The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed a foundational principle of criminal procedure: an accused cannot invoke Section 91 of the CrPC to summon documents during the prosecution’s evidence stage. This ruling reinforces the procedural boundaries that safeguard the integrity of trial sequencing and ensures that the right to a fair defence is preserved without disrupting the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The revision petitioner, Rohit, faces trial under multiple sections of the Indian Penal Code including Section 420, Section 467, Section 468, Section 471, and Section 406, all read with Section 120-B, arising from allegations of forgery and criminal conspiracy. At the stage of prosecution evidence, he filed two applications before the Additional Sessions Judge, Depalpur: one under Section 91 of the CrPC, 1973 seeking production of documents not included in the charge-sheet, and another under Section 231(2) of the CrPC seeking deferment of cross-examination until all prosecution witnesses were examined.
Procedural History
- Crime No. 153/2019: Registered at Police Station Betma, Indore
- 12.02.2022: Charges framed against Rohit and co-accused
- 26.09.2023: Petitioner filed applications under Section 91 CrPC and Section 231(2) CrPC
- 08.09.2025: Trial Court dismissed both applications
- 03.02.2026: Criminal Revision filed before the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought: (1) issuance of process under Section 91 CrPC to compel production of documents allegedly in the possession of the complainant, and (2) permission to defer cross-examination of prosecution witnesses until after all examination-in-chief was completed.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether an accused may invoke Section 91 of the CrPC to summon documents during the prosecution’s evidence stage, and whether the trial court’s refusal to defer cross-examination under Section 231(2) CrPC constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution and argued that documents not included in the charge-sheet but relevant to his defence must be accessible at the earliest opportunity. He contended that delaying access until the defence stage would prejudice his ability to prepare effectively and violate the principle of audi alteram partem. He cited Om Prakash Sharma v. CBI and State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi to support his position.
For the Respondent/State
The State countered that Section 91 CrPC is not a tool for pre-trial discovery and must be exercised only after the prosecution has closed its evidence. It emphasized that the trial court’s discretion under Section 231(2) is broad and not subject to interference unless manifestly arbitrary. The State relied on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Suninder Sandha v. NCT of Delhi and the binding precedent in Sarla Gupta v. State of Haryana to argue that the trial court acted correctly.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed review of the evolving jurisprudence on Section 91 CrPC, particularly the landmark 2025 decision in Sarla Gupta v. State of Haryana. It held that while the accused has a constitutional right to a fair trial, this does not translate into an unfettered right to demand documents before the defence stage. The Court emphasized that Section 91 CrPC is not meant for fishing expeditions or premature disclosure.
"The accused is entitled to exercise his right at the stage of entering upon defence by compelling the prosecution or a third party to produce a document or a thing in their possession or custody."
The Court clarified that the phrase "ordinarily not available" in Sarla Gupta does not mean an absolute bar, but a procedural norm designed to prevent disruption of the prosecution’s case. The trial court’s rejection of the application at the prosecution stage was therefore legally sound.
Regarding Section 231(2), the Court noted that the power to defer cross-examination is discretionary and not a right of the accused. The trial judge’s decision to deny deferment was based on case-specific considerations and did not violate principles of natural justice. No grounds of arbitrariness or mala fide were established.
The Verdict
The revision was dismissed. The Court held that Section 91 CrPC applications cannot be entertained before the commencement of the defence stage, and the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Section 231(2) CrPC was lawful. The petitioner retains the right to renew his application for document production at the appropriate stage.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Document Production Is Deferred Until Defence
- Practitioners must now delay Section 91 CrPC applications until after the prosecution closes its evidence
- Applications filed prematurely will be dismissed without prejudice, preserving the right to refile at the defence stage
- Advocates should prepare detailed affidavits specifying the exact documents, their relevance, and custodian at the time of re-filing
Cross-Examination Deferment Is Discretionary, Not Entitlement
- Courts retain wide latitude under Section 231(2) to manage witness examination
- Defence counsel must justify deferment with concrete reasons - e.g., witness interdependence or need for contextual impeachment
- Blanket requests for deferment without factual basis will not be entertained
Fair Trial Does Not Mean Pre-Trial Discovery
- The right to a fair trial under Article 21 does not equate to pre-trial access to prosecution’s non-relied-upon documents
- The Sarla Gupta framework now governs all applications under Section 91 CrPC across India
- Accused must rely on Section 233(3) CrPC (now Section 256(3) BNSS) to compel production at the defence stage
