The Supreme Court’s judgment in Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon marks a significant intervention in property disputes governed by customary law. The Court set aside concurrent findings of three lower courts, emphasizing that custom must be strictly proved and that the nearest male agnate inherits property in the absence of direct heirs under Oraon tribal law. This ruling underscores the limitations of appellate review under Article 136 when custom is inadequately established.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The dispute revolves around the inheritance of land owned by Sukhu Oraon, who had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula. The appellant, Bejla Oraon (Dhungru’s second son and Sukhu’s grandson), claimed ownership of all land owned by Sukhu. This claim was opposed by Budhain (Bhoula’s daughter) and her husband Punai, who asserted that Ledura (who had no children) had adopted Punai as his ghardamad (a son-in-law adopted as a son). The parties agreed that under Oraon tribal customs, daughters have no right of inheritance.
Key Facts
Sukhu Oraon had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula.
Ledura had no children and allegedly adopted Punai (Budhain’s husband) as his ghardamad.
A deed dated 27 February 1975 purportedly partitioned properties between Budhain and Ledura.
The appellant contended that Budhain and Punai had no title to the land, rendering the partition deed non est.
The defendants claimed that Punai, as ghardamad, inherited Ledura’s property.
Procedural History
The litigation spanned nearly five decades:
1975: Partition deed executed between Budhain and Ledura.
TS No. 22 of 1975: Suit filed by the appellant before the Munsif, Gumla, challenging the partition deed.
1990: Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that Punai was Ledura’s ghardamad.
TA No. 42 of 1990: First appeal before the 1st Additional District Judge, Gumla, which affirmed the trial court’s decree.
Second Appeal No. 35 of 1995: High Court of Jharkhand upheld the concurrent findings.
2024: Special Leave Petition (SLP © No. 23458/2024) filed before the Supreme Court.
9 July 2026: Supreme Court allowed the appeal, decreeing the plaintiff’s suit.
The Parties' Positions
Appellant (Plaintiff): Argued that the partition deed was invalid as Budhain and Punai had no title. Relied on Oraon customary law, which excludes daughters from inheritance and requires strict proof of ghardamad adoption.
Respondents (Defendants): Contended that Punai was validly adopted as ghardamad by Ledura, entitling him to inherit Ledura’s property. Relied on the partition deed and testimonies supporting the custom of ghardamad adoption.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought:
A declaration that the partition deed dated 27 February 1975 was invalid.
Recognition of the appellant’s title to the disputed land as the nearest male agnate.
Setting aside of the concurrent findings of the lower courts.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which upheld the validity of the partition deed and Punai’s status as ghardamad, were sustainable in law, given:
The burden of proof required to establish a custom under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The applicability of Oraon tribal customs governing inheritance and ghardamad adoption.
The scope of the Supreme Court’s interference under Article 136 of the Constitution with concurrent findings of fact.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
Burden of Proof: The appellant argued that the respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving the custom of ghardamad adoption, as required under Section 48 of the Evidence Act. Testimonies of the defendants were inconsistent and insufficient to establish a long-standing custom.
Customary Law: Relied on Halsbury’s Laws of England and precedents like Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari to contend that custom must be immemorial, reasonable, certain, and continuous. The alleged custom of ghardamad adoption by an uncle-in-law was not proved.
Agnatic Succession: Cited the work of scholar SC Roy, which states that in the absence of male heirs, the nearest male agnate inherits the property. The appellant, being Sukhu’s grandson, was entitled to the land.
Invalid Partition: The partition deed was invalid as it was executed between parties without title (Budhain and Ledura). The deed was either a lease (which confers no title) or a partition (which requires co-owners with shares).
For the Respondents
Validity of Partition Deed: Contended that the partition deed was validly executed and reflected the custom of ghardamad adoption. Ledura’s adoption of Punai was consistent with Oraon tribal practices.
Custom of Ghardamad: Argued that the custom of ghardamad adoption was well-established and recognized by the lower courts. The testimonies of defendant witnesses supported Punai’s status as ghardamad.
Concurrent Findings: Emphasized that the Supreme Court should not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they were perverse or based on no evidence. The lower courts had correctly applied the custom.
The Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court conducted a meticulous examination of the evidence and legal principles governing custom and appellate review:
Proof of Custom
The Court reiterated the essential attributes of a valid custom, as outlined in Halsbury’s Laws of England and Indian precedents:
“To be valid, a custom must have four essential attributes: (1) it must be immemorial; (2) it must be reasonable; (3) it must be certain in its terms, and in respect both of the locality where it is alleged to obtain and of the persons whom it is alleged to affect; and (4) it must have continued as of right and without interruption since its immemorial origin.”The Court held that the burden of proving a custom lies on the party alleging it (Section 48 of the Evidence Act). The respondents failed to establish:
Long Usage: The testimonies of defendant witnesses were inconsistent and did not prove continuous usage.
Certainty: The custom of ghardamad adoption by an uncle-in-law was not clearly defined or proved.
Reasonableness: The alleged custom was not shown to be reasonable or free from ambiguity.
Scope of Interference Under Article 136
The Court examined the principles governing interference with concurrent findings under Article 136, citing precedents like Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Ramachandran v. Vijayan:
“Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened in an appeal by special leave unless it is established: (1) that the finding is based on no evidence or (2) that the finding is perverse, it being such as no reasonable person could have arrived at even if the evidence was taken at its face value or (3) the finding is based and built on inadmissible evidence... or (4) some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked.”The Court identified several grounds justifying interference:
Findings Based on No Evidence: The lower courts’ acceptance of Punai’s ghardamad status was not supported by consistent evidence.
Perversion of Evidence: The testimonies of defendant witnesses were contradictory, particularly on whether daughters could inherit property or whether a nephew or niece would inherit in the absence of male heirs.
Misapplication of Custom: The trial court misapplied SC Roy’s work, which states that a ghardamad inherits only if there is no male agnate. The Court noted:
“It is not borne from record that Bhola, that is father of Budhain had any role to play or for that matter that even DW-4 had explicitly adopted him. The consistent position is that Ledura who is the uncle-in-law had adopted Punai.”
Substantial Question of Law: The High Court framed a substantial question of law (whether an uncle-in-law could adopt a ghardamad) but failed to answer it, merely relying on concurrent findings.
Evaluation of Evidence
The Court analyzed the testimonies of witnesses on six key issues:
Partition Between Sukhu’s Branch and Ledura/Bhola:
Plaintiff witnesses (PW 1-4) consistently denied any partition.
Defendant witnesses (DW 1-4) were inconsistent, with only DW-4 claiming Ledura had “written land to Bhuden.” The Court held this claim was unsubstantiated.
Daughters’ Right in Property:
Plaintiff witnesses uniformly stated that daughters have no right to inheritance.
Defendant witnesses were inconsistent, with some claiming daughters could inherit through a written instrument.
The Court accepted the plaintiff’s version, holding that daughters have no right to inheritance.
Ghardamad’s Rights:
The custom of ghardamad acquiring rights in the property of his father-in-law was held to be proved. However, the Court clarified that this applied only if the ghardamad was adopted by the father-in-law, not an uncle-in-law.
Property of an Issueless Udaon:
Defendant witnesses were inconsistent on whether a nephew or niece inherits.
The Court relied on SC Roy’s work, which states that the nearest male agnate inherits in the absence of direct heirs.
Entitlement After Deaths of Bhola, Ledura, and Buranga:
Plaintiff witnesses consistently stated that the appellant, as the nearest male agnate, was entitled to the property.
Defendant witnesses were inconsistent, with DW-4 acknowledging the possibility of the appellant’s entitlement.
The Court held that the appellant, as the nearest male agnate, was entitled to the property.
Validity of the Lease Deed:
The Court noted that the deed was termed a “partition deed” by the trial court but a “lease deed” by witnesses.
Regardless of its nature, the deed was invalid as it purported to partition property between parties without title (Ledura and Budhain). The Court held:
“It is well established that lease deeds do not confer title. It is also well established that a partition can be affected only amongst people who have shares between them.”
The Verdict
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts. The key holdings and directions were:
Custom Not Proved: The alleged custom of ghardamad adoption by an uncle-in-law was not established, and the partition deed was invalid.
Agnatic Succession: The appellant, as the nearest male agnate, was declared entitled to the disputed property.
Decree Granted: The plaintiff’s suit was decreed, with all necessary consequences to follow.
Costs: Each party was directed to bear its own costs.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Strict Proof of Custom Is Mandatory
Burden on the Alleging Party: Parties relying on a custom must prove its immemorial usage, reasonableness, certainty, and continuity. Mere assertions or inconsistent testimonies are insufficient.
Section 48 of the Evidence Act: Courts must insist on clear and consistent evidence of custom, including public records or testimonies of community members. In this case, the defendants’ failure to prove the custom of ghardamad adoption by an uncle-in-law was fatal to their claim.
Judicial Notice: Once a custom is judicially noticed, it need not be proved in every proceeding. However, this case demonstrates that novel or contested customs require rigorous proof.
Concurrent Findings Are Not Sacrosanct
Grounds for Interference: The Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings under Article 136 if:
The findings are based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence.
The findings are perverse or arbitrary, such that no reasonable person could arrive at them.
Material evidence is overlooked or legal principles are misapplied.
The findings cause undue hardship or shock the conscience of the court.
Substantial Questions of Law: If a High Court frames a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC, it must answer it. Mere reliance on concurrent findings is insufficient.
Agnatic Succession Prevails in Tribal Customs
Nearest Male Agnate: In the absence of direct male heirs, the nearest male agnate inherits property under Oraon tribal law. This principle was reaffirmed by the Court’s reliance on SC Roy’s work.
Daughters’ Rights: The judgment reinforces that daughters have no inheritance rights under Oraon customs, unless expressly provided through a written instrument (which was not proved in this case).
Ghardamad’s Limited Rights: A ghardamad inherits property only if adopted by the father-in-law, not by other relatives like an uncle-in-law. The custom must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication.
