The Central Administrative Tribunal's judgment in A.R. Naik v. Union of India reaffirms a foundational principle in Indian administrative law: disciplinary authorities are the sole arbiters of fact in departmental proceedings, and judicial review by tribunals or courts is strictly limited to procedural fairness and perversity, not factual reappreciation. This decision reinforces the separation between appellate review and supervisory jurisdiction, offering critical guidance to public servants, disciplinary authorities, and legal practitioners navigating service disputes.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The applicant, A.R. Naik, a retired Additional Defence Estate Officer, was charged with grave misconduct in connection with the recruitment of three junior clerks at Shahjahanpur Cantonment Board between 2009 and 2011. The charge sheet alleged multiple irregularities including: unauthorized advertisement of a third vacancy despite denied sanction; acceptance of applications on non-prescribed formats; failure to conduct a mandatory typing test; absence of a time limit on the written examination; allowing candidates to submit answers on plain paper; awarding marks exceeding the maximum possible; and assigning equal weightage (50%) to interview and written test - contrary to established norms.
Procedural History
The case progressed through the following stages:
- September 2013: Charge sheet issued under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965.
- April 2017: Inquiry Officer submitted a detailed report finding eight out of twelve charges proved, including procedural lapses and abdication of responsibility, but declined to establish "lack of integrity."
- March 2018: Disciplinary Authority imposed penalty of reduction to a lower stage in pay by two stages for one year, with no postponement of future increments due to the inconclusive nature of the integrity charge.
- January 2022: Appellate Authority confirmed the penalty after reviewing all submissions.
- February 2023: Applicant filed Original Application before CAT Bangalore seeking quashment of both orders.
Relief Sought
The applicant sought quashment of the punishment and appellate orders, arguing that he was not responsible for procedural lapses, relied on advice from subordinates, lacked experience, and that the punishment was disproportionate. He contended that the findings were based on surmises and violated principles of natural justice.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the Administrative Tribunal, in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, can reappreciate evidence and substitute its own factual findings in a departmental inquiry, or whether it is bound by the settled doctrine that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts so long as its conclusions are supported by some evidence and free from perversity or procedural illegality.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The applicant relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India to argue that the disciplinary authority failed to apply its mind, acted arbitrarily, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings. He contended that the Inquiry Officer’s conclusions were speculative, particularly regarding manipulation and favouritism, and that his lack of experience and reliance on senior advice should mitigate culpability. He further argued that the penalty was disproportionate given the delay of nearly nine years and his superannuation.
For the Respondent
The Union contended that the inquiry was conducted in strict compliance with the rules of natural justice, with full opportunity for hearing, cross-examination, and submission of written briefs. It emphasized that the Disciplinary Authority had meticulously reviewed the Inquiry Report, considered all defenses, and found the charges proved on the basis of documented evidence. The Respondent cited Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra and Union of India v. Parma Nanda to assert that the Tribunal cannot act as an appellate body and must defer to the factual findings of the disciplinary authority unless they are perverse or based on no evidence.
The Court's Analysis
The Tribunal undertook a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on judicial review in departmental proceedings. It emphasized that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 is not to reweigh evidence or substitute its own view, but to ensure the process was fair, lawful, and free from arbitrariness.
"The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry... it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
The Tribunal noted that the Inquiry Officer had meticulously analyzed each charge, distinguishing between proved and unproved allegations, and had granted the applicant the benefit of doubt on the charge of "lack of integrity." The Disciplinary Authority, in turn, independently applied its mind, rejecting the applicant’s defenses not on surmise but on documented lapses: acceptance of applications on plain paper, failure to conduct a typing test despite advertisement requirements, and assigning equal weightage to interview without rational basis.
The Tribunal held that the applicant’s claim of acting on subordinate advice was no defense. As the appointing authority, he bore ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance with rules. The fact that he was a new appointee did not absolve him of duty. The Tribunal further observed that the penalty - reduction by two stages for one year, with no impact on future increments - was lenient and proportionate, especially considering the delay and the applicant’s superannuation.
The Court reiterated the principles from State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, and Deputy General Manager v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava: judicial review does not extend to correcting errors of fact, however grave, unless the finding is based on no evidence or is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached it. The Tribunal found no such perversity here.
The Verdict
The applicant’s petition was dismissed. The Tribunal held that the Disciplinary Authority’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence, the inquiry complied with natural justice, and the penalty was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. The core legal holding affirmed that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts in departmental proceedings, and judicial review cannot substitute factual appreciation for procedural scrutiny.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Disciplinary Findings Are Presumed Valid Unless Perverse
- Practitioners must focus arguments on procedural flaws - lack of notice, bias, denial of cross-examination - not on rearguing evidence.
- If the inquiry was fair and some evidence supports the finding, the Tribunal will not interfere, even if the conclusion appears harsh or debatable.
- The burden shifts to the petitioner to demonstrate perversity or absence of evidence, not merely to present an alternative interpretation.
Reliance on Subordinates Is Not a Defense for Appointing Authorities
- Public servants cannot evade responsibility by claiming they "followed advice" from junior staff.
- The appointing authority must independently verify compliance with rules and procedures; delegation without oversight constitutes dereliction of duty.
- Legal advice must be sought from authoritative sources, not informal counsel, especially in recruitment and disciplinary matters.
Delay and Superannuation Do Not Automatically Mitigate Penalty
- While delay in disciplinary proceedings is a relevant factor, it does not invalidate findings or mandate leniency if the misconduct is substantiated.
- Courts and Tribunals may consider delay in determining quantum of punishment, but will not set aside findings solely on grounds of time elapsed or retirement.
- The Tribunal’s observation that the penalty was "lenient" underscores that proportionality is assessed on the nature of misconduct, not the passage of time alone.
