The Chhattisgarh High Court set aside an order denying IVF treatment to a couple solely because the husband exceeded the age limit under Section 21(g)(ii) of the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, while the wife remained within the prescribed age limit and was medically fit for treatment. The Court held that such a rigid application of the age restriction disproportionately impinges on the constitutional right to reproductive autonomy under Article 21 when the statutory framework prescribes individual-specific eligibility criteria.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, a legally wedded couple aged approximately 47 and 57 years, sought permission to undergo IVF/ART treatment after years of unsuccessful medical interventions for infertility. Their request was rejected by the competent authority solely on the ground that the husband had crossed the upper age limit prescribed for men under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act, 2021, despite the wife being within the age limit for women under Section 21(g)(i) and medically found suitable for the procedure.
Key Facts
- The petitioners have been married for about 22 years and have no surviving child.
- Petitioner No. 1 (wife) underwent Intrauterine Insemination (IUI) treatment in 2013, which did not result in successful conception.
- Petitioner No. 1 conceived in 2015 but suffered a miscarriage at approximately four months of gestation.
- After exhausting conventional medical options, the petitioners approached Respondent No. 5 (Aayush Test Tube Baby Centre) for IVF/ART treatment.
- Upon medical examination and counselling, Respondent No. 5 found the petitioners suitable for the proposed treatment and recommended obtaining permission from the competent authority.
- The petitioners submitted a representation dated 24.06.2026 seeking permission for IVF/ART treatment.
- Respondent No. 5 addressed a communication dated 24.06.2026 recommending permission be granted after appropriate counselling and informed consent.
- The representation was rejected vide impugned letter/order dated 31.07.2026 solely on the ground that Petitioner No. 2 (husband) had crossed the upper age limit prescribed for a man under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act.
- Petitioner No. 1 is aged about 47 years, falling within the age limit of 21-50 years prescribed for women under Section 21(g)(i).
- Petitioner No. 2 is aged about 57 years, exceeding the age limit of 21-55 years prescribed for men under Section 21(g)(ii).
Procedural History
- 24.06.2026: Petitioners submitted representation seeking permission for IVF/ART treatment.
- 31.07.2026: Impugned letter/order dated rejecting the request solely on husband's age exceeding limit.
- 29.09.2026: Order reserved by the High Court of Chhattisgarh.
- 06.10.2026: Judgment delivered.
- WPC No. 4926 of 2026 filed before the High Court challenging the impugned order.
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought:
- Quashing of the impugned letter/order dated 31.07.2026.
- Direction to respondents to permit and proceed with IVF/ART treatment.
- Direction to continue IVF treatment even if Petitioner No. 2 surpasses age 50 during treatment.
- Direction to ensure no administrative or regulatory hurdles are placed against ongoing treatment.
- Any other relief deemed fit in the interest of justice, including costs.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioners could be denied access to Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART)/IVF treatment solely on the ground that Petitioner No. 2 had crossed the upper age limit prescribed under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act, 2021, when Petitioner No. 1 was within the prescribed age limit under Section 21(g)(i) and had been medically found suitable for the proposed treatment.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioners
The petitioners contended that Section 21(g) of the ART Act prescribes separate and gender-specific age limits for women and men without any composite age criterion for a commissioning couple. They argued that eligibility for ART services must be examined with reference to individual statutory requirements, citing Sections 2(1)(n), 2(1)(u), and 2(1)(e) of the ART Act. Reliance was placed on judgments from this Court (Neeru Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), Calcutta High Court (Sanchita Ghosh & Another v. Union of India), Gujarat High Court (X2 v. Chief Medical Officer-cum-Civil Surgeon), Calcutta High Court (Ankhi Laha v. Union of India and Piu Das Sarkar v. Union of India), Madhya Pradesh High Court (Babitha A. Singh v. State of M.P.), Calcutta High Court (Chayana Bisui v. State of W.B.), Delhi High Court (Shewta Tuteja v. Union of India), and Punjab & Haryana High Court (Pushpa v. Union of India and Jayanta Dasgupta v. State of W.B.) to assert that the ART Act's age restrictions cannot be interpreted mechanically to defeat legitimate claims of reproductive autonomy where individual eligibility criteria are satisfied. It was submitted that the legislature did not enact a joint age ceiling for commissioning couples, and administrative authorities cannot create additional disqualifications by interpretation.
For the Respondent/State
The State counsel argued that Section 21(g) of the ART Act expressly prescribes age limits: women aged 21-50 years and men aged 21-55 years. Since Petitioner No. 2 is aged about 57 years, he does not satisfy the statutory eligibility requirement, and the competent authority was justified in declining the request. It was contended that the petitioners cannot seek relaxation of an express statutory condition by relying on personal circumstances or desire to have a child. The State emphasized that the ART Act aims to regulate assisted reproductive technology services with appropriate safeguards for persons undergoing procedures and children born through ART, and that age restrictions under Section 21(g) are part of this statutory framework that cannot be diluted or relaxed by administrative authorities or judicial directions creating exceptions not contemplated by the legislature.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by noting that reproductive autonomy forms an integral part of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration and expanded in subsequent decisions including K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and Vijaya Kumari S. v. Union of India. It observed that while statutory provisions regulating ART must be complied with, their interpretation must align with the object and purpose of the legislation and the constitutional rights sought to be protected.
The Court examined Section 21(g) of the ART Act, which prescribes:
"(i) to a woman above the age of twenty-one years and below the age of fifty years; (ii) to a man above the age of twenty-one years and below the age of fifty-five years."
It highlighted that the provision uses gender-specific language and applies age restrictions with reference to the individual seeking ART services, not by treating the commissioning couple's age as a composite criterion. This interpretation is supported by Section 2(1)(n) defining "patients" as individuals or couples seeking infertility treatment, indicating individual eligibility assessment.
The Court emphasized that the statutory scheme does not expressly provide that the ineligibility of one spouse on account of age would, by itself, render the other spouse ineligible where such spouse independently satisfies the prescribed conditions. It held that reading a composite age restriction into Section 21(g) would amount to adding words to the statute that the legislature consciously did not enact. The Court further noted that such an interpretation would lead to anomalous consequences, depriving a medically fit woman within the age limit of ART opportunities merely because her husband exceeded the male age limit, despite her independent eligibility.
Crucially, the Court distinguished between initiating a fresh ART cycle after crossing the age threshold and continuing an already commenced treatment involving existing cryopreserved embryos. It relied on judgments from the High Court of Kerala (Nandini K. v. Union of India), High Court of Delhi (D and Another vs. Union of India), and High Court of Punjab and Haryana (Pushpa v. Union of India) to hold that statutory age restrictions cannot be applied retrospectively to defeat legitimate continuation of lawfully undertaken treatment processes. The Court affirmed that where the body remains capable and the heart remains willing, the desire for parenthood cannot be dismissed merely as a desire whose time has passed.
The Verdict
The writ petition was allowed. The Court set aside the impugned letter/order dated 31.07.2026 that rejected the petitioners' request solely on the ground that Petitioner No. 2 had crossed the upper age limit prescribed under Section 21(g)(ii) of the ART Act. It directed respondent authorities and Respondent No. 5 to permit the petitioners to proceed with IVF/ART treatment, subject to Petitioner No. 1 satisfying applicable medical requirements and the petitioners complying with all other statutory, ethical, and regulatory requirements under the ART Act and applicable Rules/Regulations. The Court clarified that the mere fact that Petitioner No. 2 has crossed the age prescribed under Section 21(g)(ii) shall not, by itself, be treated as a bar to Petitioner No. 1 undergoing the proposed IVF/ART procedure, she otherwise being within the age prescribed under Section 21(g)(i). It further directed that if, during the course of treatment already commenced pursuant to this order, Petitioner No. 1 crosses the age of 50 years, such intervening attainment of age shall not, by itself, operate to discontinue or frustrate an ongoing treatment cycle, subject always to medical advisability and compliance with other applicable statutory requirements. Respondent No. 5 shall not be subjected to any penal or adverse action under the ART Act for providing treatment in compliance with this order, provided all other statutory, medical, and regulatory requirements are duly complied with. The concerned respondents shall ensure no unnecessary administrative impediment is created in implementing the order, with treatment remaining subject to medical assessment, informed consent, professional advice, and all other safeguards mandated under applicable law.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Individual Eligibility Trumps Composite Bar in ART Cases
This judgment establishes that under the ART Act, 2021, age eligibility for IVF/ART treatment must be assessed individually for each spouse seeking treatment, not as a combined criterion for the commissioning couple. Practitioners must argue that where one spouse satisfies the individual age limit (e.g., wife under 50 years under Section 21(g)(i)) and is medically fit, denial of treatment solely because the other spouse exceeds the male age limit (Section 21(g)(ii)) is unsustainable. The statutory framework does not authorize importing a composite age restriction not expressly enacted by the legislature.
Continuation of Lawfully Undertaken Treatment Protected
The Court's distinction between initiating fresh ART cycles after age threshold crossing versus continuing existing treatment involving cryopreserved embryos creates a vital protection for patients. For cases where embryo creation, retrieval, or cryopreservation occurred while both spouses were within statutory age limits, subsequent age progression of one spouse during storage or treatment cannot automatically terminate ongoing cycles. Lawyers should document medical timelines meticulously to demonstrate that the treatment process commenced within permissible statutory parameters.
Reproductive Autonomy Requires Purposive Statutory Interpretation
This decision reinforces that statutory age restrictions in welfare legislation like the ART Act must be interpreted in harmony with constitutional rights under Article 21. Where a rigid application disproportionately impinges on reproductive autonomy despite individual eligibility and medical suitability, courts must adopt a purposive construction that advances constitutional freedoms while preserving the regulatory object. Advocates should foreground constitutional principles when challenging mechanical applications of statutory conditions that defeat legitimate claims.
