The Madhya Pradesh High Court has suspended the sentence of an appellant convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, after finding that the prosecution failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix beyond reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that conviction under POCSO hinges on the victim being under eighteen at the time of the offense, and without reliable evidence of age, the foundation of the conviction is compromised.
The Verdict
The appellant, Yuvraj @ Anil, won the application for suspension of sentence. The Madhya Pradesh High Court suspended his combined sentence of 47 years rigorous imprisonment under Sections 363, 366, 342 IPC and Sections 3/4, 5/6 of the POCSO Act, subject to deposit of fines and furnishing a bail bond of Rs. 50,000 with one surety. The court held that the prosecution’s failure to prove the prosecutrix’s age through credible documentation rendered the POCSO conviction unsustainable, and the appellant’s six-year incarceration warranted interim relief pending appeal.
Background & Facts
The appellant was convicted by the trial court for abducting a minor girl, sexual exploitation, and unlawful confinement. The prosecution alleged that the girl, who was below eighteen years of age, was taken away and subjected to sexual abuse. The age of the prosecutrix was primarily established through a school register entry, which recorded her date of birth as 2004. A DNA report was also produced to support the prosecution’s case.
The appellant, aged nineteen at the time of the incident, challenged the conviction on appeal. He contended that the school register entry was not authenticated and was likely based on guesswork, as no birth certificate, hospital records, or other corroborative evidence was presented. The trial court had noted the appellant’s age as nineteen but did not adequately address the evidentiary gaps regarding the victim’s age.
The appellant filed an application under Section 430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking suspension of sentence, arguing that he had already served six years in custody and that the final hearing of his appeal would take considerable time. The State and the objector opposed the application, relying on the DNA report and the school register as sufficient proof of the victim’s minority.
The Legal Issue
The central legal question was whether a conviction under the POCSO Act can be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish the age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the only evidence is an unverified school register entry.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Counsel for the appellant relied on the precedent in Tijubai @ Omvati Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025(1) MPLJ (Cri.) 75, where the court held that an unauthenticated school register entry, recorded without verification of official documents, cannot serve as the sole basis for proving the age of a victim under POCSO. He argued that the prosecution’s failure to produce birth records, school admission forms, or any other corroborative evidence created reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the prosecutrix had voluntarily traveled with the appellant and stayed with him for a day, suggesting possible consent, and that the appellant’s own youth (age nineteen) indicated a relationship more consistent with mutual involvement than predatory exploitation.
For the Respondent
The State and objector contended that the DNA report confirmed the victim’s biological age and that the school register, even if imperfect, was a public document entitled to presumption under Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act. They argued that the cumulative evidence, including the nature of the acts and the victim’s testimony, established the victim’s minority. They further asserted that suspension of sentence would undermine the deterrent purpose of POCSO and set a dangerous precedent for offenders in sexual crimes against children.
The Court's Analysis
The court undertook a careful review of the evidentiary record and the precedent in Tijubai. It noted that while DNA evidence may indicate biological age, it does not conclusively establish legal age for the purposes of POCSO, which requires proof of chronological age as of the date of the offense. The court emphasized that the burden of proving the victim’s age lies squarely on the prosecution, and that reliance on an unverified school register, without corroboration from official records, is legally insufficient.
"If the source of the date of birth recorded in the scholar register has not been proved and the same is recorded on guess, the same cannot be the basis for conviction."
The court explicitly adopted this principle from Tijubai, holding that the prosecution’s failure to discharge its burden rendered the POCSO conviction vulnerable. The court also acknowledged the appellant’s six-year incarceration and the likelihood of prolonged appellate proceedings. While not acquitting the appellant, the court found that the gravity of the sentence, combined with the evidentiary weakness, warranted interim relief.
The court did not accept the argument of consent as a defense under POCSO, noting that the statute is designed to protect minors regardless of apparent willingness. However, the absence of reliable age evidence was deemed fatal to the prosecution’s case.
What This Means For Similar Cases
This judgment reinforces that convictions under POCSO cannot rest on unverified school records alone. Practitioners must now ensure that age evidence is corroborated by birth certificates, hospital records, or other official documentation. Prosecutors should avoid overreliance on school registers and must proactively secure primary evidence of age.
For defense counsel, this ruling provides a clear pathway to challenge POCSO convictions where age is contested. The Tijubai precedent now stands as binding authority in Madhya Pradesh and carries persuasive weight elsewhere. However, the decision is fact-specific: it does not create a blanket rule for suspension of sentence, but rather applies only where age remains unproven and the accused has served substantial time.
Future applications for suspension under Section 430 BNSS may cite this judgment to argue for interim relief when the conviction’s foundation is undermined by evidentiary gaps, particularly in cases involving minors.
