The Bombay High Court has clarified that while prolonged reservation of land by municipal authorities infringes upon the constitutional right to property under Article 300-A, the remedy for acquisition cannot be enforced by writ jurisdiction without strict adherence to the statutory framework under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. The judgment underscores that judicial intervention cannot substitute procedural compliance mandated by law.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, MotiPark Co-operative Housing Society Limited, purchased land in Survey No. 152/1, Plot No. 70/3, Yerwada, Pune, on 26.12.1978 for residential development. The total area was 8,262.50 sq.mtrs. Under the Town Planning Scheme, the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) took over 1,520 sq.mtrs., leaving the petitioner with 6,780 sq.mtrs. Over the next four decades, the reserved portion of this land underwent multiple changes in designation, preventing the petitioner from developing it.
Key Facts
The petitioner acquired the land on 26.12.1978.
In 1980, PMC resolved to acquire 6,780 sq.mtrs. for a playground.
In 1981, acquisition proceedings were dropped due to fund shortage.
In 1982, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued but later withdrawn.
In 18.09.1982, the Draft Revised Development Plan redesignated the land for 'parking'.
In 1984, the petitioner submitted a building plan, which was rejected due to reservation.
In 1987, the Revised Development Plan was sanctioned, redesignating 5,317.4 sq.mtrs. of the land for 'Pune Municipal Transport (PMT) Bus Depot'.
On 06.04.1992, a notification under Section 126(2) and (4) of the MRTP Act was issued for acquisition of the 5,317.4 sq.mtrs. for PMT Bus Depot.
On 22.08.1992, the State Government disposed of the petitioner’s appeal under Section 47 of the MRTP Act, remitting the matter for feasibility of an agreement.
In 1993, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993 challenging the change from 'parking' to 'bus depot' as illegal.
On 01.02.1993, the High Court granted rule in the writ petition but restrained declaration of final award.
In 1994, PMC sought to take possession of 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. for road widening without acquisition proceedings.
On 11.01.1994, the High Court permitted possession of the 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. but preserved the petitioner’s right to compensation.
On 03.05.2005, the High Court quashed the 1992 notification for PMT Bus Depot reservation.
The Supreme Court set aside this order on 09.08.2017, holding the change from 'parking' to 'bus depot' was not substantial.
On 05.01.2017, the Development Plan was revised again, redesignating the 5,317.4 sq.mtrs. for 'Pune Mahanagar Parivahan Mahamandal Limited (PMPML)'.
The petitioner repeatedly sought acquisition and compensation, but no steps were taken.
Procedural History
26.12.1978: Petitioner purchases land.
1980: PMC resolves to acquire land for playground.
1981: Acquisition dropped due to funds.
1982: Land Acquisition Act notification issued and withdrawn.
18.09.1982: Draft Development Plan redesignates land for 'parking'.
1984: Building plan rejected due to reservation.
1987: Final Development Plan designates 5,317.4 sq.mtrs. for PMT Bus Depot.
06.04.1992: Notification under Section 126(2) and (4) MRTP Act issued.
22.08.1992: State Government remits matter for feasibility of agreement.
1993: Writ Petition No. 347 of 1993 filed challenging reservation change.
01.02.1993: High Court grants rule, restrains final award.
1994: PMC takes possession of 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. for road widening.
11.01.1994: High Court permits possession but preserves compensation rights.
03.05.2005: High Court quashes 1992 notification.
09.08.2017: Supreme Court sets aside 2005 order.
05.01.2017: Development Plan revised to designate land for PMPML.
2025: Present Writ Petition No. 2706 of 2025 filed.
01.07.2026: Reserved.
15.07.2026: Judgment pronounced.
The Parties' Positions
Petitioner: Argued that repeated reservation since 1980, coupled with 30+ years of inaction on acquisition of 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. and failure to initiate fresh acquisition for 5,317.4 sq.mtrs. after 2017, violated its right to property under Article 300-A. It sought immediate acquisition and compensation.
Respondent PMC: Conceded that acquisition of the 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. must proceed urgently. For the 5,317.4 sq.mtrs., it argued that the 10-year reservation period under Section 127 of the MRTP Act would expire soon, and the petitioner must invoke Section 49 to trigger acquisition.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought:
Immediate acquisition of the 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. and 5,317.4 sq.mtrs. of land.
Payment of compensation for both parcels.
A direction to complete acquisition and disburse compensation within a fixed timeframe.
A declaration that the continued reservation without acquisition violated Article 300-A.
The Legal Issue
Can a Writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution direct a municipal authority to initiate and complete land acquisition for reserved land, without the affected party first triggering the statutory process under Section 49 of the MRTP Act, read with Sections 126 and 127?
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, and Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah to assert that the right to property under Article 300-A is a human right and that prolonged, unremedied reservation constitutes arbitrary deprivation. It argued that PMC’s own admission of intent to acquire the land rendered the statutory process redundant. It contended that the Supreme Court in Chhabildas v. State of Maharashtra had recognized that inordinate delay, even without a Section 127 notice, could justify lapsing under Article 142, and that the High Court should exercise similar equitable powers.
For the Respondent
The respondent argued that Sections 49, 126, and 127 of the MRTP Act form a comprehensive statutory scheme for acquisition and lapsing of reservations. It emphasized that the petitioner had never served a purchase notice under Section 49, nor invoked Section 127 after the 10-year period from the 2017 plan. It cited Chhabildas and Kolhapur Municipal Corporation v. Vasant Mahadev Patil to show that courts cannot bypass statutory procedures, even for long delays, unless the affected party follows the prescribed route. The PMC maintained that its statement of intent was not a legal admission to bypass procedure.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed examination of Sections 49, 126, and 127 of the MRTP Act, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Chhabildas v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 2 SCC 784. It noted that Section 49 provides a mechanism for landowners to compel acquisition by serving a purchase notice. Section 126 governs the State’s power to acquire land for public purposes specified in plans, while Section 127 provides for automatic lapsing of reservation if acquisition is not initiated within 10 years and no steps are taken within 24 months of a notice.
"In all Section 49 cases, where a purchase notice has been served and is confirmed within the period specified, the appropriate authority must make an application to acquire the land within one year from the date of confirmation of the notice. If it does not do so, the reservation, designation, etc. shall be deemed to have lapsed."
The Court emphasized that while the Supreme Court in Chhabildas had invoked Article 142 to declare lapsing due to 20+ years of inaction, such extraordinary power is not available to High Courts under Article 226. The Court held:
"The Writ Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not have the power exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India."
It further clarified that the petitioner had never served a purchase notice under Section 49, nor invoked Section 127 after the 10-year period from the 2017 plan. The mere statement of intent by the PMC in its reply affidavit could not substitute statutory compliance. The Court distinguished between judicial recognition of rights and judicial enforcement of procedures:
"Although the respondent PMC has stated in the above-quoted paragraph IX of its reply affidavit that it intends to acquire land reserved for PMPML... while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226... this Court cannot issue a positive direction to start the process of acquisition... without the statutory procedure being followed."
The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s hardship but held that equity cannot override statutory mandates. The 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. were treated differently because the PMC had already taken possession and conceded liability.
The Verdict
The writ petition was partly allowed. The Court directed:
The respondents shall forthwith initiate acquisition of 1,462.50 sq.mtrs. under the MRTP Act read with the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
The acquisition process shall be completed within nine months from the date of this order, and the award shall be declared.
Compensation shall be disbursed within four weeks of the award.
The petitioner may claim enhancement of compensation after the award, as per law.
As regards the 5,317.4 sq.mtrs., the petitioner is at liberty to invoke Section 49 of the MRTP Act.
If such a notice is served, the respondents shall act expeditiously under Sections 49, 126, and 127.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Statutory Procedure Is Non-Negotiable
Practitioners must ensure that clients serve a formal purchase notice under Section 49 before seeking judicial intervention for acquisition.
Mere delay or inaction by authorities, however long, cannot be grounds for a writ directing acquisition unless the statutory trigger has been activated.
Courts will not substitute their discretion for legislative procedure, even where rights are infringed.
Lapsing Requires Active Invocation
The 10-year lapsing period under Section 127 does not operate automatically; a notice must be served by the landowner.
Failure to serve a Section 127 notice after 10 years means the reservation remains valid, regardless of administrative inaction.
Landowners must proactively monitor plan revisions and serve notices within the statutory window to preserve their rights.
Concession by Authority Does Not Bind the Court
An admission by the municipal body to acquire land does not create a legal obligation enforceable by writ.
Such statements may be used as evidence of intent but cannot replace statutory compliance.
Practitioners should advise clients to document all communications and follow up with formal notices, not rely on verbal or written assurances.
