Article 14 & 21 | Maternity Benefit for Adoptive Mothers Cannot Be Restricted by Age Limit : SC

The Supreme Court has held that imposing a three-month age limit on adopted children for eligibility to maternity benefit under the Code on Social Security, 2020, is unconstitutional. The judgment affirms that motherhood, whether biological or adoptive, is protected under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and that legal distinctions based on the age of the adopted child lack rational nexus and violate the dignity of both mother and child.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner, Hamsaanandini Nanduri, an adoptive mother of two children, challenged Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, as amended by the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017, which limited maternity benefit to women adopting children below the age of three months. After the enactment of the Code on Social Security, 2020, which consolidated all social security laws, the petitioner amended her petition to challenge Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code, the pari materia provision that retained the same three-month age restriction.

Key Facts

• The petitioner adopted two children through legal adoption procedures under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the CARA Regulations, 2022.
• Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, entitles only women who adopt a child below the age of three months to twelve weeks of maternity benefit.
• Women adopting children aged three months or older are categorically excluded from any maternity benefit under the provision.
• The adoption process for orphaned, abandoned, or surrendered children typically takes a minimum of two to four months to complete, including mandatory waiting periods for biological parents to reconsider surrender and for authorities to declare the child legally free for adoption.
• The petitioner’s adoption of her second child occurred after the child had surpassed the three-month threshold, rendering her ineligible for maternity benefit despite the emotional and practical demands of integration.
• The provision does not apply to establishments with fewer than fifty employees, thereby excluding a large segment of working women from access to crèche facilities as an alternative.
• The petitioner retired on 31.03.2019 and filed the writ petition on 20.10.2021.

Procedural History

• 20.10.2021: Original writ petition filed under Article 32 challenging Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
• 21.11.2025: Code on Social Security, 2020, came into force, replacing the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
• 12.12.2025: Supreme Court permitted the petitioner to amend the petition to challenge Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code.
• 15.01.2026: I.A. No. 33856/2026 filed seeking amendment of the petition to reflect the new provision.
• 17.03.2026: Judgment delivered by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court.

The Parties' Positions

For the Petitioner

• The three-month age limit creates an arbitrary and irrational classification among adoptive mothers, violating Article 14.
• The distinction bears no rational nexus with the object of the Code, which is to support motherhood and child welfare.
• The provision disregards the emotional, psychological, and practical needs of adoptive families, particularly for children with disabilities or those adopted by single mothers.
• The adoption process under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations takes longer than three months, making the provision practically unworkable and illusory.
• The provision violates the right to reproductive autonomy and dignity under Article 21 by denying adoptive mothers equal recognition of motherhood.
• The best interests of the child require uninterrupted parental presence during the critical integration phase, regardless of the child’s age.

For the Respondents

• The age limit of three months is reasonable because infants under this age require intensive, continuous care for feeding, sleeping, and bonding.
• Adoptive mothers of older children may avail crèche facilities under Section 67 of the 2020 Code.
• The provision balances the rights of adoptive mothers with the concerns of employers.
• The classification is not discriminatory as it aligns with international norms and the physiological needs of newborns.

Relief Sought

The petitioner sought a declaration that Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, is unconstitutional to the extent it imposes a three-month age limit on adopted children for maternity benefit. She further sought a direction to read the provision as applicable to all legally adopted children, irrespective of age.

The Legal Issue

The central question was whether Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, by limiting maternity benefit to women adopting children below the age of three months, violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution by creating an arbitrary classification and denying adoptive mothers and children their right to dignity, reproductive autonomy, and equal protection.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

Ms. Bani Dikshit, counsel for the petitioner, argued that the three-month age limit is artificial and lacks any rational connection to the purpose of maternity benefit, which is to support motherhood and child integration. She cited precedents such as Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Lata Goyal v. Union of India, and Pratiba Himral v. State of H.P., which recognize adoption as equivalent to biological motherhood under constitutional law. She emphasized that the adoption process under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations takes at least two to four months, making the provision practically unenforceable. She further contended that the provision discriminates against children with disabilities and single adoptive mothers, who require extended time for bonding. The petitioner relied on international jurisprudence, including Werner Van Wyk v. Minister of Employment and Labour (South Africa) and Topčić-Rosenberg v. Croatia, to show that age-based restrictions on adoptive leave are unconstitutional.

For the Respondent

Mr. K.M. Nataraj, Additional Solicitor General, defended the provision as a reasonable classification aimed at balancing employer interests with maternal needs. He argued that children above three months are less dependent on continuous care and that crèche facilities under Section 67 provide an alternative. He contended that the age limit reflects biological realities and international standards, and that the legislature is entitled to make policy choices on social security benefits. He dismissed the argument of unworkability, asserting that district magistrates can expedite adoption orders.

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional validity of Section 60(4) under Articles 14 and 21. It began by affirming that motherhood is not confined to biological reproduction but encompasses the emotional, psychological, and caregiving responsibilities of raising a child. The Court held that the purpose of maternity benefit is to support the transition into motherhood, not merely to facilitate recovery from childbirth.

"Motherhood does not end with the birth of a child. This was observed, or rather emphasized by the Chhattisgarh High Court in Lata Goyal v. Union of India... Motherhood never ends on the birth of the child and a commissioning/adoption mother cannot be refused paid maternity leave."

The Court rejected the respondents’ reliance on crèche facilities, noting that such facilities are mandatory only in establishments with fifty or more employees, leaving a vast majority of working women without access. It emphasized that crèche facilities cannot substitute for the indispensable presence of a mother during the critical early phase of integration.

On the question of classification under Article 14, the Court applied the twin tests of intelligible differentia and rational nexus. It found that the distinction between adoptive mothers of children below and above three months was arbitrary. The Court held that women adopting children aged three months or older are similarly situated to those adopting younger children in terms of caregiving obligations, emotional bonding, and professional disruption. The classification failed the test of substantive equality because it excluded all similarly placed individuals.

The Court further held that the provision was under-inclusive, violating the principle that a beneficial law must include all those similarly situated. It cited Pravinsinh Indrasinh Mahida v. State of Gujarat and Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6-A, In re to underscore that the State bears a higher burden of justification when a classification affects core rights like dignity and reproductive autonomy.

The Court also examined the provision’s workability. It noted that the adoption process under the JJ Act and CARA Regulations requires a minimum of two months for declaration of legal status, and often exceeds four months. By the time a child is legally placed, the three-month window is invariably exhausted. The Court held that a law which is practically unenforceable due to administrative realities is illusory and violates the constitutional promise of social justice.

"A legislative provision, more particularly, one which is beneficial in nature, must be capable of meaningful implementation so that the class for whose benefit it has been enacted is able to effectively avail the protection intended by the legislature."

On Article 21, the Court affirmed that adoption is an exercise of reproductive autonomy and a legitimate form of family formation. It relied on Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India to hold that the right to choose parenthood through adoption is protected under the right to life and personal liberty. The Court further held that the best interests of the child, as mandated by the JJ Act and international conventions, require sustained parental presence during the integration phase, regardless of the child’s age.

The Court also highlighted the institutional invisibility of unpaid care work and the gendered burden it imposes on women. It noted that the provision perpetuates structural inequality by failing to recognize that adoptive mothers, like biological mothers, require time to adjust, bond, and provide uninterrupted care.

The Verdict

The petition was allowed. The Supreme Court declared Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, to the extent that it imposes a three-month age limit on adopted children for maternity benefit, violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court read down the provision to read as follows:

"(4) A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be."

The Court directed that all adoptive mothers, irrespective of the child’s age, are entitled to twelve weeks of maternity benefit. The Union was urged to introduce a statutory provision for paternity leave, with duration responsive to the needs of both parent and child.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Motherhood Is Not Defined by Biology

• Practitioners must now argue that any legal distinction between biological and adoptive motherhood in social security, leave, or benefit schemes is constitutionally suspect.
• Employers and tribunals must treat adoptive mothers identically to biological mothers in granting maternity leave, childcare leave, or related benefits.
• Denial of benefits to adoptive mothers on the ground of the child’s age or mode of acquisition is now a clear violation of Article 14 and Article 21.

The Best Interests of the Child Extend Beyond Legal Formalities

• Courts must assess the ongoing integration needs of adopted children, not merely the moment of placement.
• In custody, adoption, or welfare disputes, the best interests of the child require consideration of the child’s emotional bonding period, regardless of age.
• Administrative delays in adoption processes cannot be used to justify exclusion from benefits; the law must adapt to reality, not the reverse.

Legislative Workability Is a Constitutional Imperative

• Beneficial legislation must be practically enforceable. If administrative timelines render a benefit inaccessible, courts may strike it down as illusory.

• Legislators must account for procedural realities when designing social welfare schemes.

• Courts will not uphold provisions that are theoretically generous but practically unattainable, especially when they affect vulnerable groups.

• Practitioners should challenge any benefit scheme with rigid time thresholds that conflict with statutory or administrative timelines.

• In cases involving adoption, disability, or single-parent families, the burden shifts to the State to justify exclusions.

• This judgment sets a precedent for extending similar protections to fathers under paternity leave schemes, reinforcing gender-neutral parenting norms.