Article 300A | State Cannot Retain Private Land for 45 Years Without Lawful Acquisition or Compensation : Calcutta HC

The Calcutta High Court has affirmed that the State cannot indefinitely retain private land for public use without initiating lawful acquisition proceedings or paying fair compensation, even after nearly five decades of possession. This ruling reinforces Article 300A of the Constitution as a non-negotiable safeguard against arbitrary state action, irrespective of delay or lapse of time.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioners, including Champabati Bera and others, are recorded owners of RS Plot No. 558 (LR Plot No. 558), measuring 0.56 acres, located in Mouza Bural, JL No. 388, Police Station Sabong, Paschim Medinipur. The land was requisitioned by the Government of West Bengal in 1975-76 under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (1948 Act), for the construction of the Sabong-Mohar ODR road. Despite possession being taken over and the land being permanently utilised for public infrastructure, no formal acquisition proceedings were initiated under the 1948 Act, and no compensation has ever been paid.

Key Facts

• The land was requisitioned under Section 3(1) of the 1948 Act on or about 1975-76.
• Possession of the land was delivered to the Requiring Body on 22.02.1978.
• No notification under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act was ever published in the Calcutta Gazette.
• No award was ever passed under the 1948 Act.
• No compensation was paid to the petitioners at any stage.
• The petitioners submitted a representation for compensation on 15.10.2004.
• A prior writ petition (WPA 12924 of 2017) was filed, leading to a direction by a coordinate bench on 18.05.2018 for the Special Land Acquisition Officer to pass a speaking order.
• On 18.05.2018, the 5th respondent (Special Land Acquisition Officer) confirmed that the land was requisitioned, possession taken, and compensation due, but stated it lacked authority to pay due to repeal of the 1948 and 1894 Acts.
• On 18.03.2020, the 8th respondent (Superintendent Engineer) issued a memo requesting the District Land Purchase Committee to prepare an estimate under the direct purchase policy.
• The 1948 Act ceased to be operative on 31.03.1997 after its validity expired.
• The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was repealed with effect from 01.01.2014 by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act).
• No notice under Section 9(3A) of the 1894 Act was issued before its repeal.
• The petitioners have never received any compensation, despite continuous use of the land by the State for over 45 years.

Procedural History

• 1975-76: Land requisitioned under Section 3(1) of the 1948 Act (LA Case No. 255 of 1975-76).
• 22.02.1978: Possession delivered to the Requiring Body.
• 15.10.2004: Petitioners submitted first formal representation for compensation.
• 2017: WPA 12924 of 2017 filed before the Calcutta High Court.
• 18.05.2018: Special Land Acquisition Officer passed order confirming entitlement to compensation but declined payment due to repeal of laws.
• 18.03.2020: Superintendent Engineer issued memo seeking land estimate under direct purchase policy.
• 2025: WPA 15687 of 2025 filed before the Calcutta High Court.
• 09.03.2026: Arguments concluded.
• 06.05.2026: Judgment delivered.

Relief Sought

The petitioners sought:

• A direction to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under the 2013 Act.
• Setting aside of the memo dated 18.03.2020.
• Payment of fair compensation for the land, calculated as per the 2013 Act.
• Compliance within a specified timeframe.

The Legal Issue

Can the State retain possession of private land for public use for over four decades without initiating any lawful acquisition proceeding or paying compensation, and can it invoke the doctrine of delay and laches to defeat a claim for fair compensation when no legal authority for deprivation exists?

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

The petitioner’s counsel relied on Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, and Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh to argue that deprivation of property without authority of law violates Article 300A of the Constitution. He contended that the 1948 Act, being a temporary statute, expired on 31.03.1997, and since no notice under Section 4(1a) was issued, the requisition lapsed. No notice under Section 9(3A) of the 1894 Act was issued before its repeal on 01.01.2014, leaving the State’s possession unlawful. He further argued that delay cannot bar a claim where the cause of action is continuous and the State’s conduct shocks judicial conscience. The Supreme Court’s decisions in B.K. Ravichandra v. Union of India and Mahadeb Khan v. State of West Bengal were cited to show that the State cannot evade its obligation by relying on lapse of time.

For the Respondent

The State’s counsel argued that the writ petition was barred by inordinate delay and laches, citing Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India. He contended that possession was taken in 1978, and the petitioners had ample opportunity to seek redress but remained silent for nearly 40 years. He further argued that the 2013 Act cannot be applied retrospectively to acquisitions initiated under the 1948 Act, and that Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies only to proceedings under the 1894 Act, not the 1948 Act. He relied on the unreported judgment in Mariam Ahmed v. State of West Bengal (02.02.2026) to assert that the 2013 Act is inapplicable.

The Court's Analysis

The Court began by affirming that Article 300A protects the right to property as a constitutional right, even though it is no longer a fundamental right. The State cannot deprive a citizen of property except by authority of law. The Court observed that the requisition under Section 3(1) of the 1948 Act was merely a temporary measure, and acquisition under Section 4(1a) was mandatory to convert it into permanent ownership. Since no such notice was issued, the requisition remained incomplete.

"The act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of 'absolute power' which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the landowner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our Constitution."

The Court rejected the State’s reliance on delay, citing Tukaram Kana Joshi and Vidya Devi, holding that delay and laches are not absolute bars when the cause of action is continuous and the State’s conduct shocks judicial conscience. The Court emphasized that the State, as a welfare entity, cannot invoke adverse possession to legitimise unlawful possession.

The Court then examined the legal effect of the expiry of the 1948 Act on 31.03.1997. It held that since no notice under Section 4(1a) was issued, the requisition lapsed. The Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, permitted revival of such requisitions via Section 9(3A) of the 1894 Act, but no such notice was issued before the 1894 Act was repealed on 01.01.2014. The Court relied on Mahadeb Khan v. State of West Bengal (22.12.2023) to hold that once the 1894 Act was repealed, no further notices under Section 9(3A) could be issued. The State’s failure to act during the statutory window cannot now be used to justify continued unlawful possession.

The Court distinguished Mariam Ahmed on facts, noting that in that case, a notice under Section 9(3B) had been issued, whereas here, no notice under either Section 9(3A) or 9(3B) was ever issued. The Court concluded that the State’s possession since 01.01.2014 is entirely without legal authority.

The Verdict

The writ petition is allowed. The State is directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for RS Plot No. 558. The competent authority shall complete all proceedings, including determination of compensation, payment of interest, and issuance of award, within four months from the date of receipt of a certified server copy of this order. The compensation shall be calculated as per the provisions of the 2013 Act, including market value, solatium, and other statutory entitlements. Urgent photostat certified copies shall be supplied upon compliance of formalities.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Delay Cannot Shield Unlawful Possession

• Practitioners must argue that delay is not a bar where the State has no legal authority to retain land.
• Courts will examine whether deprivation occurred under lawful procedure or through executive fiat.
• Even decades-long possession without compensation is actionable under Article 300A.

Fresh Acquisition Mandatory Under 2013 Act

• Where acquisition proceedings under repealed statutes (1948 Act, 1894 Act) lapsed due to non-compliance, the only remedy is initiation of fresh proceedings under the 2013 Act.
• Section 24 of the 2013 Act does not save proceedings initiated under the 1948 Act unless they were converted into acquisition under the 1894 Act via Section 9(3A) or 9(3B).
• No notice under Section 9(3A) = no valid acquisition = no applicability of Section 24(1)(b).

State Cannot Claim Adverse Possession

• The State cannot invoke adverse possession to legitimise unlawful occupation of private land.
• This principle is now binding under Article 141 of the Constitution, as affirmed in Sabitri Devi and Mahadeb Khan.
• Any claim by the State that long possession equals title is legally untenable and contrary to constitutional morality.