The Delhi High Court has clarified that a person granted probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 cannot be denied employment solely on the basis of a prior conviction, even if the offence involves moral turpitude. The judgment affirms that statutory protection under Section 12 overrides employer-imposed disqualifications, reinforcing the legislative intent to rehabilitate offenders.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The respondent, Rajesh, was convicted in 2014 under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code for offences arising from a marital dispute. He was sentenced to one year’s simple imprisonment for each offence. During the pendency of his criminal appeal, the marriage was dissolved by mutual consent under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Appellate Court, noting the amicable settlement and the wife’s lack of objection, released him on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, with a bond of Rs.25,000 and a six-month probation period.
Procedural History
- 2014: Conviction by Trial Court under Sections 498A and 406 IPC
- 2015: Appellate Court grants probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958; conviction upheld but sentence suspended
- 2019: Respondent appointed as Library Attendant, Government of Haryana
- 2024: Selected for Junior Executive (Common Cadre) post by Airport Authority of India (AAI); offered appointment on 11.04.2024
- 19.08.2024: AAI cancels appointment citing Regulation 6(7)(b) of its 2003 Service Regulations
- 30.09.2024: Delhi High Court directs AAI to reconsider appointment, specifically considering Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act
- 09.12.2024: AAI reiterates cancellation; respondent files writ petition
- 31.10.2025: Single Judge quashes cancellation and directs appointment
- 23.01.2026: Division Bench upholds Single Judge’s order in intra-court appeal
Relief Sought
The respondent sought reinstatement of his appointment to the post of Junior Executive (Common Cadre), arguing that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, shields him from any disqualification arising from his conviction.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 nullifies an employer’s regulatory disqualification based on conviction, where the convict has been granted probation under Section 4, and whether such protection extends to appointments in public sector entities.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The Airport Authority of India contended that Regulation 6(7)(b) of its 2003 Service Regulations deems persons convicted of offences involving moral turpitude ineligible for appointment. It argued that probation under Section 4 does not erase the conviction or its consequences, and that employers retain discretion to assess character and antecedents. Reliance was placed on Ajit Kumar v. Commissioner of Police, Shankar Dass v. Union of India, and other judgments to assert that dismissal or ineligibility based on conviction is not a "disqualification" within the meaning of Section 12, and that the nature of the post (involving public trust) justified exclusion.
For the Respondent
The respondent argued that Section 12 contains a non-obstante clause that overrides any other law, including service regulations. He emphasized that his conviction was not suppressed and that the Appellate Court’s grant of probation under Section 4 was a judicial recognition of rehabilitation. He relied on Shaitan Singh Meena v. Union of India and Bakshi Ram v. Union of India to assert that ineligibility flowing directly from conviction is a disqualification within Section 12’s scope, and that the employer’s regulation must yield to the statute.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, distinguishing between "disqualification" and "punishment". It held that while dismissal from service under Article 311(2) of the Constitution is a penalty, ineligibility for appointment based on conviction is a disqualification. The Court cited Shankar Dass v. Union of India to affirm that "disqualification" under Section 12 refers to statutory bars such as those under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and not to administrative penalties.
"Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offender ‘shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law’. Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction."
The Court found that Regulation 6(7)(b) of the AAI Regulations directly ties ineligibility to conviction, making it a disqualification within the meaning of Section 12. The fact that the respondent disclosed the conviction and was granted probation under Section 4 triggered the statutory shield. The Court distinguished Ajit Kumar on grounds of factual context: the offence in Ajit Kumar involved grave moral turpitude without reconciliation, whereas here, the marital dispute was resolved by mutual consent, and the victim-wife expressed no objection. The Court emphasized that Section 12 does not erase the conviction but removes its collateral consequences.
The Court also rejected the appellant’s reliance on other judgments, noting that none involved a claim under Section 12 or a disclosure of facts as in this case. The principle in Bakshi Ram was applied directly: where a law imposes disqualification due to conviction, Section 12 removes it upon probation.
The Verdict
The respondent won. The Court held that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 overrides regulatory disqualifications based on conviction where probation has been granted. The cancellation of the respondent’s appointment was unlawful, and the direction for his appointment was upheld.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Disqualification Based on Conviction Is Not Absolute
- Employers cannot invoke service regulations to deny appointment solely on the basis of a conviction if the individual has been granted probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act
- The disqualification must be directly tied to the conviction; if it is a general bar on "convicted persons," Section 12 applies
- Disclosure of conviction during application does not negate protection under Section 12
Moral Turpitude Does Not Override Statutory Protection
- Even offences involving moral turpitude, such as Section 498A IPC, cannot be used to bypass Section 12 if probation is granted
- The nature of the post (e.g., public trust, safety-sensitive roles) is irrelevant if the disqualification is statutorily linked to conviction
- Courts will examine whether the disqualification flows from the conviction itself or from independent conduct
Probation Is a Judicial Recognition of Rehabilitation
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Grant of probation under Section 4 is not a technicality but a judicial determination that the offender is fit for reintegration
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Employers must treat probation as a rehabilitative outcome, not a procedural loophole
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Failure to consider Section 12 renders administrative decisions arbitrary and violative of Article 14
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Practitioners must raise Section 12 as a mandatory defence in all appointment-related writ petitions where probation has been granted
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Employers should revise service regulations to distinguish between "conviction" and "disqualification" to avoid legal challenges
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Candidates with past convictions should proactively disclose and cite Section 12 in applications and representations
