Case Law Analysis

Section 61(2) IBC | Section 4 Limitation Act Cannot Override 45-Day Outer Limit for Appeals : SC

The Supreme Court held the 45-day limit under Section 61(2) IBC for appealing resolution plan approvals is an absolute ceiling that Section 4 Limitation Act cannot extend. The NCLAT's condonation of a 16-day delay was reversed, dismissing appeals and upholding the resolution plan involving ₹271 crore investment.

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Nov 19, 2026, 12:17 AM
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Section 61(2) IBC | Section 4 Limitation Act Cannot Override 45-Day Outer Limit for Appeals : SC

The Supreme Court has held that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) acted illegally in condoning a 16-day delay in filing appeals against the approval of a resolution plan, by incorrectly applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to extend the statutory 45-day outer limit prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court set aside the NCLAT's condonation order and dismissed the underlying appeals as time-barred, reaffirming that the discretionary extension period under Section 61(2) is not part of the 'prescribed period' for limitation purposes.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The dispute arose from the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) of Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited (the corporate debtor). The National Company Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (NCLT) initiated CIRP against the corporate debtor vide order dated 18.07.2023 in Company Petition (IB) No. 296/7/HDB/2022. Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited (the appellant) emerged as the successful resolution applicant upon 100% approval of its resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors. The NCLT approved the resolution plan vide order dated 26.03.2025 passed in IA(IBC)(Plan) No. 08 of 2024 in CP (IB) No. 296/7/HDB/2022. The appellant claims to have invested ₹271.52 crore in implementing the resolution plan.

Key Facts

  • The respondents - Gorinka Pratyusha, Srinivas Kalluri, and Rajani Kalluri - claimed to have entered into agreements with the corporate debtor for purchase of commercial units in Manjeera Mall
  • They alleged that the Resolution Professional, Birendra Kumar Agarwal, recorded their payments towards full sale consideration as 'advances from customers' instead of acknowledging them as financial creditors
  • The NCLT, in I.A. Nos. 384 and 492 of 2024 in the company petition, directed the Resolution Professional to include their claims in the Information Memorandum, but these directions were not given effect to
  • The respondents filed appeals against the approval of the resolution plan: Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) No. 388 of 2025 by Gorinka Pratyusha, and Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) No. 389 of 2025 by Srinivas and Rajani Kalluri

Procedural History

  • 18.07.2023: NCLT, Hyderabad Bench initiates CIRP against Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited in CP (IB) No. 296/7/HDB/2022
  • 26.03.2025: NCLT approves resolution plan of Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited in IA(IBC)(Plan) No. 08 of 2024
  • 11.05.2025: Respondents file Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 before NCLAT, Chennai - the 46th day from the NCLT order (30 days prescribed period + 15 days extendable period expired on 10.05.2025)
  • 10.10.2025: NCLAT condones delay in filing appeals vide common order in I.A. Nos. 1139 of 2025 and 1141 of 2025, applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the ground that 10.05.2025 (45th day) was a second Saturday holiday
  • 07.05.2025: Supreme Court decides Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee and others (2025) 9 SCC 483, holding Section 4 Limitation Act cannot extend the discretionary period beyond the prescribed period
  • 10.02.2026: NCLAT dismisses recall applications filed by appellant in I.A. No. 183 of 2026 and I.A. No. 232 of 2026, and condonation of delay applications in I.A. No. 184 of 2025 and I.A. No. 233 of 2026
  • 16.03.2026: Supreme Court stays proceedings in Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025
  • 16.11.2026: Supreme Court delivers judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 3110-3111 of 2026

The Parties' Positions

The appellant contended that the NCLAT's condonation of delay was illegal because: (i) the appeals were filed on the 46th day, beyond the 45-day outer limit under Section 61(2) IBC; (ii) the Supreme Court's decision in Tata Steel Ltd. (decided 07.05.2025, before the NCLAT's condonation order) barred application of Section 4 Limitation Act to the discretionary extension period; (iii) the NCLAT had inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to recall its order but wrongly refused to exercise it. The respondents argued that the condonation order dated 10.10.2025 had attained finality as it was not separately challenged within time, and that no merger occurred with the recall dismissal order.

Relief Sought

The appellant sought: (i) setting aside of the NCLAT order dated 10.02.2026 dismissing the recall applications; (ii) allowing the recall applications and setting aside the condonation order dated 10.10.2025; (iii) dismissal of Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 on the ground of limitation.

The central question was whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to exclude a holiday falling on the last day of the discretionary 15-day extension period under Section 61(2) of the IBC, thereby permitting an appeal to be filed on the 46th day when the statutory outer limit is 45 days (30 days prescribed + 15 days extendable).

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant

The appellant relied on Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee and others (2025) 9 SCC 483, where this Court categorically held that the expression 'prescribed period' in Section 4 of the Limitation Act refers only to the period of limitation and not to any period beyond that which a court or tribunal has discretion to allow. The appellant submitted that the NCLAT erred in applying Section 4 to extend the 15-day discretionary period, and further erred in refusing to recall its condonation order despite being apprised of the Tata Steel precedent. The appellant also invoked the NCLAT's inherent jurisdiction to recall orders under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016, as recognised in Union Bank of India (erstwhile Corporation Bank) vs. Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian (2024) 248 Comp Cas 108 (NCLAT) and confirmed by this Court in Union Bank of India vs. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd. (2024) 248 Comp Cas 126 (SC).

For the Respondent

The respondents contended that the condonation order dated 10.10.2025 was a final order on merits, not separately challenged within the limitation period, and therefore had attained finality. They argued that there could be no merger of the condonation order with the subsequent order dismissing the recall applications, and that the appellant's remedy, if any, lay in a separate challenge to the condonation order which was now time-barred.

The Court's Analysis

The Court first addressed the NCLAT's factual error in stating that Tata Steel Ltd. was decided after its condonation order. The Court noted that Tata Steel was decided on 07.05.2025, well before the NCLAT's order dated 10.10.2025. When this Court clarifies the legal position on a statutory provision, that clarification becomes the law of the land, and an earlier contrary order by a tribunal is not saved unless it has attained finality.

On the NCLAT's inherent jurisdiction, the Court affirmed that while the NCLAT lacks a statutory power of review under the IBC, it possesses inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 to recall its orders on sufficient grounds. This was established by the NCLAT's 5-Judge Bench decision in Union Bank of India vs. Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian and confirmed by this Court in Union Bank of India vs. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd. The Court further cited the 3-Judge Bench decision in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. Prabhjit Singh Soni (2024) 243 Comp Cas 452 (SC), which recognised that tribunals possess ancillary and incidental powers necessary to discharge their functions effectively, including the power to recall orders in appropriate cases.

The Court held that the NCLAT was not justified in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction when apprised of the settled legal position on Section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Court further observed that the respondents had not even established sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The fact that 10.05.2025 was a second Saturday did not constitute sufficient grounds, especially since the appeals were e-filed on 11.05.2025 (a Sunday) - the next day - which was also a holiday. The e-filing could have been done on 10.05.2025 itself. In any event, the application of Section 4 of the Limitation Act was invalid under Tata Steel Ltd.

The Court rejected the respondents' finality argument as specious. The condonation order did not attain finality because the recall applications kept the issue alive. When the NCLAT refused to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to recall the order, and that refusal was subjected to appellate review before this Court under Section 62 of the IBC, the defect could be remedied.

"The NCLAT was not justified in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction even when apprised of the settled legal position with regard to application of Section 4 of the Act of 1963. More so, as the respondents did not even establish sufficient cause for condonation of the delay on their part in the filing of their appeals."

The Verdict

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals. It set aside the NCLAT order dated 10.02.2026 dismissing the recall applications in I.A. No. 183 of 2026 and I.A. No. 232 of 2026. The recall applications were allowed, and the common order dated 10.10.2025 in I.A. No. 1139 of 2025 and I.A. No. 1141 of 2025 (condoning delay) was set aside. In consequence, Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 on the file of the NCLAT, Chennai, stand dismissed on the ground of limitation. Parties were directed to bear their own costs.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Discretionary Extension Periods Are Not 'Prescribed Periods' Under Section 4 Limitation Act

The judgment reinforces the principle from Tata Steel Ltd. that Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to the 'prescribed period of limitation' and not to any additional period a statute grants a court or tribunal discretion to allow. Under Section 61(2) IBC, the 30-day period is the prescribed period; the 15-day extension is a discretionary grace period. A holiday falling on the last day of this discretionary period cannot be excluded under Section 4 to push the filing to the 46th day. Practitioners must calendar the outer statutory limit (45 days under Section 61(2)) as a hard deadline, not a target.

The Court affirmed that the NCLAT possesses inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to recall its orders on sufficient grounds, despite lacking a statutory review power. This power is not discretionary in the sense of being optional when a clear legal error is brought to the tribunal's attention - particularly where a binding Supreme Court precedent directly governs the issue. The NCLAT's refusal to recall its condonation order, despite being apprised of Tata Steel Ltd. (which was decided before the condonation order), was held to be unjustified. Practitioners should file recall applications promptly under Rule 11 when a tribunal overlooks binding precedent, and not treat the absence of a statutory review provision as a bar.

E-Filing on a Holiday Does Not Cure a Missed Deadline

The Court noted that the appeals were e-filed on 11.05.2025 (Sunday), the day after the extended limitation expired on 10.05.2025 (second Saturday). The fact that e-filing was technically possible on the holiday (10.05.2025) but was not done defeats any claim of sufficient cause. This underscores that the availability of e-filing on court holidays raises the bar for condonation - parties cannot rely on a holiday as sufficient cause when the electronic filing system remains operational.

Finality of Condonation Orders Is Not Absolute When Recall Applications Are Pending

The respondents' argument that the condonation order had attained finality because it was not separately appealed was rejected. The Court held that a condonation order does not attain finality while a recall application challenging it is pending before the same tribunal. When the tribunal dismisses the recall application, and that dismissal is appealed, the appellate court can examine the legality of the underlying condonation. This preserves the integrity of the limitation regime and prevents procedural finality from insulating a jurisdictionally defective order.

  • Actionable takeaway: In IBC appeals, treat the 45th day (30 + 15) as the absolute deadline; do not rely on Section 4 Limitation Act for holidays falling within the discretionary 15-day window.
  • Actionable takeaway: If a tribunal condones delay beyond the statutory outer limit, file a recall application under Rule 11 NCLAT Rules immediately, citing Tata Steel Ltd. and Union Bank of India (Amtek Auto).
  • Actionable takeaway: E-filing capability on holidays weakens 'court holiday' as sufficient cause for condonation - file before the deadline.
  • Actionable takeaway: A pending recall application prevents finality of a condonation order; appeal the dismissal of the recall to challenge the condonation.

Case Details

LULU INERNATIONAL SHOPPING MALLS PRIVATE LIMITED vs GORINKA PRATYUSHA

2026 INSC 1224
PDF
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
2026-11-16
Case Number
C.A. No.-003110-003111 - 2026
Bench
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

Frequently Asked Questions

Section 61(2) of the IBC prescribes a limitation period of 30 days from the date of the order, with a further extendable period of 15 days at the discretion of the NCLAT, making the outer statutory limit 45 days.
No. Following Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee (2025) 9 SCC 483, the Supreme Court held that the expression 'prescribed period' in Section 4 refers only to the period of limitation (30 days under Section 61(2)), not to the discretionary extension period. A holiday on the 45th day cannot be excluded to permit filing on the 46th day.
Yes. The NCLAT possesses inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to recall its orders on sufficient grounds, as confirmed by the NCLAT's 5-Judge Bench in Union Bank of India vs. Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian and by the Supreme Court in Union Bank of India vs. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd.
No. The Supreme Court held that a condonation order does not attain finality while a recall application challenging it is pending before the tribunal. When the recall application is dismissed and that dismissal is appealed, the appellate court can examine the legality of the underlying condonation order.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.