When does the limitation period begin for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the IBC?

The limitation period begins from the date the order is pronounced in open court by the Adjudicating Authority, not from the date of upload on the e-portal or receipt of a certified copy.

Can the time taken to obtain a certified copy be excluded from the limitation period under Section 61(2)?

Only if an application for the certified copy is made within the initial 30-day limitation period. Failure to apply within this window disentitles the appellant to any exclusion under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act.

Is the upload date of an order on the NCLT portal relevant for computing limitation under Section 61?

No. The upload date is irrelevant. Limitation commences from the date of oral pronouncement in open court, as confirmed by multiple Supreme Court judgments interpreting Section 61(2) as a self-contained provision.

Can a delay of one day beyond the 45-day maximum under Section 61(2) be condoned?

No. The proviso to Section 61(2) provides a strict 45-day absolute ceiling. No judicial discretion exists to condone delay beyond this period, even by a single day.

Section 61 IBC limitation starts from oral pronouncement

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal has reaffirmed that the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code begins from the date of oral pronouncement of the order in open court, not from the date of upload or receipt of a certified copy. This ruling reinforces the time-bound nature of the IBC and closes a potential loophole for delayed filings by financial creditors and home buyers.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The appellants in Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 54/2026 and No. 56/2026 are unsecured financial creditors and home buyers of M/s. Lokaa Developer Pvt. Ltd., a corporate debtor undergoing corporate insolvency resolution. Their claims relate to Flat No. 2001 in the ``M1'' Project. The Resolution Plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority on 28.10.2025 denied them any definite allotment or payout, unlike 192 other similarly situated home buyers who received flats. The appellants claim they initially voted in favor of the plan based on incomplete information and later withdrew support.

Key Facts

The Adjudicating Authority pronounced the order approving the Resolution Plan on 28.10.2025 in open court.
The order was uploaded on the NCLT e-portal on 30.10.2025.
The appellants filed their Memorandum of Appeal on 13.12.2025.
The Registry recorded a delay of 16 days from the date of pronouncement.
The appellants sought condonation of 14 days of delay, claiming they needed time to obtain the order and seek legal advice.
The appellants filed IA No. 136/2026 seeking exemption from filing a certified copy of the order, contradicting their claim that delay was due to non-availability of the certified copy.
The appellants were members of the Committee of Creditors and had participated in the CIRP proceedings.
The appellants held a voting share of 0.11% and had not voted against the Resolution Plan.

Procedural History

28.10.2025: Order approving Resolution Plan pronounced in open court by the Adjudicating Authority.
30.10.2025: Order uploaded on NCLT e-portal.
11.12.2025: Memorandum of Appeal verified and sworn.
13.12.2025: Appeal e-filed before NCLAT.
13.12.2025: IA No. 135/2026 (condonation of delay) and IA No. 136/2026 (exemption from certified copy) filed.
13.04.2026: NCLAT delivered judgment rejecting condonation and dismissing appeals.

Relief Sought

The appellants sought condonation of 14 days’ delay in filing the appeal and, if granted, adjudication of the merits of their challenge to the Resolution Plan approved on 28.10.2025.

The Legal Issue

The central question was whether the limitation period under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 commences from the date of oral pronouncement of the order in open court, or from the date of upload on the e-portal or receipt of the certified copy.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant

The appellants contended that the limitation period should commence from 30.10.2025, the date the order was uploaded on the NCLT e-portal, as they only became aware of its contents then. They argued that they required time to obtain the order, seek legal advice, and prepare pleadings. They relied on the principle of equity and claimed the delay of 14 days fell within the condonable period of 15 days under the proviso to Section 61(2). They further submitted that the absence of a certified copy justified the delay, despite having filed an application for exemption from filing it.

For the Respondent

The Resolution Professional contended that limitation commenced from 28.10.2025, the date the order was pronounced in open court, as per binding precedents of the Supreme Court. He argued that the appellants, as members of the Committee of Creditors, were fully aware of the proceedings and had no legitimate excuse for delay. He emphasized that Section 61(2) is a self-contained provision with no provision for excluding time taken to obtain certified copies unless an application is made within the initial 30-day period. He cited V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited, A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao, and Ashdan Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. DSK Global Education to establish that the date of pronouncement is the trigger for limitation.

The Court's Analysis

The NCLAT undertook a detailed analysis of Section 61(2) of the IBC, which states: "Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days."

The Tribunal noted that unlike Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, which explicitly begins limitation from the date a copy of the order is made available to the aggrieved party, Section 61(2) contains no such language. The Supreme Court in V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited had held that this omission was intentional, reflecting the legislature’s intent to maintain the time-bound nature of the IBC.

"The limitation thus, starts from the date of pronouncement of the Order and not from the date the Order is made available to the parties."

The Tribunal further relied on A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao, which clarified that even if an appellant seeks a certified copy, the application must be made within the initial 30-day period to claim exclusion under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. In this case, no such application was made.

The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the upload date should govern limitation, stating that the mere availability of an order on a website does not alter the legal commencement of limitation. The Tribunal emphasized that the appellants, as active participants in the CIRP, were under a duty to monitor proceedings and could not claim ignorance.

The Court also noted the contradiction in the appellants’ position: they claimed delay was due to non-availability of the certified copy, yet simultaneously sought exemption from filing it. This undermined their credibility and negated any claim of sufficient cause.

The Tribunal concluded that the appeal was filed on the 46th day from the date of pronouncement - one day beyond the maximum permissible period of 45 days (30 + 15). Since Section 61(2) is a self-contained provision with no room for judicial extension beyond the 15-day condonable period, the delay could not be condoned.

The Verdict

The appellants failed. The NCLAT dismissed both Company Appeals (AT) (CH) (Ins) Nos. 54/2026 and 56/2026 as barred by limitation. The applications for condonation of delay - IA No. 135/2026 and IA No. 142/2026 - were rejected. The appeals were filed on 13.12.2025, which was the 46th day after the order was pronounced on 28.10.2025, exceeding the statutory maximum of 45 days. No relief was granted.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Limitation Starts at Pronouncement, Not Upload

Practitioners must treat the date of oral pronouncement in open court as the definitive trigger for limitation under Section 61(2) IBC.
Relying on website uploads or e-portal availability as the start date is legally untenable.
Even if the order is not immediately available in hard copy, the clock starts ticking on the day it is pronounced.

Certified Copy Applications Must Be Timely

To claim exclusion of time under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, an application for certified copy must be filed within the initial 30-day window.
Filing for exemption from submitting a certified copy after the fact does not excuse failure to apply for it within the limitation period.
Delay in obtaining a certified copy is not a valid ground for condonation unless the application was made within 30 days.

Credibility Matters in Condonation Applications

Contradictory pleadings - such as claiming delay due to non-receipt of a certified copy while seeking exemption from filing it - will be viewed as mala fide and defeat any claim of sufficient cause.
Parties who actively participate in CIRP proceedings (e.g., CoC members) are presumed to have knowledge of developments and bear a higher burden to act promptly.

Procedural Rigor Is Non-Negotiable

The IBC’s time-bound framework is sacrosanct. Courts will not extend the 45-day absolute ceiling under Section 61(2).
Any appeal filed beyond 45 days from the date of pronouncement is statutorily barred, regardless of the merits of the challenge.
Practitioners must institute internal timelines to ensure appeals are filed within 30 days, with condonation applications prepared as a contingency, not an afterthought.

Section 61 IBC | Limitation for Appeals Begins from Oral Pronouncement Date, Not Upload or Certified Copy : NCLAT