The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed a foundational principle of administrative law: writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a substitute for statutory remedies in service disputes. This judgment brings clarity to a recurring procedural confusion among practitioners and underscores the necessity of exhausting prescribed administrative channels before approaching the High Court.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, employees of Malegaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd, challenged termination orders issued by the management on grounds of alleged violation of natural justice, non-application of mind, and mala fide intent. They contended that their services were terminated without proper inquiry or opportunity of hearing, and sought reinstatement with back wages.
Procedural History
The matter arose from multiple termination orders issued between 2023 and 2024. The employees did not approach the employer’s internal grievance redressal mechanism or file claims before the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Instead, they directly filed writ petitions before the Bombay High Court. The petitions were consolidated for hearing due to identical legal issues.
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought quashing of termination orders, reinstatement with full back wages, and declaration that the termination violated principles of natural justice and Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked to challenge termination orders in a cooperative society’s service matter when an effective alternative statutory remedy exists under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioners relied on State of U.P. v. Raj Narain to argue that violations of natural justice are so fundamental that they render any proceeding void ab initio, thereby justifying direct recourse to writ jurisdiction. They contended that the employer’s internal procedures were non-existent or grossly defective, making the alternative remedy illusory.
For the Respondent
The respondent countered that the petitioners were employees of a cooperative society engaged in commercial activity, and their disputes fell squarely within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. They cited S. Srinivasan v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. to assert that the existence of a statutory forum precludes the High Court from entertaining writ petitions unless the remedy is demonstrably ineffective or unduly delayed.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the settled doctrine that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and not a right. It emphasized that Article 226 is not meant to bypass statutory mechanisms designed to resolve service disputes efficiently. The Court noted that the petitioners had not attempted to approach the Labour Court, nor had they shown any exceptional circumstance - such as delay, bias, or futility - that would render the statutory remedy inadequate.
"The existence of a statutory forum for adjudication of industrial disputes is not a mere procedural formality; it is a legislative policy choice to ensure specialized, expeditious, and cost-effective resolution."
The Court distinguished Raj Narain by observing that it applied to cases where no statutory remedy existed at all, not where one was clearly available. It further held that allegations of non-application of mind or mala fide intent, while serious, must be ventilated before the Labour Court, which has the expertise to examine evidence and grant appropriate relief including reinstatement.
The Court also rejected the argument that the cooperative society’s internal procedures were defective as a matter of law. Absent proof of complete absence of procedure, the mere assertion of procedural lapse does not oust the jurisdiction of statutory forums.
The Verdict
The petitioners lost. The Court held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked to challenge service terminations when a statutory remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is available and effective. The petitions were dismissed with liberty to approach the Labour Court.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Alternative Remedy Is Not Illusory Unless Proven
- Practitioners must now formally demonstrate futility, delay, or bias in statutory forums before seeking writ relief
- Mere assertion that a Labour Court remedy is "slow" or "cumbersome" is insufficient to bypass it
- Evidence of actual procedural denial - such as refusal to accept a complaint - must be pleaded and proved
Service Matters in Cooperative Societies Are Industrial Disputes
- Employees of cooperative societies engaged in commercial activity are covered under the Industrial Disputes Act
- This judgment closes a loophole where employers claimed exemption from labour laws by virtue of their cooperative status
- Employers must now ensure compliance with Section 2A and 2K of the Act when terminating service
Judicial Restraint in Service Jurisprudence Is Reinforced
- High Courts will routinely dismiss writ petitions in service matters unless exceptional circumstances are shown
- This reduces burden on High Courts and promotes specialized adjudication
- Lawyers must advise clients to exhaust remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act before filing writs
