The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed that the refusal to admit relevant documentary evidence in a cheque dishonour case, merely due to delay, violates the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. The judgment clarifies that courts must prioritize substantive justice over procedural technicalities when evidence is essential to determine the truth.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Shree Krishna Traders, filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging that the respondent issued two cheques totaling ₹5 lakh as payment for a commercial transaction involving scrap metal supply. The cheques were dishonoured in January 2007. The complaint was filed in 2007 and remained pending for over 18 years, with the complainant’s examination-in-chief concluding only in October 2025.
Procedural History
- 2007: Complaint filed under Section 138 NI Act and multiple IPC sections
- 2015: Case registered as SCNIA 6797 of 2015
- 11.10.2025: Examination-in-chief of complainant completed
- 15.10.2025: Cross-examination concluded
- 13.10.2025: Petitioner applied to add six documents relating to the underlying business transaction
- 21.11.2025: Trial Court rejected the application, citing delay and intent to fill lacunae
- 2025: Petitioner filed petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (successor to Section 482 CrPC)
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought to have the impugned order set aside and the proposed documents admitted into evidence, arguing they were crucial to establish the commercial context of the cheques and were only obtained on 29.10.2025 from a former employee of the respondent.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the trial court could reject an application for additional documentary evidence under Section 311 CrPC solely on the ground of delay, when the documents are relevant, previously inaccessible, and essential for a just adjudication of a case under Section 138 NI Act.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar to argue that Section 311 CrPC empowers courts to admit evidence necessary for a just decision, even if delayed. The documents were not in the complainant’s possession until October 2025 and directly corroborated the transactional context of the cheques. The complainant had already pleaded the existence of business records in the complaint. Delay alone cannot override the right to a fair trial.
For the Respondent
The respondent contended that the documents were filed after the complainant’s evidence was closed, indicating an attempt to fill evidentiary gaps. The long pendency of the case since 2007, coupled with the late submission, suggested tactical delay. The documents were allegedly available earlier and their admission would prejudice the accused.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed review of the principles laid down in Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, emphasizing that Section 311 CrPC is not a tool to cure prosecutorial negligence but a mechanism to ensure truth and justice. The Court held that the trial court’s reasoning - that the documents were filed to fill lacunae - was conclusory and unsupported by evidence.
"The Court must be conscious of the position that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners and the Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. In that parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in favour of the accused getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused."
The Court noted that the complainant had explicitly referenced transaction records in the complaint itself, negating any claim of surprise. The documents were not altering the nature of the case but reinforcing its factual foundation. The fact that the documents were received from a former employee on 29.10.2025 and filed immediately thereafter demonstrated due diligence, not dilatory intent.
The Court further observed that the trial was still ongoing, with further evidence pending. Denying relevant evidence at this stage would amount to a failure of justice. The mere passage of time, without proof of intentional suppression or prejudice to the accused, cannot justify exclusion.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded. The Court held that Section 311 CrPC mandates the admission of relevant evidence essential for a just decision, even if submitted late, provided there is no evidence of mala fide or prejudice. The impugned order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to permit the documents to be recorded.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Delay Alone Cannot Justify Rejection of Evidence
- Practitioners must argue that Section 311 CrPC permits flexibility when evidence becomes available after initial proceedings
- Courts cannot apply rigid timelines to exclude documents if their relevance is established and access was genuinely delayed
- The burden shifts to the opposing party to prove actual prejudice, not mere inconvenience
Documentary Evidence Trumps Oral Testimony in Commercial Disputes
- In Section 138 NI Act cases, cheques are often issued as part of complex commercial arrangements
- Courts must admit supporting documents (invoices, agreements, correspondence) to contextualize the transaction
- Oral testimony alone is insufficient when documentary trail exists and is material to the defence or prosecution
Fair Trial Overrides Procedural Formalities
- The constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 overrides technical objections to late filing
- Judges must exercise discretion under Section 311 CrPC with magnanimity, not mechanical rigidity
- Applications for additional evidence should be evaluated on substance, not procedural posture
