The Gujarat High Court affirmed the trial court's use of its inherent power under Section 151 of the CPC to order the restoration of possession to a lessee who was allegedly dispossessed during the pendency of a suit, while also clarifying the limits of that power when the application is framed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The plaintiff, an oil marketing company operating a petrol pump (Retail Outlet) on the suit property, entered into a registered lease deed with the defendants on 02.12.2005 for a term of twenty years. The lease expired on 02.12.2025. A separate dealership agreement, also between the parties, was terminated by the plaintiff on 20.03.2025.
Key Facts
- 02.12.2005: Lease deed executed for 20 years, ending 02.12.2025.
- 20.03.2025: Plaintiff terminated the dealership agreement; defendants handed over possession of the retail outlet to the plaintiff.
- 01.08.2025: Plaintiff requested renewal of lease; defendants denied on 19.08.2025.
- 06.11.2025: Plaintiff again requested renewal; defendants denied via email on 14.11.2025.
- 24.11.2025: Plaintiff instituted Regular Civil Suit No.104 of 2025 seeking specific performance of the lease.
- 24.11.2025: Notice issued in the suit; received by defendants on 04.12.2025.
- 02.12.2025: Plaintiff applied to Jetpur City Police Station for protection against possible forcible dispossession.
- 03.12.2025: Defendants took possession of the suit property (disputed - plaintiff claims forcible dispossession, defendants claim voluntary hand-over).
- 11.12.2025: Plaintiff filed an impugned application under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking restoration of possession.
- 11.12.2025: Plaintiff also filed an amendment application under Order VI, Rule 17 CPC to amend the prayer in the main suit and the injunction application.
- 15.01.2026 & 17.01.2026: Defendants filed replies to the impugned and amendment applications respectively.
- 18.03.2026: Trial Court allowed the impugned application, directing defendants to restore possession within 15 days and to maintain status quo until final disposal of the suit.
- 07.08.2026: Petitioners (defendants) filed Special Civil Application No.5287 of 2026 under Article 227 seeking vacating stay of the trial court order.
Procedural History
- 02.12.2005 - Lease deed executed.
- 20.03.2025 - Termination of dealership agreement.
- 01.08.2025 - First renewal request (denied 19.08.2025).
- 06.11.2025 - Second renewal request (denied 14.11.2025).
- 24.11.2025 - Regular Civil Suit No.104 of 2025 filed; notice served.
- 02.12.2025 - Police protection application filed.
- 03.12.2025 - Alleged forcible dispossession.
- 11.12.2025 - Impugned application filed under Section 6, 1963 & Section 151 CPC.
- 11.12.2025 - Amendment application filed under Order VI, Rule 17 CPC.
- 15.01.2026 - Defendant reply to amendment application.
- 17.01.2026 - Defendant reply to impugned application.
- 18.03.2026 - Trial Court order restoring possession within 15 days and imposing status-quo.
- 07.08.2026 - High Court judgment delivering this order.
The Parties' Positions
- Petitioners (Defendants Nos.1-7): argued that the trial court erred jurisdictionally by entertaining an application framed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act; contended that the plaintiff should have filed a substantive suit; claimed the lease had expired and therefore no right to retain possession; sought vacating stay of the trial court order.
- Respondent (Plaintiff - Reliance BP Mobility Ltd.): maintained that it was in settled, peaceful possession since the lease began; asserted that the defendants forcibly dispossessed it on 03.12.2025; relied on the inherent power of the court under Section 151 CPC to grant mandatory interim relief to prevent injustice; sought restoration of possession and maintenance of status-quo.
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought a declaration that the trial court’s impugned order dated 18.03.2026 was ultra vires and should be set aside, thereby preventing the restoration of possession to the plaintiff.
The Legal Issue
What is the correct scope of the trial court’s inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant mandatory interim relief when the application is framed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and does the expiry of a lease preclude the court from ordering restoration of possession during the pendency of a suit?
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioners
- The trial court committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining an application that was essentially a petition under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act; the proper remedy was a substantive suit.
- The lease had expired by efflux of time; consequently the plaintiff had no legal right to retain possession, negating any basis for interim relief.
- The trial court’s finding of a “strong prima facie case” and “balance of convenience” was unfounded.
- The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s claim of forcible dispossession was unsupported by evidence.
For the Respondent
- Section 151 CPC confers an inherent power to grant interim relief when no specific provision applies, and the trial court correctly exercised it to prevent injustice.
- The plaintiff was in settled, peaceful possession at the time of instituting the suit (24.11.2025) and was unlawfully dispossessed on 03.12.2025.
- The trial court’s order did not prejudice the substantive rights of the parties; it merely restored the status-quo ante pending final adjudication.
- Reliance on Supreme Court precedents (Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, U. Sudheera, Krishna Ram Mahale) confirming that self-help possession is unlawful and that inherent powers may be invoked where the Code is silent.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by affirming the factual matrix: the lease deed dated 02.12.2005 expired on 02.12.2025, the plaintiff sought renewal, was denied, and subsequently filed suit on 24.11.2025. The plaintiff’s application for police protection on 02.12.2025 and the defendants’ unilateral taking over of possession on 03.12.2025 were accepted as prima facie evidence of unlawful dispossession.
“The material placed on record, including the communication dated 03.12.2025 referring to taking over possession, prima facie indicates and satisfies this Court that possession of the suit property was taken over by the defendants on or about 02.12.2025.”
The Court examined the scope of Section 151 CPC, citing the Supreme Court’s articulation that the provision recognises the discretionary power of courts to do “what is right and undo what is wrong” where the Code is silent. It distinguished between procedural provisions (Order XXXIX, Section 94) and the inherent jurisdiction, concluding that the trial court was not barred from invoking Section 151 because no specific provision governed restoration of possession in the present factual matrix.
The Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that the application was per se untenable because it cited Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. It held that an application may simultaneously invoke Section 6 and Section 151, and the latter governs the exercise of inherent powers irrespective of a mis-statement of statutory provision.
Addressing the expiry of the lease, the Court observed that even if the lease had terminated, the plaintiff’s settled possession could not be disturbed without due process. It reiterated the settled principle that “a person is not permitted to take forcible possession; he must obtain such possession as he is entitled to through a court.”
The Court further evaluated the balance of convenience and irreparable injury, noting that the petrol pump housed inflammable stocks, and any unlawful dispossession posed a serious public safety risk. Accordingly, the trial court’s order to restore possession and maintain status-quo was justified to prevent abuse of process and to protect public interest.
Finally, the Court modified the trial court’s order to the extent necessary: it upheld the directive to restore possession forthwith but curtailed the broader status-quo direction, limiting it to the period until the final adjudication of the pending injunction application.
The Verdict
The High Court partially allowed the petition. It modified the trial court’s impugned order, directing the defendants to restore possession of the suit property to the plaintiff forthwith. Both parties must maintain status-quo as to possession until the final disposal of the plaintiff’s injunction application filed under Order XXXIX CPC. No order as to costs was made, and the civil application stands disposed of.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Inherent Power Is Not Circumscribed by Mis-stated Statutes
Practitioners must recognise that an application may invoke Section 151 CPC even if it erroneously cites another provision. Courts will focus on the substantive relief sought rather than dismissing the petition on technical mis-reference.
- File interim applications under Section 151 when the Code offers no specific remedy.
- Ensure that the factual matrix demonstrates a clear violation of settled possession.
Expiry of Lease Does Not Nullify Interim Relief
Even after a lease expires, a lessee in settled possession may obtain interim protection against unlawful dispossession until the substantive rights are finally decided.
- Preserve documentary evidence of possession (lease deeds, correspondence, police reports).
- Argue the risk of irreparable injury, especially where public safety is implicated.
Balance of Convenience and Public Interest
Courts will weigh the potential harm to public safety and the plaintiff’s commercial interests heavily when deciding on mandatory injunctions.
- Highlight any hazardous materials or essential services involved.
- Emphasise the urgency and the impossibility of monetary compensation for loss of possession.
Procedural Strategy
When a party files a suit for specific performance, an accompanying interim application under Section 151 can be entertained without forcing the plaintiff to abandon the substantive suit.
- File the interim application promptly after dispossession.
- Keep the amendment application separate; it does not preclude interim relief.
Limits of Status-quo Directions
The Court may tailor status-quo orders to the pendency of specific applications, avoiding over-reach that could affect unrelated proceedings.
- Seek precise wording in orders to limit their temporal scope.
- Monitor subsequent applications that may alter the interim relief landscape.
