The Rajasthan High Court has clarified that the mere discharge of public functions by a private educational institution does not render its employment decisions amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The judgment reinforces the distinction between public law and private contractual relationships, setting a critical boundary for litigants seeking constitutional remedies in service matters.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Atal Khandelwal, was employed by the Institute of Health Management Research, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. His services were terminated on 19 July 2008. He filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court seeking reinstatement and consequential benefits, arguing that the institution performed public functions in health management and policy support, thereby qualifying as an "other authority" under Article 12.
Procedural History
- 19 July 2008: Petitioner’s services terminated by the respondent society.
- 2008: Writ petition filed under Article 226 seeking reinstatement.
- 17 February 2026: Judgment delivered by Justice Praveer Bhatnagar after arguments concluded on 13 February 2026.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought reinstatement with full back wages, benefits, and a declaration that his termination was illegal and violative of his rights.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a private society registered under the Societies Registration Act, which performs public functions in health management, can be classified as a "State" under Article 12 such that its employment decisions are subject to judicial review under Article 226.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel relied on Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University, and Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India to argue that institutions discharging public functions - such as health policy research - fall within the expansive definition of "State" under Article 12. He contended that Article 226 permits writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also for "any other purpose," thereby allowing judicial review of arbitrary termination.
For the Respondent
The respondents countered that the Institute is a private society, not created by statute, and lacks effective governmental control. They relied on Thalappalam Service Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala to assert that registration under the Societies Registration Act does not confer state character. They further cited Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma and St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava to argue that employment disputes arising from private contracts, even in institutions performing public functions, lack a public law element and are not subject to writ jurisdiction.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a rigorous analysis of the evolving jurisprudence on Article 12 and the scope of Article 226. It emphasized that while institutions may perform public functions, the nature of the relationship between the institution and the employee determines the applicability of writ jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between public duties performed in the societal sphere and private contractual obligations.
"The relationship between the respondents herein and the appellant society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract. If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element."
The Court held that the petitioner’s grievance arose solely from a breach of employment terms under a private contract. Even though the Institute engaged in health policy work - a public function - the termination decision was internal, administrative, and devoid of any statutory mandate or public law dimension. The Court rejected the argument that public function alone triggers writ jurisdiction, aligning with the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Army Welfare Education Society and St. Mary’s Education Society. The public law element must be intrinsic to the impugned action, not merely incidental to the institution’s broader activities.
The Verdict
The petitioner’s writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available for private employment disputes unless a public law element is demonstrably present. The termination, being contractual and non-statutory, fell outside the ambit of constitutional remedies.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Writ Petitions Cannot Substitute Labour Courts
- Practitioners must advise clients to pursue remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act or civil contract law, not writ petitions, for service terminations by private institutions.
- Filing writ petitions in such cases invites dismissal on maintainability grounds, wasting judicial time and client resources.
Public Function ≠ Public Law Element
- Institutions like private hospitals, schools, or research bodies performing public functions cannot be automatically subjected to writ jurisdiction.
- The focus must shift to whether the impugned decision - e.g., termination, promotion, pay scale - derives from statutory authority, public duty, or state control.
Contractual Employment Demands Contractual Remedies
- Employees of private societies must rely on employment contracts, service rules, or arbitration clauses.
- Courts will not entertain writ petitions merely because the employer is involved in education or health, unless the action violates a statutory right or public policy.
