The Madhya Pradesh High Court has affirmed that a rape victim’s consent is the sole decisive factor in terminating a pregnancy beyond 24 weeks, overriding statutory gestational limits under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act. This judgment reinforces that reproductive autonomy is not a privilege granted by the State but a fundamental right under Article 21, especially when the pregnancy results from sexual violence.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The prosecutrix, a 13-year-old girl, was raped and impregnated by an accused who later threatened her family. The rape was reported and an FIR was registered under Sections 351(2), 62(2)(m), 65(1), 332 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Section 5l/6 and 5j(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 3(2)(va), 3(2)(w), and 3(1)(w)(i) of the SC/ST Act. Medical examination confirmed pregnancy at 29 weeks and 1 day, with no congenital abnormalities detected in the foetus.
Procedural History
- The victim and her parents submitted a written consent for termination on 06.02.2026.
- A Medical Board at Bundelkhand Medical College, Sagar, opined that termination was medically possible but carried significant risks due to advanced gestation and teenage pregnancy.
- The Board noted that while termination beyond 24 weeks is restricted under the MTP Act, 1971, the victim’s circumstances warranted exceptional consideration.
- The matter was taken up suo moto by the High Court pursuant to directions in In reference (suo moto) v. State of M.P. (WP No. 5184 of 2025).
Relief Sought
The prosecutrix and her parents sought permission to terminate the pregnancy, citing severe psychological trauma, lack of emotional maturity to raise a child, and the traumatic origin of the pregnancy. They also requested preservation of fetal tissue for DNA evidence in the pending criminal trial.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether the right to reproductive autonomy under Article 21 permits termination of a pregnancy beyond 24 weeks in cases of rape, even when the foetus is healthy and no statutory exception under Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 is satisfied.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner relied on Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, X v. State (NCT of Delhi), and X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department to argue that:
- The consent of the pregnant woman is the cornerstone of reproductive rights.
- The MTP Act’s gestational limit cannot override the fundamental right to dignity, privacy, and bodily integrity.
- The trauma of rape and forced pregnancy constitutes grave mental injury, satisfying the exception under Section 3(2)(b)(i).
- The Medical Board’s opinion, while noting risks, did not oppose termination - only highlighted procedural safeguards.
For the Respondent
The State did not oppose the termination. The Government Advocate acknowledged the victim’s circumstances and deferred to the Court’s discretion, citing the Supreme Court’s consistent jurisprudence on reproductive rights. No substantive counter-argument was advanced.
The Court's Analysis
The Court conducted a comprehensive review of Supreme Court precedents, emphasizing that reproductive choice is intrinsic to Article 21. It held that the MTP Act’s procedural requirements are not absolute barriers but safeguards to be interpreted in light of constitutional rights.
"The choice to continue pregnancy to term, regardless of the court having allowed termination of the pregnancy, belongs to the individual alone."
The Court rejected the notion that a healthy foetus or advanced gestation negates the victim’s right. It distinguished X v. State (NCT of Delhi), where termination was permitted despite no foetal abnormality, and reaffirmed that the woman’s mental and emotional state is paramount.
The Court further noted that the Medical Board’s report did not categorically deny termination but merely outlined risks - consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation in A v. State of Maharashtra that risk alone cannot override consent.
It also emphasized that Section 3(4) of the MTP Act explicitly requires the consent of the pregnant woman, making it a statutory as well as constitutional imperative. The Court held that the State cannot act as parens patriae to override the victim’s decision, even in cases involving minors.
The Court also addressed the evidentiary concern by directing preservation of fetal tissue for DNA testing, recognizing its critical role in securing conviction under the POCSO Act.
The Verdict
The petitioner won. The Court held that the right to terminate a pregnancy beyond 24 weeks is constitutionally protected when the pregnancy results from rape, irrespective of foetal health or gestational age. The Court permitted termination subject to medical safeguards and directed preservation of fetal tissue for evidentiary purposes.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Consent Overrides Statutory Limits
- Practitioners must now argue that consent under Section 3(4) of the MTP Act is not a formality but a constitutional precondition.
- In rape cases, mental trauma alone qualifies as grave injury to health under Section 3(2)(b)(i), even without physical complications.
- Medical Boards cannot deny termination solely on gestational age or absence of foetal abnormalities.
Judicial Discretion Is Broad in Sua Sponte Matters
- High Courts may invoke Article 226 to grant relief in exceptional cases of sexual violence, even without formal petitions.
- Sua sponte proceedings under In reference can be used to fast-track justice for vulnerable victims.
- Courts must prioritize emotional and psychological well-being over procedural rigidity.
Evidence Preservation Is Mandatory
- In all cases involving termination of pregnancy after rape, fetal tissue must be preserved for DNA testing unless medically infeasible.
- Hospitals must coordinate with investigating agencies to ensure chain of custody for forensic evidence.
- Failure to preserve evidence may constitute negligence in the context of POCSO or SC/ST Act prosecutions.
