The Madhya Pradesh High Court has granted suspension of a life sentence in a rape case under Section 376 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, holding that prima facie evidence of consent by the prosecutrix warrants interim relief under Section 389 CrPC, even before final adjudication on merits.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Durgesh @ Durgaprasad, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly raping a married woman from a Scheduled Caste community on 9 November 2020 in a forest area near Rajgarh. The prosecution alleged that the appellant intercepted the prosecutrix, dragged her into a secluded spot, and committed rape despite her cries for help. The husband arrived at the scene upon hearing her shouts and lodged FIR No. 244/2020.
Procedural History
- 9 November 2020: Alleged incident occurred; FIR registered under Section 376 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
- 6 August 2025: Special Judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000.
- 2025: Appellant filed I.A. No. 15126/2025 seeking suspension of sentence pending appeal under Section 389(1) CrPC.
- The appellant had been on bail during trial and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought suspension of the life sentence and release on bail pending disposal of his appeal, arguing that the prosecutrix’s conduct and statement indicated consent, rendering the prosecution case weak on its face.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits suspension of sentence in a rape case under Section 376 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act when the prosecutrix’s testimony raises a prima facie inference of consent, and the accused has not misused bail during trial.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
Counsel argued that the prosecutrix, a married woman with two children, was a consenting adult and her statement, read with the circumstances, suggested voluntary participation. The husband’s presence at the scene, according to the appellant, indicated prior knowledge or acquiescence. Reliance was placed on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar and State of U.P. v. Krishna to argue that where consent is plausibly suggested, the gravity of the offence must be balanced against the right to liberty under Article 21.
For the Respondent/State
The State contended that rape under the SC/ST Act is a heinous offence and suspension of sentence is impermissible absent exceptional circumstances. It emphasized the vulnerability of the prosecutrix as a member of a Scheduled Caste and argued that the court must not prejudge the trial court’s findings. The State relied on State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant to assert that suspension should not be granted in cases involving sexual violence against marginalized communities.
The Court's Analysis
The Court declined to evaluate the merits of the conviction but focused on the threshold for suspension under Section 389 CrPC, which requires a prima facie case for appeal and a reasonable likelihood of success. The Court observed that the prosecutrix’s statement, while not conclusive, contained material inconsistencies suggesting possible consent. The absence of any allegation of force or threat in the FIR, coupled with the husband’s timely arrival, raised a plausible doubt.
"It is not for this Court to determine guilt or innocence at this stage, but where the record raises a prima facie doubt as to the absence of non-consent, the balance of convenience tilts in favour of suspending the sentence pending appeal."
The Court noted that the appellant had been on bail throughout trial without any violation, indicating no risk of flight or tampering. The Court further held that the principle of proportionality under Article 21 requires that incarceration pending appeal must not be punitive where the appeal has substantial grounds. The Court distinguished cases involving minors or vulnerable victims, noting that the prosecutrix was a major adult woman.
The Verdict
The appellant succeeded. The Court held that suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC is permissible even in serious offences under the SC/ST Act when the record raises a prima facie doubt on consent and the accused has not abused bail. The appellant was released on bail upon depositing the fine and furnishing a bond of ₹50,000 with one surety.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Consent Evidence Can Trigger Suspension Even in Heinous Offences
- Practitioners must now argue that prima facie evidence of consent, even if contested, can satisfy the "reasonable likelihood of success" threshold under Section 389 CrPC.
- In cases involving adult victims, courts may weigh the credibility of the victim’s narrative more critically before denying interim relief.
- The absence of physical resistance or immediate reporting may be considered, but not as conclusive proof of consent.
Bail Conduct Is a Critical Factor
- A defendant’s compliance with bail conditions during trial is now a decisive factor in suspension applications.
- Courts are less likely to deny interim relief where there is no history of non-compliance, regardless of the offence’s severity.
- This reinforces the principle that pre-appeal incarceration must not be punitive.
SC/ST Act Does Not Automatically Bar Suspension
- The Court clarified that Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act does not create an absolute bar to suspension under Section 389 CrPC.
- Courts must still apply the triple test - prima facie case, likelihood of success, and balance of convenience - without presuming guilt due to caste-based victimhood.
- This prevents automatic denial of liberty based on the identity of the victim alone.
