Case Law Analysis

Civil Contempt | Willful Disobedience Requires Mens Rea : Punjab & Haryana High Court

The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that **civil contempt** under **Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971** requires proof of **willful and intentional disobedience**, not mere delay. The judgment clarifies that *mens rea* is essential for contempt, and unconditional apologies may mitigate charges.

Cassie News NetworkCassie News Network
Feb 2, 2026, 7:38 PM
6 min read
Be the first to share in your circle
Civil Contempt | Willful Disobedience Requires Mens Rea : Punjab & Haryana High Court

The Punjab & Haryana High Court has delivered a significant judgment clarifying the threshold for establishing civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court held that mere delay in complying with judicial directions does not constitute contempt unless accompanied by willful and intentional disobedience, emphasizing the necessity of mens rea in contempt proceedings.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner, Jhulka College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order dated 05.06.2025 by which its affiliation for the D.Pharm course was denied. The College had already received approval from the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) on 19.08.2025, but the Punjab State Board of Technical Education and Industrial Training (Board) refused to grant affiliation, citing regulatory concerns.

Procedural History

The case progressed through the following stages:

  • 2025: Writ petition (CWP-29440-2025) filed seeking quashing of the Board’s order and a direction for affiliation.
  • 17.10.2025: Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the writ petition with directions to the Board to comply with the PCI’s approval order forthwith and permit admissions.
  • Post-17.10.2025: Petitioner alleged non-compliance by the Board, leading to the filing of the contempt petition (COCP-5325-2025).

Allegations of Contempt

The petitioner contended that the Board willfully disobeyed the Court’s order by:

  • Failing to act on the PCI’s approval order until 28.10.2025, just two days before the admission deadline (30.10.2025).
  • Ignoring repeated representations from the petitioner (emails dated 18.10.2025, 20.10.2025, and 21.10.2025).
  • Verbally refusing to comply, citing administrative constraints.

Respondents’ Defense

The Board argued that:

  • There was no willful disobedience, as the delay was due to administrative exigencies (limited working days post-Diwali).
  • Compliance was eventually achieved on 28.10.2025, and the petitioner admitted two students through the online portal.
  • An unconditional apology was tendered for the delay.

The central question before the Court was whether the delayed compliance with the judicial order dated 17.10.2025 constituted civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which defines contempt as willful disobedience of a court’s direction. Specifically, the Court had to determine:

  1. Whether the delay was willful and intentional, or merely a result of administrative constraints.
  2. Whether mens rea is a necessary ingredient for establishing civil contempt.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

The petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Pawan Kumar Mutneja, argued that:

  • The Board’s inaction for 11 days (17.10.2025 to 28.10.2025) despite the forthwith direction demonstrated willful disobedience.
  • The Board’s initial affidavit, which claimed ignorance of the timeframe, was unacceptable for senior officers.
  • The delay prejudiced the petitioner’s right to admit students, as the admission deadline was 30.10.2025.

For the Respondents

Dr. Puneet Kaur Sekhon, counsel for the respondents, contended that:

  • The delay was not willful but due to administrative constraints, including limited working days and the need for internal approvals.
  • Compliance was achieved before the admission deadline, and the petitioner suffered no prejudice.
  • The Board tendered an unconditional apology, which should be accepted as a mitigating factor.

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed examination of the legal principles governing civil contempt, relying on precedents to delineate the scope of willful disobedience under Section 2(b) of the 1971 Act.

  1. Definition of Civil Contempt: The Court reiterated that civil contempt under Section 2(b) requires willful disobedience of a court’s order, decree, or direction. Mere delay or technical non-compliance is insufficient unless accompanied by mens rea.

    "Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines 'Civil Contempt' as willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court. The framers of the Act intended to punish only those acts where disobedience is willful and intentional."

  2. Mens Rea Requirement: The Court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is not punitive but coercive, aimed at ensuring compliance with judicial orders. Citing Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, the Court held that:

    "Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the directions of a Court, the Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was willful and intentional."

  3. Distinction Between Delay and Willful Disobedience: The Court distinguished between mere delay and contumacious conduct. While the Board’s delay was unacceptable, it did not rise to the level of willful disobedience because:

    • The Board eventually complied before the admission deadline.
    • The delay was attributed to administrative exigencies, not a deliberate intent to flout the Court’s order.
    • The Board’s apology was unconditional and unqualified, indicating remorse.
  4. Judicial Precedents: The Court relied on several judgments to underscore the high threshold for contempt:

    • Brahm Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P.: Contempt jurisdiction exists to prevent interference with the course of justice, not to settle personal grievances.
    • Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union: Contempt proceedings serve a dual purpose - vindicating public interest and coercing compliance.
    • A.K. Jayaprakash v. S.S. Mallikarjuna Rao: Contempt jurisdiction is not intended to uphold personal grievances but the majesty of law.
    • Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang: In civil contempt, the breach must be deliberate and intentional.

Application to the Facts

The Court analyzed the Board’s conduct in light of the above principles:

  • Delay in Compliance: The Board took 11 days to comply with the forthwith direction, which was unjustifiable given the urgency of admissions.
  • Administrative Constraints: The Court rejected the Board’s claim of limited working days, noting that compliance could have been achieved within one working day.
  • Lack of Mens Rea: The Court held that while the delay was negligent, it did not evince willful or contumacious intent. The Board’s eventual compliance and apology were mitigating factors.

The Verdict

The Court dismissed the contempt petition, holding that:

  1. The Board’s delay in complying with the order dated 17.10.2025 was not willful or intentional.
  2. Mens rea, a necessary ingredient for civil contempt, was absent in this case.
  3. The unconditional apology tendered by the respondents was accepted as a mitigating factor.
  4. The rule was discharged, and the contempt petition was dismissed.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Contempt Requires Proof of Willful Disobedience

The judgment reaffirms that civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be established merely on the basis of delay or technical non-compliance. Practitioners must:

  • Prove mens rea: Establish that the disobedience was willful, intentional, and contumacious.
  • Distinguish negligence from contempt: Mere administrative delays or procedural lapses may not suffice unless accompanied by deliberate defiance.
  • Rely on precedents: Cite Niaz Mohammad, Brahm Prakash Sharma, and Rama Narang to argue that contempt requires a higher threshold of proof.

Apologies Can Mitigate Contempt Charges

  • Unconditional apologies tendered by contemners may negate the element of willfulness, especially where compliance is eventually achieved.
  • Courts are likely to accept apologies where the delay is not prejudicial to the aggrieved party.

Forthwith Directions Demand Immediate Compliance

  • Forthwith directions in judicial orders do not permit delays, even for administrative reasons.
  • Public authorities must prioritize compliance with court orders, especially where time-sensitive rights (e.g., admissions, licenses) are involved.
  • Failure to act promptly may invite adverse inferences, even if contempt is not ultimately established.

Judicial Discretion in Contempt Proceedings

  • Contempt jurisdiction is discretionary and not automatic. Courts will consider:
    • The nature of the delay (e.g., administrative vs. deliberate).
    • The impact on the aggrieved party (e.g., prejudice suffered).
    • The conduct of the contemner (e.g., apology, eventual compliance).
  • Practitioners should frame contempt petitions to highlight willful defiance, not mere procedural lapses.

Case Details

*Jhulka College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences v. Moneesh Kumar and another*

2026:PHHC:014058
PDF
Court
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
Date
31 January 2026
Case Number
COCP-5325-2025
Bench
Mr. Justice Vikram Aggarwal
Counsel
Pet: Mr. Pawan Kumar Mutneja, Senior Advocate, Ms. Suverna Mutneja, Advocate, Mr. Viranjeet Singh Mahal, Advocate
Res: Dr. Puneet Kaur Sekhon, Senior Advocate, Ms. Dilpreet Kaur, Advocate

Frequently Asked Questions

**Civil contempt** is defined under **Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971** as **willful disobedience** of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court. The disobedience must be **intentional and contumacious**, not merely negligent or delayed. The Punjab & Haryana High Court emphasized that *mens rea* (guilty intent) is a necessary ingredient for establishing contempt.
Mere **delay in compliance** does not automatically constitute contempt unless it is accompanied by **willful and intentional disobedience**. The Court held that while delays may be **unacceptable**, they do not rise to the level of contempt unless the contemner **deliberately defies** the court’s order. Administrative constraints or procedural lapses may explain delays but do not justify contempt charges without proof of *mens rea*.
An **unconditional apology** tendered by a contemner can **mitigate contempt charges** by negating the element of **willfulness**. The Court may accept such apologies, especially where compliance is eventually achieved and no **prejudice** is caused to the aggrieved party. However, apologies do not absolve contemners of liability if the disobedience is **deliberate and contumacious**.
The **burden of proof** in civil contempt cases lies on the **petitioner** to establish that: 1. The contemner **disobeyed a judicial order**. 2. The disobedience was **willful and intentional** (*mens rea*). 3. The disobedience **prejudiced the petitioner’s rights** or **interfered with the administration of justice**. The Court clarified that **mere delay or technical non-compliance** is insufficient unless accompanied by **deliberate defiance**.
**Forthwith** directions in judicial orders demand **immediate compliance** without delay. Public authorities must: - **Prioritize compliance** over administrative constraints. - **Act within the shortest possible timeframe**, especially where time-sensitive rights (e.g., admissions, licenses) are involved. - **Document efforts** to comply to avoid adverse inferences of willful disobedience. Failure to act promptly may invite **judicial censure**, even if contempt is not ultimately established.
0

Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.