Case Law Analysis

Transfer of Criminal Trial Requires Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Not Mere Dissatisfaction : Punjab and Haryana High Court

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that transfer of a criminal trial requires more than subjective dissatisfaction-it demands cogent evidence of actual or perceived bias that imperils fair trial.

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Feb 2, 2026, 1:41 AM
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Transfer of Criminal Trial Requires Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Not Mere Dissatisfaction : Punjab and Haryana High Court

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has reaffirmed that the power to transfer a criminal trial is not a remedy for litigants dissatisfied with adverse rulings or procedural delays. It must be invoked only when there is a reasonable, substantiated apprehension that the trial cannot be fair due to actual or perceived bias.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The dispute arose from a criminal complaint filed under Section 500 IPC by Dr. Tarsem Kumar Ruby, a prominent pharmaceutical businessman and former District Governor of Rotary International. The petitioner, Dinesh Chand Bansal, a rival candidate for the same Rotary position, was accused of circulating false and defamatory communications among Rotary members, alleging that Dr. Ruby had been taken into custody to damage his reputation. The complainant alleged these acts were malicious, aimed at undermining his social standing and professional credibility.

Procedural History

The case progressed through the following stages:

  • 2019: Criminal complaint filed before Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula
  • 2019: Petitioner granted bail by the trial court
  • 2024: Petitioner’s writ petition challenging summoning order dismissed by this Court
  • 2025: Petitioner filed application under Section 448 of BNSS, 2023 seeking transfer of trial, citing age, health, and alleged bias
  • 2025: Sessions Judge dismissed transfer application
  • 2025: Trial court issued non-bailable warrants against petitioner, later quashed by this Court
  • 2026: Petitioner approached High Court under Section 528 read with Section 447 of BNSS challenging dismissal of transfer application

Relief Sought

The petitioner sought transfer of the criminal case from the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, to another competent court within the same Sessions Division, citing his advanced age (89 years), serious health conditions, prolonged litigation since 2019, and alleged prejudice by the presiding officer.

The central question was whether Section 448 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits transfer of a criminal trial based on a litigant’s subjective apprehension of bias, or whether such relief requires demonstrable, cogent evidence that the trial’s fairness is genuinely imperiled.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

Learned senior counsel argued that the petitioner, an octogenarian with multiple chronic ailments, faces severe hardship traveling 250 km to Panchkula. He contended that the trial court’s conduct - requiring repeated appearances, delaying proceedings, and allegedly favoring the complainant - demonstrated bias. Reliance was placed on Mrs. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Miss Rani Jethmalani and Abdul Nazar Madani v. State of Tamil Nadu to assert that the perception of bias, if reasonable, warrants transfer under Article 21. Counsel emphasized that the six-year delay and alleged collusion between the complainant and the magistrate rendered a fair trial impossible.

For the Respondent

The State and complainant contended that the transfer application was a tactic to delay proceedings. They argued that mere dissatisfaction with adverse orders or inconvenience does not constitute bias. Counsel cited Umesh Kumar Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand and Usmangani Adambhai Vahora v. State of Gujarat to stress that apprehension must be reasonable and substantiated by material evidence, not conjecture. The complainant’s counsel highlighted that the petitioner had previously filed multiple petitions and that allegations against the magistrate were unsubstantiated and defamatory.

The Court's Analysis

The Court examined the statutory framework under Section 448 of BNSS, 2023, which mirrors the erstwhile Section 408 of Cr.P.C., and found that the power to transfer is discretionary and must be exercised only when it is “expedient for the ends of justice.” The Court emphasized that this is not an administrative tool but a judicial safeguard against actual prejudice.

"The apprehension expressed by a party to the lis must be reasonable and not imaginary, based on conjectures and surmises."

The Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s scheduling practices or unfavourable orders indicated bias. It held that judicial error or unfavourable rulings, even if later overturned, do not equate to partiality. The Court noted that the petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence - such as recorded conversations, written communications, or witness affidavits - to substantiate allegations of collusion between the magistrate and the complainant.

The Court also condemned the petitioner’s unsubstantiated attacks on the trial judge and opposing counsel, calling them an assault on the integrity of the judiciary. Citing Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, it reaffirmed that advocates are officers of the court and that vilifying them to gain procedural advantage undermines the adversarial system.

The Court distinguished this case from precedents where transfer was granted due to communal tension, witness intimidation, or systemic corruption. Here, the only grounds were inconvenience and dissatisfaction - factors insufficient to invoke the extraordinary remedy of transfer.

The Verdict

The petition was dismissed. The Court held that no reasonable apprehension of bias had been established under Section 448 of BNSS, 2023, and that the petitioner’s allegations were speculative and unsubstantiated. The trial must proceed in the original court, but the Court directed the trial judge to ensure expeditious disposal.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Apprehension of Bias Must Be Substantiated, Not Speculative

  • Practitioners must now produce concrete evidence - affidavits, recordings, or contemporaneous records - to support claims of judicial bias
  • Mere complaints about delays, inconvenient timings, or adverse rulings are insufficient to trigger transfer
  • Allegations of collusion with opposing counsel require corroborative material; ipse dixit assertions will be dismissed

Delay Alone Does Not Justify Transfer

  • Prolonged pendency, even exceeding six years, cannot be the sole ground for transfer unless attributable to deliberate judicial inaction or procedural manipulation
  • Courts will scrutinize whether delay stems from the litigant’s own conduct, such as repeated applications or non-appearance
  • Litigants must demonstrate that the delay is systemic and prejudicial, not merely inconvenient

Abuse of Transfer Jurisdiction Will Invite Costs

  • The Court imposed ₹50,000 in costs on the petitioner for frivolous allegations against the judiciary
  • Future litigants making unsubstantiated claims of bias risk exemplary costs, recovery through revenue channels, and potential contempt proceedings
  • Courts will treat such tactics as forum shopping and an abuse of process under Section 448(3) read with Section 447(7) of BNSS

Case Details

Dinesh Chand Bansal v. State of Haryana and Another

2026:PHHC:013845
PDF
Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Date
30 January 2026
Case Number
CRM-M-72601-2025
Bench
Justice Sumeet Goel
Counsel
Pet: Dr. Anmol Rattan Sidhu, Mr. Pratham Sethi
Res: Ms. Mahima Yashpal Singla, Mr. Rohit Kaushik

Frequently Asked Questions

A reasonable apprehension of bias requires more than mere dissatisfaction with an adverse order or inconvenience. It must be grounded in credible, material evidence-such as documented communications, witness testimony, or patterns of conduct-that demonstrates a real risk the trial cannot be impartial. Mere allegations or conjectures are insufficient.
No. While delay may be a relevant factor, it cannot by itself justify transfer unless it is shown to result from deliberate judicial inaction, procedural manipulation, or systemic failure. The burden lies on the applicant to prove that the delay is attributable to the court and not to the litigant’s own conduct.
No. Unsubstantiated allegations against judicial officers or opposing counsel are considered an assault on the integrity of the judiciary. Such tactics are treated as abuse of process and may attract exemplary costs or contempt proceedings, as affirmed by the Court in this judgment.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.