The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reaffirmed the narrow scope of revisional jurisdiction over interim maintenance orders under the Family Courts Act, 1984, emphasizing that appellate interference cannot substitute factual findings made by trial courts. This ruling reinforces procedural restraint in family matters where interim relief is granted pending final adjudication.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Salman Khan, challenged an interim maintenance order passed by the Family Court at Ujjain, which directed him to pay Rs. 8,000 per month - Rs. 5,000 to his wife, Shabnoor Khan, and Rs. 3,000 for their one-year-old daughter. The petitioner contended that the wife had independent income sources, including teaching Quran and stitching burkas, and that the maintenance award was excessive given his claimed earnings of Rs. 6,000 per month as a laborer.
Procedural History
- August 13, 2024: Respondents filed an application for interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, read with Section 12 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
- September 24, 2025: Family Court awarded Rs. 8,000 per month as interim maintenance, effective from the date of application.
- January 23, 2026: Criminal Revision No. 215 of 2026 was filed before the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with Section 438 of the BNSS, 2023.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought quashing or modification of the interim maintenance order, arguing that the Family Court failed to adequately consider the wife’s income and that the award was unjustified given his financial constraints.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether a revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 can be used to reappreciate evidence or reassess income details in an interim maintenance order, or whether such interference is restricted to patent jurisdictional errors or errors of law.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner argued that the Family Court erred in ignoring the wife’s documented income from teaching and tailoring, which together exceeded Rs. 25,000 per month. He relied on Sunita Kachwaha v. Rajesh Kachwaha to assert that maintenance must be proportionate to both parties’ means and that the award was arbitrary and disproportionate. He further contended that the order was passed without proper application of mind to the financial realities.
For the Respondent
The respondents maintained that the wife’s income was irregular and insufficient to meet the full-time care needs of a one-year-old child. They emphasized that the maintenance amount was modest and aligned with the child’s basic needs and the petitioner’s capacity to pay, as inferred from his occupation as a building contractor. They cited Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P. to argue that interim maintenance is meant to ensure subsistence, not final adjudication.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the scope of revision under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and held that it is not a substitute for appeal. It reiterated the principle laid down in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh that revisional jurisdiction is confined to correcting patent errors of jurisdiction or law, not re-evaluating evidence or factual findings.
"The scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect of an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual case. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings."
The Court noted that the Family Court had considered both parties’ submissions, including the wife’s claimed income and the petitioner’s occupation. The award of Rs. 8,000 was deemed reasonable given the child’s age and the wife’s responsibility for full-time care. The Court emphasized that interim maintenance is not a final determination of rights but a measure to ensure immediate subsistence. It further observed that the petitioner’s challenge was essentially an attempt to reargue facts, which falls outside the permissible scope of revision.
The Verdict
The revision petition was dismissed. The Court held that interim maintenance orders cannot be disturbed on revision unless there is a patent error of law or jurisdiction, and that factual reappreciation is impermissible. The Family Court was directed to decide the main application within four months without further adjournments.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Revision Cannot Substitute Factual Reappreciation
- Practitioners must avoid filing revision petitions solely to challenge the quantum of interim maintenance based on disputed income claims.
- Courts will not entertain revision petitions that seek to reweigh evidence already considered by the Family Court.
- Any challenge must focus on procedural irregularities, lack of jurisdiction, or manifest illegality - not on whether the amount is "too high" or "too low."
Interim Maintenance Must Reflect Immediate Needs, Not Final Entitlement
- The primary purpose of interim maintenance is to ensure subsistence pending final adjudication, not to apportion assets or determine long-term liability.
- Courts must consider the child’s needs, the custodial parent’s inability to work full-time, and the payer’s capacity, even if income is irregular.
- Income from informal or irregular sources (e.g., stitching, tutoring) must be taken into account, but not discounted merely because it is non-salaried.
Timely Disposal of Maintenance Cases Is Mandatory
- The Court’s directive to dispose of the main application within four months sets a precedent for expeditious resolution in family matters.
- Practitioners should now routinely seek directions for time-bound disposal in interim maintenance applications, especially where children are involved.
- Delay in final disposal undermines the very purpose of interim relief and may attract contempt proceedings if ignored.
