The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has clarified that suspension of sentence under Section 430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is not automatically barred merely because an accused stands convicted under Section 302 IPC. The Court granted interim relief to an appellant whose role in the alleged crime was distinct from the primary act of violence, underscoring that the gravity of the offense must be weighed against the individual’s specific involvement.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellants were convicted for the murder of Ramkala, who died after being set on fire with kerosene. The prosecution’s case rested primarily on two dying declarations (Exhibit-P/21 and P/22), in which the deceased named Panchulal, Sunitabai, and Ghisalal as the individuals who poured kerosene and ignited her. The appellant Harchand, however, was alleged only to have arrived at the scene after the fire had been set and to have participated in verbal abuse.
Procedural History
- 14 March 2023: Incident occurred; deceased made dying declarations before medical officers.
- 24 May 2025: Second Additional Sessions Judge, Rajgarh, convicted all appellants under Section 302 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000.
- June 2025: Appellant Harchand, who had been on bail during trial, filed I.A. No. 12994/2025 seeking suspension of sentence pending appeal.
- 23 January 2026: High Court heard the application without prejudging the merits of the appeal.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought suspension of his jail sentence pending disposal of his criminal appeal, arguing that his conduct did not constitute direct participation in the fatal act and that he had not misused his bail liberty.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Section 430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits suspension of sentence for an appellant convicted under Section 302 IPC when the evidence suggests a materially lesser degree of involvement compared to co-accused, particularly where the conviction hinges on a dying declaration that does not implicate the applicant in the actus reus.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
Counsel for Harchand argued that the dying declarations explicitly excluded him from the act of setting fire. He relied on State of U.P. v. Krishna Kumar to assert that suspension of sentence is a discretionary remedy meant to prevent irreparable hardship, especially where the accused’s role is peripheral. He emphasized that Harchand had remained on bail throughout trial without any violation, indicating no flight risk or threat to justice.
For the Respondent/State
The Government Advocate contended that since the conviction was under Section 302 IPC, a grave offense, suspension of sentence should be denied as a matter of public policy. He cited State of M.P. v. Rameshwar to argue that any involvement in a homicide, even indirect, warrants continued incarceration pending appeal.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the distinction between participation in the act of murder and mere presence or subsequent conduct. It noted that the dying declarations, though admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, did not attribute the act of pouring kerosene or igniting the fire to Harchand. The Court observed that the prosecution’s case against him was confined to verbal abuse after the fire had been lit.
"The appellant’s presence at the scene after the commission of the act, even if accompanied by abusive language, does not equate to participation in the homicidal act. The law does not impose equal culpability on all persons present."
The Court further held that suspension of sentence under Section 430 BNSS is not contingent on the nature of the offense alone but on the individual’s role, conduct during trial, and likelihood of prejudice if incarceration continues pending appeal. It distinguished this case from those where the accused was the principal actor or where the evidence was unambiguous as to direct involvement.
The Court also noted that the appellant had not abused his bail, and there was no indication of tampering with evidence or witness intimidation.
The Verdict
The appellant won. The Court held that suspension of sentence is permissible under Section 430 BNSS even in cases involving Section 302 IPC, provided the accused’s role is demonstrably distinct from the primary act of violence and there is no risk of abuse of liberty. Harchand was released on bail upon depositing the fine and furnishing a bond of ₹50,000 with one surety.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Role-Based Distinction Matters in Suspension Applications
- Practitioners must meticulously dissect the dying declaration or eyewitness testimony to isolate the accused’s specific conduct from the principal act.
- Suspension applications should highlight factual distinctions between co-accused, even in murder cases.
- Mere presence or post-facto conduct, absent direct participation in the lethal act, supports a strong case for suspension.
Bail Conduct Is a Critical Factor
- A clean record during trial bail significantly strengthens the application.
- Courts are more likely to grant suspension where the accused has not violated bail conditions or attempted to influence witnesses.
- Failure to demonstrate good conduct during pre-trial liberty may negate even a weakly implicated accused.
Dying Declarations Require Precise Interpretation
- Courts will not treat all accused named in a dying declaration equally if the language clearly differentiates roles.
- Defense counsel must parse the exact wording of dying declarations to isolate non-perpetrator roles.
- Prosecution’s failure to prove direct involvement in the fatal act opens the door for interim relief under Section 430 BNSS.
