The Madhya Pradesh High Court has affirmed that a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy arising from a breakdown in marital status is protected under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and Article 21 of the Constitution. In a landmark ruling, the Court permitted the petitioner to undergo medical termination of her 13-week pregnancy, emphasizing that the woman alone is the ultimate decision-maker regarding her reproductive health.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Urvashi Arya, is a married woman who became pregnant during her marriage to respondent no. 3, Ajay Verma. The couple subsequently decided to dissolve their marriage and initiated divorce proceedings. A compromise was reached in the presence of police authorities, during which both parties expressed mutual consent to divorce. However, the husband later withdrew his cooperation, refusing to proceed with the divorce. The petitioner, now residing at her parental home and facing emotional distress, sought termination of her pregnancy, citing severe mental trauma, insecurity, and threat to her physical and psychological well-being.
Key Facts
- The petitioner is currently 13 weeks and 1 day pregnant at the time of filing the petition on 29.06.2026
- The marriage was solemnized prior to conception
- The petitioner and her husband mutually agreed to divorce in the presence of police on an unspecified date prior to filing
- The husband has since refused to cooperate with divorce proceedings
- The petitioner has not alleged rape, incest, or fetal abnormality
- The petitioner has not sought any financial or custodial relief beyond termination of pregnancy
- The petitioner is not a minor, not disabled, and not a victim of sexual violence
Procedural History
- 29.06.2026: Writ Petition No. 22392 of 2026 filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore
- 29.06.2026: Notice issued to respondent no. 3 (husband) via police service
- 29.06.2026: Service report confirmed by State counsel; husband did not appear
- 29.06.2026: Hearing conducted on admission; matter taken up for final disposal
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought:
- Permission to undergo medical termination of pregnancy at any government or recognized private hospital
- Direction to constitute a Medical Board if necessary to assess safety of the procedure
- Any further relief deemed just and expedient in the interest of justice
The Parties' Positions
Petitioner: Argued that her situation falls squarely within Rule 3B(c) of the MTP Rules, 2003, which explicitly includes "change in marital status during ongoing pregnancy (widowhood and divorce)" as a ground for termination up to 24 weeks. She emphasized that continuation of pregnancy would cause irreparable mental harm and violate her right to bodily autonomy under Article 21.
Respondent State: Did not oppose the petition. Relied on X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare (2023) 9 SCC 433 to argue that the husband’s consent is irrelevant and that reproductive autonomy is a fundamental right. The State affirmed that no statutory bar exists to prevent termination under the facts presented.
The Husband’s Position
The husband, respondent no. 3, was duly served with notice but did not appear or file any objection. His silence was noted by the Court as non-participation in a matter directly affecting his legal rights.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a woman undergoing a breakdown in marital status, including separation and intent to divorce, qualifies for termination of pregnancy under Rule 3B(c) of the MTP Rules, 2003, and whether her right to reproductive autonomy under Article 21 overrides any claim of spousal consent.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel relied on X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare (2023) 9 SCC 433 to argue that reproductive autonomy is an intrinsic part of Article 21. He contended that Rule 3B(c) was designed to protect women whose material circumstances change during pregnancy, including those abandoned by spouses or facing hostile marital environments. He emphasized that the Act does not require spousal consent and that the woman’s mental health, social vulnerability, and future stability are central to the assessment.
For the Respondent/State
The State’s General Advocate did not oppose the petition. She cited paragraphs 94, 101, and 114 of X v. Principal Secretary to assert that the woman alone is the ultimate decision-maker. She argued that the husband’s non-appearance and lack of objection further validated the petitioner’s claim. The State also noted that the pregnancy was within the 24-week statutory limit and that no medical contraindication had been raised.
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a comprehensive review of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, and the MTP Rules, 2003, particularly Rule 3B(c). It held that the provision was not merely procedural but substantive, recognizing that a change in marital status - such as divorce or separation - constitutes a material change in a woman’s life circumstances that may render continuation of pregnancy unsafe for her mental and physical health.
"A woman can become pregnant by choice irrespective of her marital status. In case the pregnancy is wanted, it is equally shared by both the partners. However, in case of an unwanted or incidental pregnancy, the burden invariably falls on the pregnant woman affecting her mental and physical health. Article 21 of the Constitution recognises and protects the right of a woman to undergo termination of pregnancy if her mental or physical health is at stake. Importantly, it is the woman alone who has the right over her body and is the ultimate decision-maker on the question of whether she wants to undergo an abortion."
The Court further referenced its own earlier decision in W.P. No. 13794 of 2026 and the Kerala High Court’s ruling in X v. Union of India, both of which affirmed that no statutory provision mandates spousal consent for termination. The Court observed that the husband’s absence and lack of objection were not merely procedural but indicative of the breakdown of marital partnership.
The Court also noted that the petitioner’s pregnancy was within the 24-week window, eliminating the need for a Medical Board under Rule 3B(c). However, in the interest of due care and to ensure compliance with medical protocols, the Court directed the constitution of a team of specialists to perform the procedure.
The Court rejected any notion that the husband’s potential objection could override the woman’s constitutional right. It emphasized that the State’s role is not to act as a gatekeeper of reproductive decisions but to facilitate access to safe, legal, and dignified healthcare.
The Verdict
The petition was allowed. The Court directed the Chief Medical & Health Officer to constitute a team comprising at least one gynecologist, pediatrician, anesthesiologist, and one medical officer to perform the medical termination of pregnancy. The procedure must be carried out in strict compliance with the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and the precedents set by the Supreme Court and this Court. The medical team must preserve a fetal sample for DNA examination if required for ongoing criminal proceedings, ensure sensitive handling of the petitioner, and maintain her privacy under Section 5A of the MTP Act. The procedure must be completed within seven days of the order.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Reproductive Autonomy Is Absolute
- Practitioners must now argue that spousal consent is legally irrelevant under the MTP Act, regardless of marital status
- Any denial of termination on grounds of husband’s objection is unconstitutional and contrary to X v. Principal Secretary
- Courts must treat the woman’s statement of distress as sufficient grounds under Rule 3B(c)
Rule 3B(c) Covers Separation, Not Just Divorce
- The phrase "change in marital status" includes legal separation, desertion, and irretrievable breakdown, even if divorce proceedings are pending
- A woman need not have obtained a divorce decree to qualify - intent to divorce and cessation of cohabitation are sufficient
- Legal advice should focus on documenting separation (e.g., police compromise, residence records, communication)
Procedural Safeguards Are Mandatory, Not Discretionary
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Even when termination is statutorily permitted, courts must direct constitution of a medical team to ensure compliance with safety norms
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Preservation of fetal DNA for potential criminal cases is now a binding directive
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Medical institutions must provide trauma-informed care and maintain confidentiality under Section 5A
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All petitions under Rule 3B(c) must be heard expeditiously; delay itself violates Article 21
