The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that statutory limitation periods under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are mandatory and cannot be circumvented by judicial discretion absent a formal application for condonation. This ruling clarifies that even a one-day delay in filing a complaint renders it time-barred unless the complainant seeks and obtains judicial approval for condonation.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Forbes Gokak Ltd., filed a criminal complaint against Brig Cargo International and its director, Balasaheb G. Rakshe, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, alleging dishonour of four cheques totaling Rs. 1,71,817.97. The cheques were deposited on 08.07.1999 and returned unpaid on 09.07.1999. A statutory notice dated 14.07.1999 was first delivered by hand on 15.07.1999, but the accused refused to accept it. The same notice was then sent via Registered Post with Acknowledgement Due (RPAD) and received by the accused on 16.07.1999.
Procedural History
- 09.07.1999: Cheques returned unpaid by bank
- 15.07.1999: Hand-delivered notice refused by accused
- 16.07.1999: RPAD notice received by accused
- 30.07.1999: 15-day notice period expired
- 30.08.1999: One-month limitation period for filing complaint expired
- 01.09.1999: Complaint filed - one day late
- 13.07.2005: Trial Court acquitted accused on grounds of limitation
- 30.01.2026: Bombay High Court dismisses appeal
Relief Sought
The appellant sought reversal of the acquittal, arguing that the limitation period commenced only after receipt of the RPAD notice on 16.07.1999, making the complaint timely. Alternatively, it sought condonation of the one-day delay.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act permits a court to take cognizance of a complaint filed one day beyond the statutory limitation period in the absence of any application seeking condonation of delay.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The appellant’s counsel, Mr. Kiran Kulkarni, contended that the cause of action arose only on 01.08.1999, after the 15-day period following receipt of the RPAD notice on 16.07.1999. He relied on M/s. SIL Import, USA v. Exim AIDES Silk Exporters to argue that actual receipt of notice, not dispatch, triggers the limitation period. He further submitted that the trial court erred in treating the refusal of hand-delivery as effective notice, and that the complaint was filed within the correct limitation window.
For the Respondent
The respondents’ counsel, Mr. Pintu Singh, supported the trial court’s finding that the refusal of the hand-delivered notice on 15.07.1999 constituted sufficient intimation under Section 138, thereby making the cause of action arise on 31.07.1999. He emphasized that the complaint was filed on 01.09.1999 - one day late - and that no application for condonation of delay had ever been filed, rendering the complaint legally invalid.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the interplay between Section 138 and Section 142(b), which mandates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 unless the complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises. The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the RPAD notice alone triggered the limitation period, citing M/s. SIL Import to affirm that actual receipt is determinative, but also held that refusal of delivery constitutes effective notice under the Act.
"The endorsement of refusing to accept the demand letter-cum-notice (Exh.14), served as the required intimation to the accused on 15.07.1999 itself."
The Court then applied the rule of computation under the General Clauses Act - excluding the first day and including the last - to determine that the 15-day notice period ended on 30.07.1999, making the cause of action arise on 31.07.1999. The limitation period thus expired on 30.08.1999. The complaint filed on 01.09.1999 was therefore one day late.
Crucially, the Court relied on the recent Supreme Court decision in H.S. Oberoi Buildtech (P) Ltd. v. M/s. MSN Woodtech, which held that condonation of delay under Section 142(b) is not automatic or presumed. The Court observed:
"Once the statute prescribes a mandatory time limit for filing a complaint, there cannot be any deviation from the same except when an application accompanying the complaint is filed seeking condonation disclosing reasons for the delay..."
The Court emphasized that the complainant had not filed any application for condonation at any stage, and that judicial discretion cannot be invoked in the absence of a formal request. The trial court’s dismissal was therefore legally sound.
The Verdict
The appeal was dismissed. The Bombay High Court held that Section 142(b) imposes a mandatory limitation period, and condonation of delay is impermissible without a formal application. The complaint, filed one day late without seeking condonation, was rightly dismissed.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Condonation Requires Formal Application
- Practitioners must file a separate application for condonation of delay alongside the complaint under Section 138
- Merely arguing delay in oral submissions or appeal is insufficient
- Courts will not presume or infer condonation even for minor delays
Actual Receipt, Not Dispatch, Governs Limitation
- The date of actual receipt of notice - whether by hand, post, or fax - determines the start of the 15-day period
- Refusal of delivery constitutes valid notice if documented
- Postal receipts and endorsements are critical evidence
Judicial Discretion Is Not a Safety Net
- The H.S. Oberoi precedent now binds all High Courts
- Delay, even by one day, renders a complaint non-maintainable
- Lawyers must audit limitation dates with precision before filing
