The Madras High Court upheld the trial court's refusal to transfer a disproportionate assets case to a Special Court, clarifying that Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act cannot be invoked before the Special Court has taken cognizance and the requisite sanction is produced.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The Directorate of Enforcement (ED) sought to commit a pending disproportionate assets case, originally filed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, to the Special Court in Madurai that was handling a related money-laundering complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The petition challenged the order dated 11.12.2025 of the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, which rejected the ED's application under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA.
Key Facts
The second respondent, Anitha R. Radhakrishnan, was MLA from Tiruchendur (May 2001 - May 2006) and Minister for Housing and Urban Development.
FIR registered in 2006 alleging assets worth Rs.2.68 crore beyond known income.
Final report on disproportionate assets filed in Spl.C.No.3 of 2019; alleged disproportionate amount Rs.2.08 crore.
20.04.2023: Directorate filed application under Sections 301(2) & 302(2) of the Code; dismissed on merits 03.07.2024.
28.03.2025: Money-laundering complaint e-filed under PMLA Section 3; hard copy filed 03.04.2025 (A.No.122 of 2025) before Special Court, Madurai.
04.09.2025: Special Court sought sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code for prosecuting the former minister.
24.12.2025: Special Court issued pre-cognizance notice under Section 223 of the BNSS, calling accused to appear on 29.01.2026.
07.10.2025, 15.10.2025, 30.10.2025: ED's application under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA returned by Thoothukudi court for procedural deficiencies.
10.12.2025: Application re-presented with additional judgments.
11.12.2025: Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, rejected the application, holding lack of jurisdiction and absence of sanction.
29.04.2025: High Court directed trial to be concluded by 15.12.2025.
07.01.2026: Prosecution completed arguments; defence partially argued.
15.04.2026: High Court stayed further proceedings in Spl.C.No.3 of 2019.
04.08.2026: Judgment delivered.
Procedural History
2006: FIR registered against Anitha R. Radhakrishnan.
2019: Final report filed in Spl.C.No.3 of 2019 (disproportionate assets).
20.04.2023: Application under Sections 301(2) & 302(2) of the Code filed; dismissed 03.07.2024.
28.03.2025: Money-laundering complaint filed under PMLA.
04.09.2025: Special Court requested sanction under Section 197(1).
24.12.2025: Pre-cognizance notice issued.
07.10.2025, 15.10.2025, 30.10.2025: Application under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA returned.
10.12.2025: Application re-presented.
11.12.2025: Thoothukudi Sessions Judge rejected the application.
15.04.2026: High Court stayed proceedings in Spl.C.No.3 of 2019.
04.08.2026: High Court judgment delivered.
Relief Sought
The Directorate prayed that the High Court set aside the order of 11.12.2025 and direct that the disproportionate assets case be committed to the Special Court, Madurai, under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA.
The Legal Issue
Whether the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, was correct in rejecting the Directorate's application under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA seeking to commit the pending disproportionate assets case to the Special Court at Madurai.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The Directorate contended that Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA expressly empowers an authority to commit a scheduled offence to the Special Court when the same court has taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint. It relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement, and the Calcutta High Court decision in Ranjit Singh Kothari v. State of West Bengal to argue that the legislature intended a single court to try both offences to avoid inconsistent findings.
For the Respondents
The respondents argued that the Special Court at Madurai had not taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint; it had only issued a pre-cognizance notice under Section 223 of the BNSS. They highlighted the requirement of a sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code (now Section 218 of the BNSS) for prosecuting a former public servant, which remained unproduced. Citing Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Enforcement Directorate and Seeman v. Varun Kumar, they maintained that cognizance is a prerequisite and that the High Court’s earlier order directing time-bound disposal precludes a fresh transfer at this advanced stage.
The Court's Analysis
The Court began by reproducing the text of Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA, emphasizing that the provision speaks of “the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence” and “the Special Court … which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering”.
"A bare reading of Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA makes it clear as day that the clause is speaking of two courts, each of which has already taken cognizance - one of the scheduled offence, and the other, being the Special Court, of the money-laundering complaint. Only when both the courts have taken cognizance and they turn out to be different courts, does the mechanism of committal come into play."
The Court held that the statutory language imposes a dual-cognizance condition; the Special Court must have already taken cognizance before an application for committal can be entertained. The pre-cognizance notice issued on 24.12.2025 does not satisfy this requirement. The Court further noted that the absence of the mandatory sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code renders the Special Court legally incapable of taking cognizance against the former minister.
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court’s observations in Rana Ayyub and Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, stating that those decisions dealt with cases where cognizance had already been taken and the trial was at an early stage. Here, the trial was on the verge of conclusion, with 79 prosecution witnesses examined, 312 exhibits marked, and the defence having completed its evidence. The Court stressed that invoking Section 44(1)(c) at such a stage would defeat the statutory purpose of avoiding parallel trials and would prejudice the accused’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
The Court also rejected the contention that the High Court’s earlier direction under Section 406/407 of the Code (now Sections 448/449 of the BNSS) could be overridden by Section 44(1)(c). It reiterated that the power to transfer a criminal case rests exclusively with the High Court, and the Sessions Court cannot unilaterally commit a case to another jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court observed that the Directorate had previously sought similar relief under Sections 301(2) & 302(2) of the Code, which was dismissed on merits in July 2024. The present application, therefore, amounted to an abuse of process and was premature.
The Verdict
The High Court dismissed Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3792 of 2026, upholding the order dated 11.12.2025 of the Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, rejecting the Directorate’s application under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA. No costs were awarded. The Court allowed Crl.M.P.(MD) No.11904 of 2026 to vacate the interim stay of proceedings in Spl.C.No.3 of 2019 and dismissed Crl.M.P.Nos.4074 of 2026. The Principal Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi, was directed to take up the disproportionate assets trial at the earliest available date.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Cognizance Must Pre-Exist
An application under Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA is maintainable only after the Special Court has formally taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint.
Pre-cognizance notices or pending sanction orders do not satisfy the statutory condition.
Sanction Is a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
For former public servants, the prosecution must produce a sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code (now Section 218 of the BNSS) before any court can take cognizance.
Absence of such sanction renders the Special Court powerless to entertain the money-laundering charge, and consequently bars committal.
Timing and Stage of Trial Matter
Courts will not entertain committal applications when the scheduled-offence trial is at an advanced stage, as it would cause unnecessary delay and prejudice the accused’s right to a speedy trial.
Practitioners should assess the procedural posture before invoking Section 44(1)(c); premature filings will be dismissed as an abuse of process.
