The Rajasthan High Court has clarified that the mere existence of a preventive order under Sections 107 and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot justify the denial of regular parole when the prisoner’s conduct is satisfactory and no credible threat to public order exists. This ruling reinforces the rehabilitative purpose of parole and curbs arbitrary executive discretion.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Safar Mohammad alias Golu, was serving a sentence in Central Jail, Kota, and had successfully availed two regular paroles without any incident or complaint. He applied for a third regular parole, which was rejected solely on the grounds that he had been subjected to preventive detention under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. during his previous parole period while in an open-air camp.
Procedural History
- December 2024: District Probation and Social Justice Officer, Baran, submitted a report (Annexure R-3) stating there was no apprehension of breach of peace or commission of any offence if the petitioner was granted third parole.
- January 2025: The District Parole Advisory Committee reviewed the application and rejected it, citing the pendency of preventive orders under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C.
- 12 February 2025: The rejection order was formally issued by the respondents.
- February 2026: The petitioner filed a Criminal Writ Petition before the Rajasthan High Court seeking quashing of the order.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing of the order denying third regular parole and a direction to the authorities to grant him parole immediately, emphasizing his unblemished jail conduct and the absence of any risk to public order.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the existence of a preventive order under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C., without any actual breach of peace or criminal activity, can validly override the grant of regular parole when the prisoner’s conduct is satisfactory and the parole authority’s own report finds no risk of reoffending.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Learned counsel argued that parole is a statutory privilege rooted in rehabilitation, not punishment, and must be granted unless there is concrete evidence of risk. She relied on the District Probation Officer’s report affirming no apprehension of breach of peace and the jail’s nominal roll showing consistent good conduct. She contended that preventive detention under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. is a precautionary measure, not a finding of guilt or danger, and cannot be used as a blanket bar to parole.
For the Respondent
The Government Advocate contended that the preventive orders were issued due to the petitioner’s past association with potential law and order disturbances, and that the state has a duty to maintain public order. He argued that the Parole Advisory Committee was entitled to weigh the risk of reoffending and that the existence of such orders justified caution.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the purpose of regular parole under prison rules and its alignment with constitutional principles of human dignity and rehabilitation. It noted that Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. are preventive in nature and do not involve adjudication of guilt or proof of imminent criminality. The Court emphasized that these provisions are not a substitute for criminal conviction and cannot be mechanically invoked to deny parole.
"In view thereof, we do not find that the respondents were justified in rejecting petitioner's case for third regular parole only on account of action taken against him, in view of laud object behind parole, under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C."
The Court held that the parole authority must base its decision on actual risk assessment, not on the mere existence of a preventive order. The report from the District Probation Officer, which explicitly found no apprehension of breach of peace, was decisive. The Court further noted that the petitioner’s jail conduct, as recorded in the nominal roll, was satisfactory - a factor that must carry substantial weight.
The Court rejected the notion that preventive measures, even if lawfully issued, can override the rehabilitative intent of parole. It clarified that the burden lies on the state to demonstrate a real and present danger, not on the prisoner to disprove speculative concerns.
The Verdict
The petitioner won. The Court quashed the order denying third regular parole and directed the respondents to grant the benefit forthwith. The Court held that preventive detention under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. cannot be a standalone ground to deny parole when there is no evidence of risk and the prisoner’s conduct remains satisfactory.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Parole Decisions Must Be Risk-Based, Not Mechanistic
- Practitioners must challenge parole denials that rely solely on the existence of Sections 107 or 151 Cr.P.C. orders without supporting evidence of threat
- Parole Advisory Committees must record specific reasons linking preventive measures to actual risk of reoffending
- Jail conduct reports and probation officer assessments must be treated as primary evidence, not secondary considerations
Preventive Orders Are Not Convictions
- Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. are not criminal findings; they are administrative safeguards
- Courts will not permit these orders to function as de facto disqualifiers for parole, probation, or other rehabilitative benefits
- Legal aid organizations should routinely request copies of the grounds for preventive orders to test their relevance to parole eligibility
Judicial Scrutiny of Administrative Discretion Is Strengthened
- This judgment affirms that administrative bodies cannot use vague public order concerns to override statutory parole frameworks
- Writ petitions under Article 226 remain a viable remedy where parole is denied without reasoned application of criteria
- Future parole applications should include annexures of prior parole compliance and conduct records as mandatory supporting documents
