The Madhya Pradesh High Court has clarified that the absence of serious injury does not preclude the framing of charges under Section 307 IPC, reinforcing that the threshold for charge-framing is not proof of guilt but the existence of a prima facie case. This decision resolves conflicting interpretations in lower courts and reasserts the limited scope of judicial scrutiny at the pre-trial stage.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The dispute stems from a violent incident on 9 May 2019 at a marriage ceremony in village Sedra, Rajgarh, Madhya Pradesh. Rupesh Dangi, a government official, allegedly drove his Indigo car into his estranged wife Manisha Dangi and her three-month-old daughter, as well as Omprakash Dangi, a lawyer representing Manisha in divorce proceedings. Two FIRs were registered: Crime No. 122/2019 against Rupesh under Sections 279, 337, and later 307 IPC; and Crime No. 123/2019 against Omprakash and others under Sections 294, 323, 337, 506, and 307 IPC.
Procedural History
- 2019: FIRs registered at P.S. Chapikheda following the incident.
- 2020: Charge sheets filed in both cases; charges under Section 307 IPC added against both Rupesh and Manisha.
- 2021: Charges framed against Rupesh under Section 307 IPC in ST No. 28/2020.
- 2022: High Court quashed charges against Manisha in MCRC No. 3249/2022, citing lack of evidence.
- 2024: Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s quashing order, directing trial to proceed.
- 2024: Charges framed against Manisha under Section 307 IPC in ST No. 27/2020.
- 2026: Both Rupesh and Manisha filed criminal revisions challenging the framing of charges under Section 307 IPC.
Relief Sought
Rupesh Dangi sought quashing of charges under Section 307 IPC, arguing the injuries were minor, old, and the FIR was malicious. Manisha Dangi contended that the final report lacked material to support an attempt to murder charge, and that the complainant’s criminal record rendered the case baseless.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code requires proof of serious injury or death to justify framing of charges, and whether malicious intent or prior litigation history of the complainant can justify discharge at the pre-trial stage.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
Rupesh and Manisha argued that the injuries sustained were minor and documented as 72 hours old, making it impossible for the alleged act on 9 May 2019 to have caused them. They cited R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, Bherulal Tank v. State of M.P., and Dilwar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra to assert that Section 307 IPC cannot be invoked without grave injury. They further contended that Omprakash, the complainant, had a history of ten criminal cases, rendering the FIR a tool of harassment.
For the Respondent/State
The State argued that Section 307 IPC does not require actual injury; the critical element is the intention or knowledge that the act, if successful, would cause death. The prosecution relied on the nature of the act - driving a vehicle at high speed into a person and child - as inherently lethal, satisfying the mens rea requirement. The State emphasized that the complainant’s background is irrelevant at the charge-framing stage.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 307 IPC and the legal standards for framing charges under Section 227 CrPC (now Section 250 BNSS, 2023). It held that the presence of injury is not a sine qua non for invoking Section 307. The provision punishes acts done with the intention or knowledge that, if death resulted, the offender would be guilty of murder.
"If any act is done with an intention or knowledge that, if assailant by that act causes death, then the assailant would be guilty of murder, then such act would certainly be punishable under Section 307 of IPC."
The Court emphasized that at the charge-framing stage, the court must not conduct a mini-trial or weigh evidence. It must only determine whether the material on record discloses a prima facie case. The Court cited P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, and CBI v. Aryan Singh to reaffirm that the court’s role is not to assess credibility or motive, but to examine whether the facts, taken at face value, constitute an offence.
The Court rejected the argument that the complainant’s criminal record invalidated the FIR. It held that such allegations are relevant for defence at trial, not for discharge. Similarly, the age of injuries and conflicting medical reports were matters for trial, not for pre-trial dismissal.
The Court also noted the parties’ status as public servants and the need for expeditious trial, directing the trial court to follow the Supreme Court’s guidelines in CBI v. Mir Usman for day-to-day proceedings.
The Verdict
The petitioners lost. The Court held that Section 307 IPC can be invoked even in the absence of serious injury, provided the act demonstrates intention or knowledge of likely death. The framing of charges was upheld in both cases, and the revisions were dismissed.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Charge Framing Is Not a Mini-Trial
- Practitioners must resist attempts to challenge charges based on evidentiary contradictions or witness credibility at the pre-trial stage.
- Courts must not engage in weighing probabilities or assessing motive - these are trial functions.
- A single credible allegation of a lethal act, even without injury, suffices for framing under Section 307 IPC.
Malicious Complaints Are Not Grounds for Discharge
- A complainant’s criminal history or prior litigation does not render an FIR legally invalid at the charge-framing stage.
- Defence of malice or fabrication must be raised during trial, not through revision petitions under Section 482 CrPC.
- Courts should not allow accused to use procedural challenges to delay trial in cases involving serious allegations.
Day-to-Day Trials Are Mandatory in Sensitive Cases
- In cases involving public servants or allegations of violence, trial courts must adopt day-to-day proceedings as per CBI v. Mir Usman.
- Adjournments for advocate convenience are not "special reasons" under Section 309 CrPC.
- Courts may cancel bail or appoint amicus curiae if counsel obstructs trial progress.
