The Supreme Court has definitively clarified that the period of limitation for taking cognizance of offences under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure begins from the date of filing of the complaint or registration of the FIR, not from the date the Magistrate takes cognizance. This ruling overturns a Delhi High Court order that had quashed an FIR on grounds of limitation, and reaffirms the binding precedent established in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The dispute arose from a physical altercation on 09.05.2011 outside the court premises of the Special Executive Magistrate, Moti Nagar, Delhi. The appellant, Roma Ahuja, along with her father and brother, was allegedly assaulted by Respondent No. 2, Ashutosh, an advocate representing the appellant’s younger sister. The appellant sustained injuries to her head, right eye, cheek, and shoulder. In response, two cross-FIRs were registered on the same day: FIR No. 120 of 2011 filed by Ashutosh against the appellant and her family, and FIR No. 121 of 2011 filed by the appellant against Ashutosh.
Key Facts
- The incident occurred on 09.05.2011 at the court premises in Moti Nagar, Delhi.
- FIR No. 120 of 2011 (against the appellant) was filed on 09.05.2011 and the charge-sheet was submitted on 13.07.2011, within the limitation period.
- FIR No. 121 of 2011 (against Ashutosh) was also registered on 09.05.2011, but the charge-sheet was filed on 29.05.2012, which was one year and 20 days after the incident.
- The offences alleged in FIR No. 121 of 2011 were under Sections 323 and 341 read with Section 34 IPC, punishable with imprisonment up to one year, attracting a one-year limitation under Section 468(2)(b) CrPC.
- The trial court took cognizance of the offences under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC on 17.12.2016.
- Charges were framed against Ashutosh and another accused on 17.12.2016.
Procedural History
- 09.05.2011: Incident occurs; both cross-FIRs registered.
- 13.07.2011: Charge-sheet filed in FIR No. 120 of 2011.
- 29.05.2012: Charge-sheet filed in FIR No. 121 of 2011 (beyond one-year limitation).
- 08.01.2014 and 22.09.2014: Ashutosh raised limitation objections before the trial court; both were rejected.
- 16.02.2015: Additional Sessions Judge dismissed Ashutosh’s revision petition challenging the trial court’s refusal to discharge.
- 04.04.2016: Trial court dismissed Ashutosh’s application for discharge under Section 258 CrPC.
- 28.04.2016: Ashutosh filed Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1407 of 2016 before the Delhi High Court seeking quashing of FIR No. 121 of 2011 on limitation grounds.
- 12.01.2017: Writ Petition was renumbered as Crl. M.C. No. 1170 of 2017 and Crl. M.A. No. 7270 of 2016.
- 30.01.2025: Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 121 of 2011, holding that the date of taking cognizance (17.12.2016) was the relevant date for limitation, and since it fell beyond one year from 09.05.2011, the bar under Section 468 CrPC applied.
- 28.03.2023: Appeals filed before the Supreme Court as SLP(Crl.) Nos. 9971-9972 of 2025.
- 09.04.2026: Supreme Court delivered judgment.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought setting aside of the Delhi High Court’s order dated 30.01.2025, restoration of the trial court proceedings, and continuation of the trial in accordance with law.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC is computed from the date of filing of the complaint or FIR, or from the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant’s counsel argued that the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases unequivocally held that the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 468 CrPC is the date of filing of the complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings, not the date of cognizance. The FIR in this case was registered on 09.05.2011, within the one-year limitation period. The delay in filing the charge-sheet was attributable to the Investigating Officer’s negligence, not the complainant’s, and the accused could not benefit from such administrative delay. The legal maxims actus curiae neminem gravabit and nullum tempus occurrit regi supported this position.
For the Respondent
The respondent contended that Sarah Mathew was distinguishable because it concerned a private complaint filed directly before a Magistrate, whereas this case arose from an FIR lodged with the police. He argued that Section 2(d) of CrPC defines ‘complaint’ as excluding police reports, and Section 173 CrPC governs the filing of charge-sheets, making the date of cognizance the relevant point for limitation. He further submitted that the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew did not consider the distinction between complaints and police reports, and therefore the judgment should not apply here.
The Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court categorically rejected the respondent’s attempt to distinguish Sarah Mathew. The Court emphasized that the key principle in Sarah Mathew was not the form of initiation (complaint vs. FIR), but the date of initiation of criminal proceedings. The Constitution Bench had held that Section 468 CrPC is concerned with the timely initiation of prosecution, not the court’s subsequent administrative act of taking cognizance.
"It is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution which is material. The complainant or the prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation period because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent complainant out of the court in this manner."
The Court noted that the distinction between a ‘complaint’ under Section 2(d) and a ‘police report’ under Section 2(r) is procedural, not substantive, for the purpose of limitation. Whether the case originates from a private complaint or an FIR, the criminal proceedings are initiated at the moment the complaint is lodged with the police or the Magistrate. The Court reaffirmed that Section 468 is designed to protect diligent complainants from being prejudiced by delays attributable to the state machinery.
The Court also dismissed the respondent’s argument that Sarah Mathew failed to consider Section 173 CrPC, observing that the Constitution Bench had comprehensively examined the entire Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC, including the interplay between Sections 468, 473, 190, and 173. The Court reiterated that a Constitution Bench judgment binds all subordinate courts and cannot be circumvented by raising technical objections about the absence of specific arguments.
The Court further underscored the ethical duty of advocates to respect binding precedents, stating that raising arguments contrary to settled law merely to demonstrate advocacy skills is an abuse of process and undermines the administration of justice.
The Verdict
The appeals were allowed. The Delhi High Court’s order dated 30.01.2025 quashing FIR No. 121 of 2011 was set aside. The trial court proceedings shall proceed expeditiously in accordance with law. The charge-sheet filed on 29.05.2012, though delayed, does not invalidate the prosecution because the FIR was registered on 09.05.2011, within the one-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(b) CrPC. All pending interlocutory applications are dismissed.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Initiation, Not Cognizance, Triggers Limitation
- Practitioners must now argue that the limitation clock under Section 468 CrPC starts from the date of FIR registration or complaint filing, regardless of when cognizance is taken.
- Any application to quash on grounds of limitation must be evaluated based on the date of initiation, not the date of cognizance or charge-sheet filing.
- Delay by Investigating Officers or court backlogs cannot be used to defeat a valid prosecution.
Police Reports Are Covered Under Section 468
- The distinction between ‘complaint’ and ‘police report’ under Sections 2(d) and 2(r) is irrelevant for limitation purposes.
- FIRs are treated as the equivalent of complaints for initiating criminal proceedings under Section 468 CrPC.
- This applies uniformly across all offences, whether triable by Magistrate or Court of Session.
Ethical Obligation to Concede Binding Precedents
- Advocates must not re-litigate issues already settled by Constitution Benches, even if they believe the judgment is flawed.
- Raising meritless arguments against binding precedent may invite adverse costs and professional censure.
- Courts will treat such conduct as contrary to the duty of candour and professionalism.
