The Andhra Pradesh High Court has clarified that courts cannot permit expert comparison of disputed signatures under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act unless a specific plea of forgery is pleaded in the written statement, and that such applications filed at the final arguments stage, especially after partial payment of the claim, raise serious doubts about bona fides.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, G. Guru Prasad, filed a civil suit for recovery of Rs. 5,00,000 based on a promissory note dated 02.10.2016 (Ex.A1). The respondent, B. Krishna Murthy, denied execution of the document in his written statement, alleging it was "created and fabricated" for the purpose of litigation. He did not use the term "forgery" in his pleadings.
Procedural History
- 2019: Suit filed for recovery of Rs. 5,00,000 on the basis of Ex.A1
- 2024: Respondent filed I.A. No. 223 of 2024 under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 151 CPC, seeking comparison of his signature with admitted signatures on other documents
- 06.03.2025: Trial Court allowed the application for expert comparison
- 2025: Civil Revision Petition filed challenging the order
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought setting aside of the Trial Court’s order permitting expert comparison, arguing that no specific plea of forgery was pleaded, the application was belated, and the respondent’s conduct - including payment of Rs. 1,00,000 during pendency - demonstrated mala fide intent to delay proceedings.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act permits a court to order expert comparison of signatures when the defendant denies execution but does not specifically plead forgery, and whether such an application filed after closure of evidence and during arguments can be granted without considering conduct and bona fides.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Counsel argued that the respondent’s plea of "fabrication" does not equate to a plea of "forgery" under Section 47 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, which require a specific allegation of forgery to trigger expert comparison. Reliance was placed on Mallavarapu Sesha Reddy v. Govela Srinivasa Rao, where the court held that absence of a specific plea of forgery bars expert reference. It was further contended that the application was filed only after evidence closed and after partial payment of the claim, indicating mala fide intent to prolong litigation.
For the Respondent
Counsel contended that "fabrication" and "forgery" are synonymous under Black’s Law Dictionary, and that denial of execution inherently implies challenge to genuineness. Reliance was placed on Surapaneni Umamaheswara Rao v. Bank of India and Sheila Sebastian v. R.Jawaharaj, arguing that courts have discretion to order comparison even without the word "forgery" if genuineness is disputed. It was submitted that the Trial Court’s discretion should not be interfered with.
The Court's Analysis
The Court first examined the written statement and found no use of the word "forgery" - only "created and fabricated." It held that while Devasahayam (Dead) by LRs v. P. Savithramma mandates reading pleadings as a whole, evidence cannot go beyond pleadings, as affirmed in Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao. The Court distinguished Surapaneni Umamaheswara Rao, noting that in that case, the application was filed early, before trial commenced, whereas here, it was filed after both parties closed evidence and were ready for arguments.
"The application was filed only after the evidence on both sides was closed and the matter was posted for arguments... no separate application seeking to reopen the evidence and to recall the witness appears to have been filed."
The Court emphasized that Section 73 grants discretion, but discretion must be exercised judicially. The respondent’s payment of Rs. 1,00,000 during pendency, recorded in court, undermined his claim of non-execution. The Court observed:
"The discretion exercised... cannot be viewed as sound, but erroneous and tantamount to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, in the correct perspective."
The Court rejected the argument that "fabrication" equals "forgery" under the Evidence Act, noting that forgery under Section 463 IPC requires intent to cause damage or injury, which is a distinct legal concept from mere fabrication. The timing, conduct, and absence of specific pleading collectively rendered the application an abuse of process.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded. The High Court set aside the Trial Court’s order permitting expert comparison of signatures, holding that expert comparison under Section 73 IEA cannot be ordered without a specific plea of forgery and that such applications filed belatedly, especially after partial payment and without justification, are an abuse of process.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Specific Plea of Forgery Is Mandatory
- Practitioners must ensure written statements explicitly use the term "forgery" if expert comparison is sought under Section 73 IEA
- Vague allegations like "fabricated," "not signed," or "fake" are insufficient to trigger statutory provisions requiring expert opinion
- Courts will not infer forgery from general denial of execution
Timing and Conduct Are Decisive
- Applications for expert comparison filed after closure of evidence, especially during arguments, face heightened scrutiny
- Partial payment of claim during litigation, if recorded, will be weighed against claims of non-execution
- Courts may dismiss such applications as mala fide if they appear designed to delay proceedings
Discretion Is Not Unfettered
- While Section 73 grants discretion, it is not absolute
- Courts must consider the entire conduct of the party, including delay, inconsistency, and financial conduct
- Belated applications will be viewed with suspicion unless accompanied by compelling, timely justification
