The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, quashing the rejection of a retired Income Tax Commissioner’s candidature for appointment to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal after finding that the presence of a biased member in the selection committee created an irrebuttable apprehension of partiality. This judgment reinforces the foundational principle that even the appearance of bias in public appointments undermines public confidence in institutional fairness.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj, a former Indian Army officer released on disability, cleared the Civil Services Examination in 1989 and rose to the rank of Commissioner of Income Tax in 2012. In 2014, he applied for the post of Member (Accountant), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), and was ranked first by the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) chaired by a sitting Supreme Court Judge. Despite this, his appointment was withheld on unsubstantiated Intelligence Bureau inputs related to a settled matrimonial dispute.
Procedural History
The case unfolded through multiple judicial forums:
- 2016: Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) directed the government to consider the petitioner’s candidature.
- 2017-2019: The High Court and Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the CAT’s orders, directing compliance.
- 2019: The Department issued a charge memorandum and compulsorily retired the petitioner three months before superannuation.
- 2023: The Supreme Court quashed the compulsory retirement, holding it was punitive and mala fide, and restored the petitioner’s service status.
- 2024: Despite the judgment, the Department convened a fourth SCSC, including the very officer who had faced contempt proceedings initiated by the petitioner.
- 2025: The fourth SCSC rejected the petitioner’s candidature.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus directing the reconstitution of the SCSC without the biased member, and the appointment to the ITAT post based on his merit and prior recommendations.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the inclusion of an officer who had been named as a contemnor in proceedings initiated by the petitioner, and who had previously obstructed his appointment, in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, created a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to vitiate the selection process under the principles of natural justice.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta and A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India to argue that the presence of a person with a prior adversarial relationship with the candidate in a selection committee creates a reasonable apprehension of bias, even without proof of actual prejudice. He emphasized that the officer had been held in contempt for willful disobedience of court orders directing his appointment, and that his participation in the fourth SCSC rendered the process procedurally unfair. He further cited Kirti Deshmankar v. Union of India to show that even indirect personal connections can vitiate selection.
For the Respondent
No counter affidavit or oral submissions were filed by the Union of India. The Court noted the deliberate absence of any response, which left the petitioner’s factual assertions uncontroverted and the procedural irregularities unexplained.
The Court's Analysis
The Court conducted a rigorous analysis of the doctrine of bias under natural justice, distinguishing between actual bias and the more critical concept of reasonable apprehension of bias. It held that the law does not require proof of actual prejudice; the mere possibility of partiality, as perceived by a reasonable observer, is sufficient to invalidate a decision.
"The doctrine of bias emerges from the legal maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. It applies only when the interest attributed to an individual is such so as to tempt him to make a decision in favour of, or to further his own cause. There may not be a case of actual bias, or an apprehension to the effect that the matter most certainly will not be decided or dealt with impartially but where the circumstances are such so as to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision, the same is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of bias."
The Court emphasized that selection committees are quasi-judicial bodies whose integrity must be beyond reproach. The officer’s prior role in initiating contempt proceedings against the petitioner, coupled with his involvement in the prolonged obstruction of the petitioner’s appointment, created an irrebuttable nexus between his personal interest and the outcome of the selection. The Court rejected the notion that his vote was merely one among many, citing A.K. Kraipak and G. Sarana v. Lucknow University to affirm that in group deliberations, even subtle influence can distort outcomes.
The Court also noted the absence of any rebuttal from the respondents, which compelled it to accept the petitioner’s narrative as true. It held that the officer’s failure to recuse himself, despite the clear conflict, was a breach of the duty to maintain institutional impartiality. The decision was therefore vitiated not merely by procedural lapse but by a fundamental violation of the rule that justice must be seen to be done.
The Verdict
The petitioner won. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of an officer who had been a contemnor in proceedings initiated by the petitioner rendered the selection process vitiated by a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court quashed the rejection and directed a fresh SCSC meeting excluding the officer, with a timeline for completion.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Apparent Bias Vitiates Selection Even Without Proof of Actual Prejudice
- Practitioners must now challenge selection outcomes on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias, even if no actual favoritism is proven.
- Any prior adversarial relationship between a committee member and a candidate - especially involving contempt or litigation - must be disclosed and addressed.
- The burden shifts to the authority to justify why a potentially biased member should remain on the panel.
Recusal Is Not Optional in Quasi-Judicial Appointments
- Public authorities must proactively identify and exclude individuals with personal stakes in outcomes.
- Failure to recuse, even if unintentional, constitutes a procedural flaw that courts will not overlook.
- Institutions must establish internal protocols for recusal in high-stakes appointments to avoid judicial intervention.
Silence of the State Is Fatal in Administrative Challenges
- When the state fails to file a counter affidavit, courts are entitled to accept the petitioner’s averments as true.
- Deliberate non-compliance with court directions, as seen here, invites adverse inferences and cost penalties.
- Practitioners should routinely move for adverse inference applications when the state remains silent in writ petitions involving administrative fairness.
