The Himachal Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed a foundational principle of administrative law: no officer can act as judge in his own cause. In a significant ruling, the Court quashed a revision order passed by the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh against his own earlier appellate decision, holding that such a proceeding violates the cardinal rule of natural justice. This judgment reinforces the necessity of impartiality in quasi-judicial functions and sets a clear precedent for procedural fairness in statutory appeals.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Bishwa Nath Sharma, challenged the legality of an order passed by the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh dismissing his revision petition under Section 33 of the Himachal Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1977. The dispute arose from the refusal by the Assistant Town Planner, Manali, to regularize a four-storeyed hotel structure allegedly constructed without adequate setbacks from the petitioner’s two-storeyed residential property. The petitioner contended that the refusal was arbitrary and contrary to statutory norms.
Key Facts
- The Assistant Town Planner, Sub-Divisional Town Planning Office, Manali, issued orders dated 19.02.2025 and 23.04.2025 refusing regularization of the structure
- The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 32 of the Act against these orders
- The appeal was heard and dismissed by the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh on 11.11.2025
- The petitioner filed a revision petition under Section 33 of the Act against the dismissal order dated 11.11.2025
- The revision petition was heard and dismissed by the same Chief Secretary on 15.01.2026
- The order dated 15.01.2026 explicitly referenced and upheld the correctness of the earlier order dated 11.11.2025, which he himself had passed
- The petitioner was not granted any independent adjudication by a different authority
Procedural History
- 19.02.2025: First refusal order issued by Assistant Town Planner, Manali
- 23.04.2025: Second refusal order issued by Assistant Town Planner, Manali
- 11.11.2025: Appeal dismissed by Chief Secretary under Section 32 of the Act
- 12.11.2025: Communication of appellate order to petitioner
- 15.01.2026: Revision petition dismissed by Chief Secretary under Section 33 of the Act
- 28.03.2026: Writ Petition (CWP No.5559 of 2026) filed before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh
- 20.04.2026: Judgment delivered by Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua
The Parties' Positions
The petitioner contended that the Chief Secretary, having already decided the appeal under Section 32, was disqualified from adjudicating the revision under Section 33. He argued that the revisional jurisdiction was meant to be exercised by an independent authority, and that allowing the same officer to review his own decision rendered the statutory remedy illusory and violated the principle of nemo judex in causa sua.
The State, through the Advocate General, did not file a formal reply but appeared and waived service of notice. The learned Additional Advocate General conceded that the revision petition was heard and decided by the same officer who passed the appellate order, but did not contest the legal principle invoked.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the revision order dated 15.01.2026, and a direction that his revision petition be decided by a competent authority other than the Chief Secretary, in accordance with law.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a quasi-judicial authority, having passed an order under Section 32 of the Himachal Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1977, can lawfully exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 33 against its own order.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on the doctrine of nemo judex in causa sua and cited Canara Bank v. Debasis Das and Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana to argue that an officer cannot be both the maker and the reviewer of his own decision. He emphasized that revision under Section 33 is not a review but a higher appellate function requiring impartiality. He further cited the Karnataka High Court’s decision in Pradeep Kumar v. Commissioner, HRI & CE to show that allowing the same officer to hear revision defeats the very purpose of statutory appeal mechanisms.
For the Respondent
The State did not file a written reply or present substantive counter-arguments. The Advocate General appeared and waived service, effectively conceding the procedural irregularity without contesting the legal principle.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by affirming that the principle of nemo judex in causa sua is not a mere formality but a cornerstone of fair adjudication, applicable to both judicial and quasi-judicial functions. It observed that the Chief Secretary, while acting under Section 32, had already formed a concluded opinion on the legality of the structure and the validity of the refusal orders. By subsequently hearing the revision petition against that very order, he was effectively called upon to review his own reasoning.
"The impugned order dated 15.01.2026 makes it apparent that respondent No.1 was very well aware of the fact that it is he, who had dismissed petitioner’s appeal on 11.11.2025 and it was the order passed on 11.11.2025 that was impugned in the revision petition. Yet, the highest quasi-judicial authority heard the revision petition against his own order and dismissed the same holding that the order passed by him in the appellate jurisdiction does not suffer from any illegality."
The Court distinguished revision from review, noting that revision under Section 33 is a supervisory function meant to be exercised by an independent superior authority. Allowing the same officer to hear revision would reduce it to a mere review, which is not contemplated under the Act. The Court cited Ram and Shyam Company to underscore that an appeal from Caesar to Caesar’s wife is legally untenable, and an appeal from one’s own order to oneself is even more indefensible.
The Court further emphasized that the purpose of statutory appeal and revision mechanisms is to provide a check on potential arbitrariness. If the same officer who committed the alleged error is also the one tasked with correcting it, the remedy becomes a charade. The Karnataka High Court’s observation that such a process renders appellate jurisdiction "illusory, elusive, otiose and nugatory" was adopted in full.
The Court concluded that the violation of natural justice was patent and did not require further inquiry into the merits of the underlying dispute. The procedural defect alone invalidated the revision order.
The Verdict
The writ petition was allowed. The impugned revision order dated 15.01.2026 is quashed and set aside. The revision petition filed by the petitioner shall be decided afresh by a competent authority other than the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh, in accordance with law. The State is directed to formulate a comprehensive training program on natural justice in collaboration with the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Academy, Shimla, with compliance to be reported by 28.05.2026.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Revisional Authority Must Be Independent
- Practitioners must challenge any revision order passed by the same officer who decided the appeal under Section 32
- The mere fact that the revision is filed under a statutory provision does not cure the bias if the adjudicator is the same
- In all statutory schemes with layered remedies (appeal + revision), the revisional authority must be functionally and hierarchically distinct from the appellate authority
Natural Justice Overrides Procedural Formalities
- Even if the petitioner has not exhausted all remedies, a violation of nemo judex in causa sua renders the order void ab initio
- Courts will intervene under Article 226 even where an alternative remedy exists, if the remedy itself is tainted by bias
- The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not apply where the remedy is inherently flawed by structural bias
Institutional Accountability Required
- State authorities must proactively train quasi-judicial officers on natural justice principles
- Failure to ensure impartial adjudication invites judicial intervention and undermines public confidence
- This judgment sets a precedent for mandatory institutional training in all states with similar statutory frameworks
