The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed that courts retain broad discretion under Section 311 of the CrPC to summon witnesses even at advanced stages of trial, provided the evidence is essential for a just outcome. This ruling clarifies that procedural finality does not override the foundational duty to ascertain truth.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Santosh Kushwaha, challenged an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, allowing the complainant, Satish Yadav, to examine a witness from UCO Bank after the prosecution’s evidence had been formally closed.
Procedural History
- 2015: Complaint case initiated under Section 420 IPC for alleged cheating
- 07.03.2024: Trial court closed the prosecution’s evidence and fixed the matter for arguments
- 29.05.2024: Complainant filed application under Section 311 CrPC seeking to examine a bank official to substantiate financial transactions
- 29.05.2024: Trial court allowed the application, citing necessity for just adjudication
- 23.01.2026: Petition under Section 482 CrPC filed before the High Court seeking quashing of the order
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the trial court’s order, arguing that permitting evidence after closure of prosecution case amounted to an abuse of process and prejudiced the defence.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 311 CrPC permits the summoning of a witness after the prosecution’s evidence has been closed, and whether such an order constitutes an abuse of process warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel contended that allowing evidence after closure of prosecution case violates the principle of finality in trial proceedings. He relied on State of Haryana v. Bhagwan Das to argue that such belated summoning fills lacunae in the prosecution’s case and undermines the accused’s right to a fair trial. He further asserted that the trial court’s order was arbitrary and amounted to an abuse of process under Section 482 CrPC.
For the Respondent
The respondent’s counsel submitted that Section 311 CrPC is a remedial provision designed to ensure justice, not procedural technicality. She cited Rajesh Kumar v. State of Haryana to emphasize that the court’s power is not fettered by stage of proceedings. She argued that the bank witness’s testimony was crucial to establish the financial context of the alleged offence and that the petitioner retained full opportunity for cross-examination.
The Court's Analysis
The High Court examined the scope and purpose of Section 311 CrPC, noting that its language is deliberately expansive: "it may at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined." The court emphasized that the provision’s object is not to assist either party, but to enable the court to discover the truth.
"The object of this provision is to enable the court to arrive at the truth and to render a just decision."
The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the order was an attempt to "fill lacunae," distinguishing between remedial evidence and substantive supplementation. It held that the trial court had recorded specific reasons for finding the bank witness’s testimony essential, and that the petitioner had not demonstrated any actual prejudice. The court further noted that Section 482 CrPC is an extraordinary remedy, to be invoked only where there is patent illegality or clear abuse of process - neither of which existed here. The trial court’s discretion was neither perverse nor jurisdictionally flawed.
The Verdict
The petition was dismissed. The court held that Section 311 CrPC permits summoning of witnesses at any stage if essential for a just decision, and that such exercise of discretion does not constitute abuse of process unless shown to be arbitrary or prejudicial. The petitioner’s right to cross-examine was preserved, and no miscarriage of justice was established.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Evidence Is Not Barred by Stage of Trial
- Practitioners must now argue that Section 311 CrPC overrides rigid timelines if the evidence is material to truth-finding
- Opposition to late summoning must demonstrate actual prejudice, not mere delay
- Courts will not entertain objections based on procedural technicality alone
Discretion Must Be Reasoned, Not Arbitrary
- Trial courts must record specific reasons linking the witness’s testimony to the core issues
- Absence of reasoning invites scrutiny under Section 482 CrPC
- Appellate courts will defer to reasoned discretion unless it is manifestly unjust
Cross-Examination Is the Safeguard
- The right to cross-examine neutralizes any alleged prejudice from late evidence
- Defence counsel must actively assert this right, not rely on procedural objections
- Failure to cross-examine may waive objections to admissibility
