Case Law Analysis

Section 29A Arbitration Act | Extension of Arbitrator's Mandate Post-Award : Supreme Court

Supreme Court clarifies that courts can extend arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A even after award is passed beyond statutory limit, holding such awards unenforceable but not nullifying extension

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Feb 5, 2026, 1:46 AM
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Section 29A Arbitration Act | Extension of Arbitrator's Mandate Post-Award : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has resolved a critical ambiguity in arbitration law by holding that courts retain jurisdiction to extend an arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 even after an award is rendered beyond the statutory timeline. This judgment establishes that while such awards are unenforceable, they do not preclude subsequent extension applications, reinforcing the Act's objective of ensuring arbitral proceedings reach their logical conclusion.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The appellant and respondent entered into three agreements to sell, governed by arbitration clauses. Disputes arose, leading to the appointment of a sole arbitrator by the Madras High Court under Section 11 of the Act on 19.04.2022. The arbitrator's mandate commenced on 20.08.2022, with an initial 12-month period under Section 29A(1), extendable by 6 months through party consent under Section 29A(3).

Procedural History

Key procedural milestones included:

  • 20.08.2022: Commencement of arbitral proceedings
  • 20.02.2024: Expiry of extended mandate after joint memo extension
  • 11.05.2024: Award passed by arbitrator post-mandate expiry
  • 12.11.2024: Appellant filed Section 29A application for mandate extension
  • 24.01.2025: High Court dismissed extension application as non-maintainable
  • 14.02.2025: High Court set aside the award under Section 34

Relief Sought

The appellant sought restoration of the Section 29A application, arguing that courts retain jurisdiction to extend mandates even post-award. The respondent contended that the award, passed after mandate expiry, was a nullity and rendered extension applications infructuous.

The central question was whether a court can entertain an application under Section 29A(5) to extend an arbitrator's mandate for making an award after:

  1. The expiry of the 18-month statutory period (12 months + 6-month extension), and
  2. The arbitrator has already rendered an award during this period.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant

The appellant relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. to argue that:

  • Section 29A(4) empowers courts to extend mandates before or after expiry of the statutory period
  • The term "terminate" in Section 29A(4) is conditional and does not preclude subsequent extensions
  • The Act's objective is to ensure arbitral proceedings conclude with a binding award, justifying post-award extensions

For the Respondent

The respondent distinguished Rohan Builders and cited Suryadev Alloys & Power Private Ltd. v. Sh. Govindaraja Textiles Pvt. Ltd. and Ayyasamy v. A. Shanmugavel to contend that:

  • Section 29A contains no provision for post-award mandate extensions
  • An award passed after mandate expiry is a nullity and unenforceable
  • Allowing post-award extensions would encourage arbitrator indiscipline

The Court's Analysis

The Supreme Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of Section 29A, its legislative intent, and comparative jurisprudence:

Statutory Interpretation

The Court examined the text and context of Section 29A, noting:

"The expression, 'if an award is not made' in sub-section (4) is employed in the context of enabling the Court to extend the mandate of the arbitrator. The context makes it clear that the sub-section is not addressing a situation where an arbitral award has been rendered after the mandate expired, but rather to declare that the Court can extend the period before or after the expiry of the mandate."

The Court rejected the High Court's narrow interpretation, emphasizing that Section 29A does not explicitly bar post-award extension applications. It held that the power to extend mandates is vested in courts to ensure arbitral proceedings reach their logical conclusion, as envisioned by the Law Commission's 176th Report.

Legislative Intent

The Court traced the evolution of Section 29A, introduced via the 2015 Amendment to address delays in arbitral proceedings. It highlighted the Law Commission's recommendation that:

"The Commission proposes to see that an arbitral award is ultimately passed even if the above said delays have taken place. In order that there is no further delay, the Commission proposes that after the period of initial one year and the further period agreed to by the parties (subject to a maximum of one year) is over, the arbitration proceedings will nearly stand suspended and will get revived as soon as any party to the proceedings files an application in the Court for extension of time."

This intent, the Court observed, underscores Parliament's objective to prevent wastage of time and resources already invested in arbitral proceedings.

Comparative Jurisprudence

The Court surveyed international arbitration laws, noting that jurisdictions like England and Singapore permit courts to extend arbitrator mandates even after statutory deadlines. It cited:

  • Oakland Metal Co Ltd. v. D. Benaim & Co. Ld. (English Court of Appeal), where the court held that expiry of a contractual time limit does not extinguish jurisdiction to enlarge time
  • Alphamix Ltd v District Council of Rivière du Rempart (Privy Council), where a tacit agreement to extend time validated a late award

These precedents reinforced the Court's view that statutory timelines should not frustrate the arbitral process, provided courts retain supervisory jurisdiction to extend mandates.

Judicial Discretion and Safeguards

The Court clarified that Section 29A vests courts with discretionary powers to extend mandates, subject to safeguards:

  • Sufficient cause must be shown for extension under Section 29A(5)
  • Courts may impose terms and conditions, including costs under Section 29A(8)
  • Arbitrator fees may be reduced under the proviso to Section 29A(4) if delays are attributable to the tribunal
  • Substitution of arbitrators is discretionary under Section 29A(6)

The Court emphasized that these tools enable courts to balance efficiency with integrity in arbitral proceedings, preventing misuse of extension applications.

The Verdict

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order dated 24.01.2025. It held that:

  1. An application under Section 29A(5) for extension of an arbitrator's mandate is maintainable even after the expiry of the statutory period and after an award is rendered.
  2. An award passed after the expiry of the arbitrator's mandate is unenforceable under Section 36 but does not nullify the court's power to extend the mandate.
  3. The High Court's Section 29A application is restored for fresh consideration in accordance with the principles laid down in this judgment.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Extension Applications Survive Post-Award

Practitioners must note that the rendering of an award after mandate expiry does not preclude subsequent extension applications. Key takeaways include:

  • Section 29A(5) applications remain maintainable even if an award is passed during the pendency of the extension request
  • Courts retain jurisdiction to extend mandates retrospectively, provided sufficient cause is shown
  • Arbitrators and parties cannot assume that post-mandate awards terminate the arbitral process

Courts' Supervisory Role Reinforced

The judgment underscores the courts' role in ensuring arbitral proceedings conclude with binding awards. Practitioners should:

  • Argue for extensions where delays are justified, citing the Court's emphasis on preventing wastage of resources
  • Anticipate judicial scrutiny of delay causes, particularly where arbitrators or parties contribute to adjournments
  • Prepare for conditional extensions, including potential reductions in arbitrator fees or imposition of costs

Awards Beyond Mandate Are Unenforceable

The Court's holding that post-mandate awards are unenforceable has significant implications:

  • Section 34 petitions challenging such awards may succeed on the ground of mandate expiry
  • Enforcement proceedings under Section 36 are likely to fail if the award was passed beyond the arbitrator's mandate
  • Parties must act promptly to seek mandate extensions before awards are rendered to avoid procedural complications

Case Details

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

2026 INSC 112
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
03 February 2026
Case Number
Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 6551 of 2025
Bench
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Atul S. Chandurkar
Counsel
Pet: Mrs. V Mohana, Senior Advocate
Res: Mr. M. Vijayan, Advocate, Mr. P.S. Sudheer, AOR

Frequently Asked Questions

**Section 29A(1)** of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 mandates that an arbitral award must be made within 12 months from the date of completion of pleadings. This period can be extended by 6 months through party consent under **Section 29A(3)**. Any further extension requires court approval under **Section 29A(4)**.
No. The Supreme Court held that an award passed after the expiry of the arbitrator's mandate is unenforceable under **Section 36** of the Act. Such awards do not require a **Section 34** challenge to be set aside, as they are inherently ineffective.
While the judgment does not define 'sufficient cause' exhaustively, it indicates that courts will consider: - The reasons for delay, including whether it was attributable to the arbitrator or parties - The stage of proceedings and evidence already recorded - The potential wastage of time and resources if the arbitral process is aborted - Any prejudice caused to the parties by the delay
Yes. The proviso to **Section 29A(4)** empowers courts to reduce arbitrator fees by up to 5% per month if delays are attributable to the arbitral tribunal. This provision serves as a deterrent against arbitrator-induced delays.
No. **Section 29A(6)** provides that courts *may* substitute arbitrators while extending mandates, but this is a discretionary power. The Supreme Court clarified in *Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles* that substitution is not automatic and depends on the facts of each case.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.