Res Judicata Bars Prohibition Under Section 22A(1)(c) Registration Act | AP HC Quashes Arbitrary Property Blacklisting

The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in a significant ruling, has underscored the binding nature of res judicata in property disputes, particularly when administrative actions conflict with settled judicial pronouncements. The Court set aside a prohibition order under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908, which had barred registration of documents relating to a property whose title had been conclusively adjudicated in favour of the petitioner’s predecessors. The judgment reinforces that administrative authorities cannot reopen issues already settled by courts, even after decades.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner, Madala Ashwin Kumar, purchased Flat Nos. 503 and 504 in Emgee Residency, Survey No. 63, Koritepadu Village, Guntur, from M/s. Emgee Value Homes India Private Limited via registered sale deeds dated 14.05.2012 (Document Nos. 2918 and 2919 of 2012). The developer had acquired the land through a Development Agreement-cum-GPA dated 21.08.2008 (Document No. 2810 of 2010) from the original landowners, who had purchased the property in 1982 from the legal heirs of Peddinti Bhavanacharyulu.

The dispute traces its origin to a personal grant made in 1822 (1242 Fasli) by Sri Raja Manuru Venkata Narayanam, Zamindar of Sattenapalli, to Peddinti Ratnamacharyulu for rendering Archakathvam (priestly services) at Sri Sita Rama Swamyvari Temple. Over the decades, the nature of this grant - whether it was a personal grant to the archakas or a grant to the deity - became the subject of prolonged litigation.

Key Facts

• 1822: Personal grant made to Peddinti Ratnamacharyulu for Archakathvam services.
• 1923: Civil Suit (O.S. No. 3 of 1923) filed in the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Guntur, seeking declaration that the archakas were not trustees and removal from office. The suit was dismissed, holding that the grant was burdened with service but vested in the archakas.
• 1924: Appeal (A.S. No. 321 of 1924) filed before the Madras High Court. The appeal was partly allowed, framing a scheme where archakas retained possession, could lease the lands, and were treated as trustees.
• 1957: The Endowments Department raised a demand under the A.P. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, claiming the lands belonged to the temple. This was challenged in O.S. No. 89 of 1957, which was allowed on 31.03.1962, holding the grant was to the archakas, not the deity.
• 1963: The Endowments Department appealed in A.S. No. 148 of 1962, which was allowed on 29.01.1963, dismissing the suit. The archakas filed a Second Appeal (S.A. No. 928 of 1963) before the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
• 18.08.1967: The High Court allowed S.A. No. 928 of 1963, setting aside the appellate decree and restoring the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the lands were granted to the archakas, not the temple, and thus not subject to contribution under Section 76 of the Endowments Act.
• 1964: The Revenue Department initiated proceedings under the A.P. Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956. The High Court, in W.A. No. 21 of 1964, held that the grant was personal to the Peddinti family and eligible for Ryotwari Patta.
• 1974: The Endowments Department filed O.P. No. 75 of 1957 seeking modification of the scheme framed by the Madras High Court. This was dismissed. The Peddinti family filed O.P. No. 169 of 1962 for modification, which was also dismissed. The family appealed in L.P.A. No. 104 of 1974, which was allowed on 09.07.1976, holding that the principle of res judicata applied, and the earlier judgments were conclusive.
• Post-1976: The Peddinti family began selling portions of the land after converting it into residential plots. Despite the conclusive judgments, the Endowments Department continued to claim the lands, leading to prohibitory orders under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908.
• 2011-2012: The prohibitory orders were challenged in W.P. Nos. 6653 of 2011, 25595 and 25638 of 2012. The High Court allowed the writ petitions, directing the registration authorities to register sale documents, holding that the issue was res judicata.

Procedural History

• 08.06.2016: The 2nd Respondent (Commissioner and Inspector General of Stamps and Registration) issued Memo No. Rc.No.M2/9577/2016, placing the petitioner’s property under the prohibited category under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908.
• 2025: The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 10211 of 2025 under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the memo and seeking:
  • Declaration that the memo and consequential actions are illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 and 300A.
  • Quashing of the memo in so far as it relates to the petitioner’s property.
  • Directions to remove the property from the prohibited list on the IGRS website and other records.
  • Directions to the respondents to register documents presented by the petitioner.
  • Declaration of any concealed memos/orders as illegal.
• 2025: The petitioner also filed I.A. Nos. 1-4 of 2025 seeking:
  • I.A. No. 1 of 2025: Direction to register documents pending disposal of the main writ.
  • I.A. No. 2 of 2025: Suspension of the impugned memo.
  • I.A. No. 3 of 2025: Dispensation with the certified copy of the memo.
  • I.A. No. 4 of 2025: Amendment of the main prayer to clarify the property description.

Relief Sought

The petitioner sought:

• Quashing of Memo No. Rc.No.M2/9577/2016 dated 08.06.2016.
• Removal of the property from the prohibited list under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908.
• Directions to the respondents to register documents for transfer/alienation of the property.
• Declaration of any concealed orders as illegal.

The Legal Issue

The central question was whether the respondents could prohibit registration of documents under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908, in respect of a property whose title had been conclusively adjudicated in favour of the petitioner’s predecessors by multiple judgments of the High Court, thereby attracting the principle of res judicata.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

• The petitioner contended that the impugned memo was issued without verification, ignoring the series of judgments holding that the property belonged to the Peddinti family, not the temple.
• Reliance was placed on W.P. Nos. 25595 and 25638 of 2012, where the High Court had set aside identical prohibitory orders, holding that the issue was res judicata.
• It was argued that the Endowments Department had no right to reopen the issue, as the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 104 of 1974 had held that it was too late in the day to disturb the findings in S.A. No. 928 of 1963.
• The petitioner’s counsel, Sri Unnam Akhil Chowdary, submitted that the property was never the property of the Endowments Department and that the impugned memo was unsustainable in light of the earlier judgments.

For the Respondent

• The Endowments Department filed a counter-affidavit, contending that the grant was in favour of the deity, not the archakas, and that the archakas had no right to alienate the property.
• It was argued that the property was entered in the temple register under Section 43 of the Endowments Act, 1987, making the entry conclusive proof of the property belonging to the temple.
• The Government Pleader for Endowments relied on a Division Bench judgment in Takkella Lakshminarasaiah Brindavan Gardens v. State of Andhra Pradesh (W.P. Nos. 27655 & 27572 of 2016), distinguishing it on facts.

The Court's Analysis

The Court conducted a detailed examination of the impugned memo and the chronology of judgments relating to the property:

1. Res Judicata: The Court observed that the issue of whether the property belonged to the temple or the archakas had been conclusively settled in S.A. No. 928 of 1963 (dated 18.08.1967), where it was held that the grant was not in favour of the temple and that the temple derived no income from it. This finding was reiterated in W.A. No. 21 of 1964 (dated 05.07.1965) and L.P.A. No. 104 of 1974 (dated *09.07.1976). The latter judgment explicitly held that the principle of res judicata applied, and it was too late to disturb the findings.

   "In this Second Appeal it is argued by the learned advocate general on behalf of the appellant that the grant in question was continued by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Justice Manohar Pershad and Justice Kumarayya, in Writ Appeal No.21 of 1963, confirming the judgment of Justice Gopal Rao Ekbote in Writ Petition No.852 of 1961, in which it was held that the lands are granted to the archakas for performing the service and that it is not a grant in favour of the temple. Even as learnt from this judgment which concludes the matter, have also read the relevant documents, namely, the grant and the subsequent letter so long as the sun and the moon of the grantor which clearly show that the inam lands were given to certain named archakas hereditarily to be enjoyed from son to grandson so long as the sun and the moon last and that the grants are intended to meet the expenses of worship and the salaries of the archakas. There is nothing in the said documents to show that the temple is entitled to any part of the income as such. The mere fact that certain services are rendered in the temple does not establish that the grant of the land is in favour of the temple. I therefore agree with the view of the trial Court that the grant of the suit lands was not in favour of the temple and that the temple derives no income therefrom and hence the lands are not subject to payment of the contribution under Section 76 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act."

2. Binding Nature of Judgments: The Court noted that the judgments in L.P.A. No. 104 of 1974 and W.P. Nos. 25595 and 25638 of 2012 had expressly barred the Endowments Department from reopening the issue. The latter judgment held:

   "It is not in dispute that LPA No.104 of 1974 filed by the Archakas pertained to the subject lands. A copy of the Judgment dated 09.07.1976 passed therein is placed on record. thereof reflects that the Division Bench took note of the fact that S.A.No.926 of 1963 was allowed by a learned Judge of this Court holding that the grant of the land in question was not in favour of the temple. Earlier, when the Archakas filed W.P.No.852 of 1961 before this Court, the same was allowed on 23.09.1963 by a learned Judge holding that the grant was neither to the Deity nor to the Anchakas burdened with service but to the office of the Archakas to serve as emoluments annexed to the office. The learned Judge consequently held that the Archakas were entitled to ryotwari pattas. This order was confirmed in W.A.No.21 of 1964. The order in the Writ Appeal was relied upon by the learned Judge while allowing S.A.No.928 of 1963. The Division Bench therefore held that the principle of res judicata would apply as it had already been decided by this Court that the lands were not granted to the Deity/ But to the Archakas. The Archakas were therefore held not liable to pay any contribution or fee to the Endowments department. The Bench further held that the judgment in S.A.No.928 of 1963 was conclusive and that it was too late in the day to be disturbed. The argument advanced on behalf of the Endowments department that the Endowments Act was rejected by the Division Bench. The LPA was accordingly allowed. In the light of the observations made by the Division Bench in the above LPA as long back as on 09.07.1976, it is not open to the Endowments department to seek to reopen the issue as to the nature and status of the inam granted by Sri Raja Manuri Venkata Rayanigaru. It is now settled that the said inam was granted to the Archakas alone and not to the temple. This Court also held that the nature of the grant was such that the Archakas were entitled to ryotwari pattas. Neither the temple nor the Endowments department can therefore seek to reopen these issues at this belated stage. As observed supra, the Division Bench in the year 1976 itself stated that It was too late in the day to disturb the findings recorded in the judgment passed in S.A.No.928 of 1963. More than 37 years having passed since then, this concluded issue is now beyond re-examination."

3. Arbitrariness of the Impugned Memo: The Court held that the impugned memo was issued routinely and hastily, without basic verification of the record. The respondents had ignored the binding judgments, which had conclusively settled the title in favour of the archakas.

4. Distinction from Reliance Judgment: The Court distinguished the judgment relied upon by the respondents (Takkella Lakshminarasaiah Brindavan Gardens v. State of Andhra Pradesh) on factual grounds, noting that the present case involved settled title through res judicata.

The Verdict

The Court allowed the writ petition with the following directions:

1. Impugned Memo No. Rc.No.M2/9577/2016 dated 08.06.2016 is set aside in so far as it relates to the petitioner’s property (Flat No. 503 & 504, Emgee Residency, Sy. No. 63, Koritepadu Village, Guntur).
2. The 1st, 2nd, and 7th respondents are directed to remove the subject property from the prohibited category under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908.
3. The 1st, 2nd, and 7th respondents are further directed to receive and process documents for registration submitted by the petitioner for transfer/alienation of the property, without reference to the impugned memo.

No order as to costs was passed. All pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Res Judicata Bars Reopening Settled Title Disputes

• Administrative authorities cannot issue prohibitory orders under Section 22A(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908 if the title to the property has been conclusively adjudicated by courts, even decades earlier.
• Practitioners must emphasize the binding nature of res judicata in property disputes, particularly when administrative actions conflict with settled judicial pronouncements.

Verification Before Prohibition Is Mandatory

• Registration authorities must verify records before placing properties under prohibited categories. Routine or hasty issuance of prohibitory orders without due diligence may render them arbitrary and liable to be set aside.
• Petitioners challenging such orders should highlight the lack of verification as a ground for quashing.

Endowments Department Cannot Reopen Concluded Issues

• The Endowments Department cannot claim properties as temple assets if multiple judgments have held that the grant was personal to the archakas and not to the deity.
• Division Bench judgments holding that it is too late to disturb settled findings serve as conclusive precedents barring re-litigation.

Registration of Documents Must Align With Judicial Findings

• Registration authorities are bound by judicial findings on title. They cannot refuse registration based on administrative memos that conflict with binding judgments.
• Buyers and sellers of properties with complex title histories should verify judicial records to ensure no prohibitory orders exist based on overruled or distinguished claims.