/19/RA/16/2025 · 11.09.2026

Bench

Soma Bhattacharjee; Ananda Kumar Tiwari