The Gauhati High Court has partially upheld a constitutional challenge to the appellate mechanism under the Arunachal Pradesh Urban Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014. While the Court rejected the broad contention that an executive authority cannot sit in appeal over the quasi-judicial decisions of the State Election Commissioner, it struck down the proviso to Section 6(1) which vested appellate jurisdiction in the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies when the Chief Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner. The Court held that conferring appellate power over electoral disqualification disputes on a member of the political executive creates a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, violating the constitutional requirement of an independent and impartial adjudicatory forum.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, three elected Councillors of the Pasighat Municipal Council in East Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh, filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 6 of the Arunachal Pradesh Urban Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014 ("the Act of 2014"). The challenge was prompted by a notice dated 11.12.2024 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, requiring the petitioners to appear in Appeal No. 01/2024 preferred under Section 6(1) of the Act. The petitioners expressly confined their challenge to the constitutional validity of the statutory provisions and did not assail the notice or the pending appellate proceedings.
Key Facts
- The petitioners are elected representatives: Smti Ponung Radeng Saring (Councillor, Ward No. 5), Smti Yalop Nyigang Yomso (Councillor, Ward No. 1), and Smti Rebeka Panyang (Deputy Chief Councillor cum Councillor, Ward No. 4) of the Pasighat Municipal Council.
- The Act of 2014 provides for disqualification of members of Urban Local Bodies on the ground of defection.
- Section 6(1) provides that an appeal against the decision of the State Election Commissioner shall lie before the Chief Secretary of the State.
- Proviso to Section 6(1) stipulates that where the Chief Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner, the appeal shall lie before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies.
- Section 6(2) prescribes a summary procedure for disposal of such appeals.
- The State Election Commission, Arunachal Pradesh, is a constitutional body constituted under Article 243K read with Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India, vested with superintendence, direction, and control of elections to Municipalities.
- The petitioners contended that subjecting the quasi-judicial decisions of this constitutional authority to appellate review by executive authorities violates the principles of separation of powers, judicial independence, and the guarantees under Articles 14 and 21.
Procedural History
- 11.12.2024: Notice issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, in Appeal No. 01/2024 under Section 6(1) of the Act of 2014.
- Date of filing: Writ Petition (C) No. 45/2025 filed before the Gauhati High Court challenging constitutional validity of Section 6(1) and (2).
- 21.07.2026: Judgment reserved by the Division Bench.
- 18.08.2026: Judgment pronounced.
The Parties' Positions
Petitioners: Argued that the State Election Commission, as a constitutional body, must remain insulated from executive interference. The adjudication of disqualification on grounds of defection is a quasi-judicial function (relying on Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu). An executive appellate authority over such decisions violates separation of powers, institutional independence, and creates reasonable apprehension of bias (A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India). The constitutional remedy is judicial review under Articles 226/227 (L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India). The proviso vesting appeal in a political Minister is particularly egregious.
Respondents (State): Contended that the challenge is academic since no actual rights have been infringed. The Legislature has competence under Entry 5, List II, Seventh Schedule. The Constitution adopts a flexible separation of powers (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab). The Chief Secretary acts as a statutory appellate authority, not in administrative capacity. Statutory appeal does not oust judicial review. Precedents relied upon by petitioners are factually distinguishable. Possibility of abuse does not invalidate a statute (Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, Natural Resource Allocation, In re). Article 14 does not permit striking down a law merely because other States follow different schemes (Sant Lal Bharti v. State of Punjab).
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought a declaration that sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 2014 are unconstitutional and void, and that orders passed by the State Election Commissioner under the Act should remain subject only to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.
The Legal Issue
The central questions were: (1) Whether the Legislature is constitutionally precluded from providing a statutory appellate remedy against decisions of the State Election Commissioner rendered in exercise of statutory jurisdiction under the Act of 2014, where such decisions are quasi-judicial in nature; (2) Whether the appellate mechanism vesting authority in the Chief Secretary, and in the alternative the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies, violates the doctrine of separation of powers, the independence of the State Election Commission, and the guarantees of fairness and impartiality under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioners
Mr. T.T. Tara, Senior Counsel, submitted that the State Election Commission is a constitutional authority under Articles 243K and 243ZA, and its independence from executive interference is essential for free and fair elections, as recognized in T.N. Seshan v. Union of India and Kishan Singh Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad. The adjudication of disqualification on grounds of defection is a judicial function, as held in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, and such decisions can only be subjected to judicial review by constitutional courts, not executive appeal. The constitutional remedy under Articles 226 and 227 forms part of the basic structure (L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India) and cannot be substituted by an executive appellate mechanism. The proviso to Section 6(1) compounds the infirmity by vesting appellate jurisdiction in a political functionary, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias (A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India). The arrangement violates separation of powers (Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala), institutional independence (State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association, Amrik Singh Lyallpuri v. Union of India, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India), and the principles of natural justice under Article 21.
For the Respondents
Mr. I. Chowdhury, Advocate General, submitted that the petition is an academic exercise since the petitioners have not challenged the notice or proceedings. The Act is a valid exercise of legislative competence under Entry 5, List II. The Constitution does not mandate rigid separation of powers (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab), and the Executive may exercise quasi-judicial functions when empowered by statute. The Chief Secretary acts as a statutory appellate authority bound by principles of natural justice under Section 6(2). The statutory appeal does not exclude judicial review under Articles 226/227. Kihoto Hollohan does not prohibit a statutory appeal. Amrik Singh Lyallpuri is distinguishable as it concerned a judicial tribunal with trappings of a court. The possibility of misuse cannot invalidate a statute (Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, Natural Resource Allocation, In re). Article 14 does not authorize invalidation based on inter-state legislative differences (Sant Lal Bharti v. State of Punjab). The precedents on tribunal independence arise in the context of tribunalisation replacing court jurisdiction, which is not the case here.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by distinguishing between the constitutional functions of the State Election Commission under Articles 243K and 243ZA - superintendence, direction, and control of electoral rolls and conduct of elections - and the statutory jurisdiction conferred by the Act of 2014 for adjudicating disqualification on grounds of defection. The latter, the Court held, derives from Entry 5, List II, Seventh Schedule, and is a statutory creation, not a constitutional function. Therefore, the Legislature is not precluded from prescribing the manner of exercise of this jurisdiction or providing an appellate remedy.
"The mere fact that a constitutional authority has been entrusted by the Legislature with a statutory function would not, by itself, result in such statutory function acquiring the character of a constitutional function. The nature and source of the power exercised by the authority have to be examined for determining the character of the jurisdiction and the constitutional limitations applicable thereto."
The Court found that T.N. Seshan and Kishan Singh Tomar concern the constitutional functions of the Election Commission and do not extend to statutory jurisdictions created by the Legislature. Judicial review under Articles 226/227 and statutory appeal operate in different fields: the former examines legality and jurisdictional errors, the latter examines correctness of the decision within statutory limits. Their coexistence does not dilute constitutional jurisdiction.
On Kihoto Hollohan, the Court clarified that while the decision on disqualification is adjudicatory and subject to judicial review, the judgment does not lay down an absolute prohibition against a statutory appellate remedy. Kesavananda Bharati and L. Chandra Kumar protect the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction from exclusion but do not render every adjudicatory decision statutorily final or prohibit a hierarchy of adjudication and appeal.
The Court distinguished Amrik Singh Lyallpuri on the ground that it involved an Appellate Tribunal manned by a judicial officer with trappings of a Civil Court, whose decisions were appealed to the Lieutenant Governor. Here, the State Election Commissioner exercises a purely statutory jurisdiction, and the appeal lies within the same statutory scheme. The Chief Secretary, while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 6, acts pursuant to a statutory mandate and is required to follow the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice under Section 6(2). This does not amount to executive interference.
The Court affirmed that the Indian Constitution adopts a functional, not rigid, separation of powers (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab), and the Executive may exercise quasi-judicial functions when so empowered by statute. The mere fact that the appellate authority belongs to the Executive does not, by itself, render the conferment of appellate jurisdiction constitutionally impermissible.
However, the Court drew a sharp distinction regarding the proviso to Section 6(1). The Minister-in-Charge is a member of the elected political executive, responsible for the administration of the concerned department. Vesting appellate jurisdiction over electoral disqualification disputes in such a political authority creates a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias. The defect is one of institutional design: an adjudicatory mechanism must not only be fair in fact but must be structured to inspire confidence in its independence and impartiality. This is especially critical in defection proceedings, which directly affect the composition and functioning of elected local bodies.
"Where the subject matter of the adjudication concerns the electoral status of elected representatives and the appellate jurisdiction is vested in the political executive responsible for the concerned department, the apprehension of institutional bias cannot be regarded as unrealistic or remote."
Applying the doctrine of severability, the Court held that the proviso to Section 6(1) is capable of being separated from the remaining provisions. The ordinary appellate mechanism before the Chief Secretary and the procedural safeguards in Section 6(2) can operate independently and do not suffer from constitutional infirmity.
The Verdict
The writ petition was partly allowed. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 6(1) (excluding the proviso) and Section 6(2) of the Arunachal Pradesh Urban Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014, holding that the Legislature may validly provide for a statutory appeal before the Chief Secretary against decisions of the State Election Commissioner in exercise of statutory jurisdiction. However, the proviso to Section 6(1), which provides for an appeal before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies when the Chief Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner, was declared unconstitutional and struck down for violating the requirement of institutional impartiality. The appellate mechanism before the Chief Secretary shall continue to operate in accordance with law. The Court expressly refrained from examining the merits of Appeal No. 01/2024 or the notice dated 11.12.2024. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Statutory Jurisdiction Does Not Inherit Constitutional Immunity
The judgment clarifies that when a constitutional authority exercises a statutory jurisdiction - as distinct from its constitutional functions - the Legislature may regulate the exercise of that jurisdiction, including by providing for an appellate remedy before an executive authority. The constitutional independence guaranteed to the State Election Commission under Articles 243K and 243ZA attaches to its constitutional functions (superintendence, direction, control of elections), not automatically to every statutory power entrusted to it. Practitioners challenging similar appellate mechanisms must demonstrate that the impugned jurisdiction is constitutional in character, not merely statutory.
Executive Authorities May Exercise Quasi-Judicial Appellate Functions
The Court's endorsement of the Chief Secretary as an appellate authority reaffirms that the Indian Constitution does not mandate a rigid separation of powers. An executive officer, when designated by statute as an appellate authority and bound to follow quasi-judicial procedures and principles of natural justice, does not ipso facto violate the constitutional scheme. This preserves the Legislature's flexibility to design hierarchical adjudicatory structures within statutory frameworks, subject to constitutional review jurisdiction remaining intact.
Institutional Impartiality Requires Structural Safeguards, Not Just Procedural Fairness
The striking down of the proviso to Section 6(1) establishes a critical principle: institutional design matters. Even where a statutory authority is required to act fairly and follow natural justice, the mere vesting of adjudicatory power in a political executive functionary over matters affecting elected representatives creates an impermissible reasonable apprehension of bias. This principle extends beyond the specific context of defection proceedings:
- Any statutory scheme that vests appellate or revisional jurisdiction over electoral or quasi-judicial decisions in a political executive authority (Minister, Secretary to Government, etc.) is vulnerable to challenge on grounds of institutional impartiality.
- The test is not whether the individual authority will act fairly, but whether the structural relationship between the appellate authority and the subject matter inspires public confidence in independence.
- Practitioners should scrutinize appellate mechanisms in local body election laws, cooperative society statutes, and other quasi-judicial frameworks for similar structural defects.
Severability Preserves Valid Legislative Schemes
The Court's application of severability - striking down only the offending proviso while preserving the Chief Secretary appellate mechanism - demonstrates that constitutional challenges to statutory schemes need not be all-or-nothing. Where the valid and invalid portions are functionally independent, courts will preserve the legislative scheme to the maximum extent possible. This encourages targeted challenges to specific provisions rather than wholesale invalidation of enactments.
