The Chhattisgarh High Court has delivered a critical clarification on the foundational requirement for conviction under Section 302 IPC: that the death must be proven to be homicidal. In a case where the deceased died by self-immolation amid allegations of dowry harassment, the Court overturned a life sentence, emphasizing that mere circumstantial suspicion or familial conflict cannot substitute for proof of intentional killing.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Durgesh Sinha, was married to Khileshwari Bai @ Shakun in April 2016. The prosecution alleged that he, along with his parents and brother, subjected her to continuous dowry-related torture. On 06/06/2016, she poured kerosene over her body and set herself on fire. The family reported the incident, and a postmortem was conducted.
Procedural History
- 06/06/2016: Death of Khileshwari Bai @ Shakun by self-immolation
- 2016: First Information Report (Ex. P/20) filed against appellant and three co-accused
- 2016: Postmortem report (Ex. P/14) concluded death was suicidal
- 2019: Trial Court acquitted three co-accused but convicted appellant under Section 302 IPC
- 2019: Sentence of life imprisonment and fine imposed
- 2019: Appeal filed before Chhattisgarh High Court under Section 374(2) CrPC
Relief Sought
The appellant sought acquittal on grounds that the prosecution failed to prove homicidal intent or his presence at the scene. He argued that the trial court misapplied Section 106 of the Evidence Act by shifting the burden of proof onto him despite the absence of evidence linking him to the act.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 302 IPC can be invoked when the postmortem and eyewitness evidence conclusively establish a suicidal death, and whether the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act can be applied in the absence of proof that the accused was present at the time of the incident.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan argued that the prosecution failed to establish the essential element of homicidal death. He relied on Madho Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Chandrapal v. State of Chhattisgarh to assert that Section 302 IPC requires proof of intentional killing, not merely a suspicious death. He further contended that the trial court erred in ignoring the panchnama (Ex. P/4), which recorded the room as bolted from inside, and in disregarding the testimony of P.W.-5, who stated the appellant was away at work during the incident.
For the Respondent
Mr. Sharad Mishra, State counsel, contended that the appellant’s prior conduct - alleged dowry harassment - created a presumption of guilt. He argued that the trial court rightly invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act to require the appellant to explain his absence and failure to prevent the tragedy, especially given his proximity to the victim.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by affirming the settled principle that Section 302 IPC cannot be applied unless the death is established as homicidal. The postmortem report (Ex. P/14), confirmed by two medical witnesses, explicitly stated the nature of death as suicidal. The Court held that this finding was binding on the prosecution and could not be disregarded merely because of allegations of prior cruelty.
"The nature of death being suicidal as per the postmortem report is binding on the prosecution. Conviction under Section 302 IPC is ex-facie illegal where the death is not proven to be homicidal."
The Court further examined the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which permits the court to require an accused to explain circumstances peculiarly within his knowledge. However, the Court emphasized that this section applies only when the prosecution has established a prima facie case of the accused’s involvement. Here, the panchnama (Ex. P/4), duly proved by two witnesses, stated the room was bolted from inside and the appellant was absent at the time. The trial court’s contrary finding - that the room was bolted from outside - was unsupported and contradicted the documentary evidence.
The Court noted that Section 106 cannot be used to reverse the burden of proof in the absence of any direct or circumstantial evidence placing the appellant at the scene. The prosecution’s failure to prove his presence or participation rendered the invocation of Section 106 legally unsustainable.
The Verdict
The appellant won. The Court held that Section 302 IPC requires proof of homicidal death, which was absent here, and that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to fill evidentiary gaps left by the prosecution. The conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Homicidal Intent Must Be Proven, Not Presumed
- Practitioners must challenge convictions under Section 302 IPC where postmortem reports indicate suicidal or accidental death
- Allegations of dowry harassment, while relevant for Section 304B IPC, cannot substitute for proof of intentional killing
- Courts must strictly adhere to the distinction between murder and dowry death
Section 106 Cannot Override Prosecution’s Primary Burden
- Section 106 of the Evidence Act applies only after the prosecution establishes a prima facie case
- If key evidence (e.g., panchnama, witness testimony) contradicts the prosecution’s theory, the court cannot ignore it to shift burden to the accused
- Defense counsel should immediately flag inconsistencies between investigation records and trial court findings
Documentary Evidence Trumps Oral Inconsistencies
- Panchnamas and forensic reports carry greater weight than speculative oral testimony
- When prosecution witnesses contradict official records, courts must prioritize the documentary evidence
- Any deviation from recorded facts must be justified with compelling reasons, not judicial assumption
