The Calcutta High Court has reaffirmed that the existence of an effective statutory remedy before a specialized tribunal bars the exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution, even where allegations of procedural irregularities are raised. This judgment clarifies the boundaries of judicial review in land reform disputes governed by the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, Gour Chandra Ghosh and others, are purchasers of agricultural land in Murshidabad district, West Bengal. They claim to have acquired title through purchase from recorded owners, mutated their names in the Record of Rights, and are in actual possession of the plots. The private respondents, who are the original vendors’ successors-in-interest, filed appeals under Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, challenging the mutation orders in favor of the petitioners. These appeals were accompanied by applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay.
Key Facts
- The petitioners’ names were mutated in the Record of Rights following purchase transactions completed prior to 2020.
- On 17.01.2020, the Prescribed Authority under Section 50 of the 1955 Act passed orders upholding the petitioners’ mutation entries.
- The private respondents filed appeals against these orders on 15.07.2023, beyond the 60-day statutory limitation period.
- On 02.05.2024, the District Land and Land Reforms Officer, Murshidabad, allowed the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act condoning the delay without serving notice on the petitioners or their vendors.
- On 28.02.2025, the appellate authority allowed the appeals, set aside the 2020 mutation orders, and directed the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer to rehear the mutation cases afresh.
- The petitioners became aware of these proceedings only after obtaining certified copies of the appellate records.
- No notice was issued to the petitioners or their vendors at any stage - neither during condonation of delay nor during the appellate hearing.
Procedural History
- 17.01.2020: Prescribed Authority passes mutation orders in favor of petitioners.
- 15.07.2023: Private respondents file appeals under Section 54 of the 1955 Act, beyond limitation.
- 02.05.2024: District Land and Land Reforms Officer condones delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ex parte.
- 28.02.2025: Appellate authority allows appeal, sets aside mutation orders, and directs rehearing.
- 20.12.2025: Writ Petitions (WPA 25183, 25184, 25185, 25187 of 2025) filed before the Calcutta High Court (Single Judge).
- 20.01.2026: Arguments concluded.
- 20.03.2026: Judgment delivered.
The Parties' Positions
Petitioners: Argued that the appellate authority violated principles of natural justice by condoning delay and allowing appeal without notice. They contended that the tribunal system is not a bar to writ jurisdiction where procedural illegality is evident.
Respondents (State and Private Respondents): Contended that the dispute falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal (WBLRTT) under the 1997 Act. They asserted that the High Court’s Single Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain such matters when an efficacious statutory remedy exists.
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought quashing of the orders dated 02.05.2024 and 28.02.2025, restoration of the 2020 mutation orders, and a direction to the Block Officer to recognize their title. They also sought costs.
The Legal Issue
Can a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution be entertained by a Single Judge of the High Court challenging an order passed by an authority under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, when an effective alternative remedy is available before the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal?
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Mr. Partha Pratim Roy argued that the appellate authority violated principles of natural justice by condoning delay and allowing the appeal without notice to the petitioners. He relied on Magadh Sugar and Energy Limited v. State of Bihar to contend that the existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the High Court’s jurisdiction where natural justice is breached. He also cited Md. Masidul Islam v. State of West Bengal to argue that writ jurisdiction is maintainable when no order has been passed by the Tribunal - though the Tribunal had passed orders here.
For the Respondent
The State, through multiple Additional Government Pleaders, contended that the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, is a “specified Act” under Section 2(r), and Section 8 explicitly bars all civil courts - including the Single Bench of the High Court - from entertaining disputes arising under the 1955 Act. They relied on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, Ananda Koley v. State of West Bengal, and Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India to establish that the Tribunal is the court of first instance and that judicial review is confined to the Division Bench. They emphasized that the Tribunal possesses full powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, including power to set aside ex parte orders and review its own decisions.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a comprehensive review of the constitutional and statutory framework governing tribunals under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution. It reaffirmed the holding in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India that while the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 is part of the basic structure, it is not exercisable by a Single Judge in matters falling within the exclusive domain of a tribunal created under Article 323B.
"The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role... The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance..."
The Court noted that Section 8 of the 1997 Act explicitly excludes the jurisdiction of the Single Bench of the High Court in matters arising under the 1955 Act. The Tribunal, under Section 16, possesses all powers of a civil court, including the power to set aside ex parte orders, review its decisions, and grant interim relief subject to strict procedural safeguards under Section 10(7).
The Court rejected the petitioners’ reliance on Samir Kumar Sarkar and Md. Masidul Islam, distinguishing them on facts. In Samir Kumar Sarkar, the petition was filed before the Division Bench after the Tribunal had been approached. In Md. Masidul Islam, the Tribunal was non-functional. Here, the Tribunal was fully functional, and the petitioners bypassed it entirely.
The Court held that the violation of natural justice, even if established, does not override the statutory bar created by Section 8. The Tribunal, under Section 10(7), has the power to set aside any ex parte order and grant relief. The petitioners’ remedy lies in approaching the Tribunal to challenge the 2024 and 2025 orders, not in invoking writ jurisdiction prematurely.
The Court emphasized that the 2001 amendment to Section 6 of the 1997 Act, replacing “order in original” with “any order,” was intended to bring appellate and interim orders under the Tribunal’s exclusive purview. The machinery created under the 1997 Act is not only effective but also designed to ensure expeditious disposal, with a statutory mandate for disposal within six months.
The Verdict
The writ petitions were dismissed as not maintainable. The Court held that the petitioners must approach the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal to challenge the orders dated 02.05.2024 and 28.02.2025. No relief was granted. There shall be no order as to costs. The petitioners are free to file appropriate applications before the Tribunal within the prescribed limitation period.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Alternative Remedy Is a Jurisdictional Bar for Single Bench Writs
- Practitioners must exhaust remedies before specialized tribunals before approaching the High Court’s Single Bench under Article 226.
- Allegations of natural justice violations do not automatically override statutory exclusions unless the tribunal is non-functional or the remedy is illusory.
- Writ petitions filed directly against tribunal-level orders (even ex parte) will be dismissed unless the tribunal is unavailable.
Tribunal’s Powers Are Sufficient to Correct Procedural Errors
- Tribunals under the 1997 Act have explicit powers under Section 16 to set aside ex parte orders and review decisions.
- Section 10(7) mandates notice and hearing before interim orders, and provides for automatic vacation of interim orders if not decided within six months.
- Petitioners should file review or restoration applications before the Tribunal, not seek writ relief.
Judicial Review Is Reserved for Division Bench Only
- Challenges to tribunal orders must be filed before the Division Bench of the High Court under Article 226/227, not the Single Bench.
- Single Bench writs against tribunal orders are not merely discouraged - they are legally barred under Section 8 of the 1997 Act.
- This principle applies uniformly to all “specified Acts” under the 1997 Act, including RERA, RERA-like state laws, and tenancy statutes.
