Tuesday, 3 November 2026

The dispute. A woman died of manual strangulation in her matrimonial home within nine months of marriage. Her husband set up an alibi of an epileptic seizure during intercourse, but medical evidence revealed hyoid bone fractures establishing homicidal throttling. The High Court affirmed dowry death convictions and convicted the husband of murder under Section 302 IPC, which he appealed to the Supreme Court.

The reasoning. When homicidal death occurs within the privacy of a home, Section 106 Evidence Act requires inmates to provide a credible explanation. A demonstrably false defence supplies the missing link in the circumstantial chain to establish guilt for murder.

For your practice. In matrimonial homicide trials, setting up a fabricated medical defence allows courts to infer guilt where death occurs in privacy.

The order. Appeals dismissed. Conviction and life sentence under Section 302 IPC affirmed, with direction to surrender within four weeks.

Section 106, Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Case

R.D.J. v. State of MAHARASHTRA

Citation

Supreme Court of India · Crl.A. No.-001849-001849 - 2013 · 2026 INSC 1187 · 02.11.2026

Bench

Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta, Aparesh Kumar Singh

The dispute. A candidate cleared physical and written examinations for police constable recruitment but was disqualified by the departmental medical board for squint eye. Two district government hospitals and premier referral hospital KGMU certified normal vision. The High Court dismissed the candidate's writ petition citing concluded selection, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The reasoning. Departmental medical opinions cannot prevail over detailed objective findings by premier referral institutions. A meritorious candidate wrongly disqualified on erroneous medical grounds cannot be denied appointment merely because recruitment concluded.

For your practice. Recruitment authorities cannot rely on conclusory departmental medical rejections when contradicted by specialized institutional assessments.

The order. Appeal allowed. Department directed to issue an appointment order if otherwise eligible, without retrospective seniority.

Rule 15(6)(d), Uttar Pradesh Police Constable and Head Constable Service Rules, 2015 (as amended 2017)

Case

AKANKSHA DEVI vs STATE OF UP

Citation

Supreme Court of India · C.A. No.-014041-014041 - 2026 · 2026 INSC 1184 · 02.11.2026

Bench

Aravind Kumar, Vipul M. Pancholi

The dispute. Following a 2018 bus accident claiming twenty-seven lives, Himachal Pradesh barred school transport vehicles over fifteen years old. Twenty-one educational institutions challenged the rule, arguing that well-maintained buses remain roadworthy and replacement burdens are unviable. The petitioners approached the High Court under Article 226, arguing that only the Central Government could fix vehicle age limits.

The reasoning. Section 96 authorizes States to attach transport permit conditions without encroaching on the Centre's Section 59 vehicle-life powers. The fifteen-year cap is a valid preventive safety measure that applies uniformly across all educational institutions.

For your practice. Regulatory challenges to state transport caps must show direct statutory conflict, as courts prioritise student safety over institutional financial burdens.

The order. The High Court dismissed all twenty-one writ petitions and vacated interim stay orders. Rule 73-A(1)A(xi) was upheld, barring vehicles over fifteen years from student transport across all institutions without costs.

Section 96, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Case

Shivalik Institute of Nursing through its President Shri Khushi Ram Thakur v. State of Himachal Pradesh & ors.

Citation

Himachal Pradesh High Court · CWP/16446/2026 · 2026:HHC:47922 · 31.10.2026

Bench

Yogesh Jaswal

The dispute. An accused was convicted for kidnapping and repeatedly sexually assaulting a minor girl over two months, resulting in pregnancy. Forensic DNA reports were inconclusive, but school records established the victim was under fifteen years of age. The trial court sentenced the convict to thirty years simple imprisonment, which was challenged as disproportionate on appeal.

The reasoning. Section 6 POCSO prior to the 2019 amendment prescribed a ten-year minimum sentence. While inconclusive forensic evidence and minor recovery lapses do not invalidate consistent victim testimony, sentencing must reflect statutory proportionality.

A sentence of 15 years' rigorous imprisonment falls within the punishment prescribed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act as it stood at the relevant time.

For your practice. Inconclusive forensic DNA does not outweigh credible victim testimony, while pre-2019 POCSO sentencing mandates statutory proportionality and rigorous imprisonment.

The order. Conviction upheld. High Court modified the Section 6 POCSO sentence from thirty years simple imprisonment to fifteen years rigorous imprisonment, running concurrently with set-off for custody since 2015. Appeal partly allowed.

Section 6, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Case

M.A.A. v. State (NCT of Delhi)

Citation

Delhi High Court · CRL.A.-276/2025 · 2026:DHC:9648 · 02.11.2026

Bench

Madhu Jain

The dispute. The applicant was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, receiving six months' imprisonment and a fine of ₹9.5 lakh. On appeal, the Sessions Judge granted bail but directed him to deposit twenty percent of the fine within thirty days. The Sessions Judge later reduced the deposit to ten percent and cancelled bail for non-deposit, prompting this challenge before the High Court.

The reasoning. The statutory floor of twenty percent under Section 148 is mandatory and admits no judicial reduction. An appellate court cannot cancel bail for failure to deposit an illegally reduced sum that violates this statutory threshold.

For your practice. In cheque appeal litigation, counsel should seek extensions of time rather than reductions, as any deposit condition below twenty percent is void.

The order. The High Court set aside the Sessions Judge's orders reducing the deposit and cancelling bail, thereby restoring the applicant's bail. The criminal miscellaneous application was disposed of with no order as to costs.

Section 148, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Case

CHAMAN DAS vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

Citation

Uttarakhand High Court · C528/2419/2026 · 2026:UHC:9944 · 31.10.2026

Bench

Alok Mahra