Topic
Abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, refers to anti-competitive conduct by a firm with significant market power in India, such as excessive pricing or exclusionary practices that harm competition.
CCI found no prima facie violation of the Competition Act in the complaint that the mandatory shift to FIPS-140-3 favoured a single token vendor, dismissing the alleged abuse of dominance claim. The ruling clears the way for MeitY's migration mandate, affecting the Controller of Certifying Authorities, Precision Biometric and other token manufacturers.
The Competition Commission of India closed Case No. 30 of 2025 after finding no prima facie violation of Sections 3(4) or 4 of the Competition Act in Jindal Stainless' nickel supply arrangements. The ruling clarifies standards for exclusive dealing and market foreclosure under the Act, impacting cross-border supply chain disputes.
The Competition Commission of India closed Case No. 27 of 2025 after finding no contravention of Sections 3 or 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 in DIAL's award of security contracts to RAXA. The ruling clarifies that related-party transactions must still meet arms-length standards to avoid dominance abuse allegations.
CCI clarifies that vertical agreements under Section 3(4) of the Competition Act require proof of dominance to establish anti-competitive practices. Dealers cannot challenge unilateral termination unless market power is demonstrated, reinforcing the threshold for abuse of dominance claims under Section 4. The ruling impacts automotive dealerships and vertical business relationships across sectors.
CCI holds that higher pricing of medical services and products, without evidence of anti-competitive conduct or market power abuse, does not violate Section 4 of the Competition Act. The ruling clarifies that excessive pricing complaints require proof of dominance and exploitative practices, not just price disparity.
CCI clarifies that limiting Core Banking Solution upgrades to Infosys-authorized partners does not violate Sections 3 or 4 of the Competition Act, reinforcing that procurement restrictions tied to technical compatibility do not constitute anti-competitive conduct. The ruling sets a precedent for digital infrastructure procurement disputes involving statutory monopolies and OEM dependencies.
The Competition Commission of India found that the solar power bidding process did not constitute abuse of dominance because the tender design permitted open participation, the relevant market was properly defined to exclude non-solar energy sources, and no anti-competitive conduct was demonstrated by Adani or SECI. This sets a critical precedent for renewable energy procurement, affirming that market structure and transparent bidding protocols can preclude dominance concerns even with major players.
CCI dismisses allegations of abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act, ruling that price variations driven by currency exchange rates and order volume do not constitute anti-competitive conduct. The decision clarifies that market-driven pricing adjustments, even by a sole supplier, are permissible unless proven predatory or exclusionary.
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) dismissed allegations of abuse of dominance against Rapido, ruling that unlicensed bike-taxi operations are governed by the Motor Vehicles Act, not the Competition Act. The decision clarifies that regulatory non-compliance does not automatically establish anti-competitive conduct, impacting app-based transport platforms and regulatory enforcement.
The Competition Commission of India ruled that mere dominance in the online ticketing market does not constitute abuse under Section 4 of the Competition Act unless there is evidence of market foreclosure or discriminatory conduct. The decision underscores that competitors must demonstrate anti-competitive effects, not just market share, to establish abuse of dominance.
CCI affirms its jurisdiction to investigate abuse of dominance by IndiGo despite DGCA's sectoral oversight, establishing that competition law operates complementarily to sectoral regulation.