The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has clarified that the mere utterance of a term allegedly linked to a Scheduled Caste does not automatically attract Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act unless the intent to humiliate on account of caste is prima facie evident. The judgment underscores the necessity of proving specific caste-based humiliation in public view, not just the use of a word.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Santosha Devi, a member of the District Development Council, Kastigarh, and her son Swarn Veer Singh Jaral, were named in an FIR registered on 09.01.2026 at Police Station Doda, alleging commission of offences under Sections 115(2), 352 BNS, and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The incident occurred on 08.01.2026 during the inauguration of a road at Kastigarh, in the presence of dignitaries including the MLA Doda and the DDC Chairman and Vice-Chairperson.
Key Facts
- The complainant, Hakam Chand, belongs to the ‘Megh’ community, a Scheduled Caste as per the Constitution (Jammu and Kashmir) Scheduled Castes Order, 1956, as amended on 31.10.2019.
- The petitioner belongs to the ‘Jaral’ Rajput community, a General Category.
- The complainant alleged that the petitioner, armed with a pair of scissors, assaulted him and others present, causing injuries and creating panic.
- The complainant further alleged that the petitioner publicly uttered the term "chinal" against him, knowing he belonged to the ‘Megh’ Scheduled Caste, with intent to humiliate.
- The term "chinal" was claimed by the complainant and corroborated by local witnesses (Lumberdar and Chowkidar) to be a derogatory caste-based slur targeting the ‘Megh’ community.
- The petitioner contested this, asserting that "chinal" in the local dialect of Doda refers to a person who carries or tends to religious symbols such as Trishuls and Flutes (collectively termed "Chinanaand"), and is not a caste name.
- The petitioner also claimed that the complainant had forcibly restrained her from inaugurating the road, leading to a physical altercation, and that the FIR was filed with political vendetta.
- Video recordings and photographs of the incident were collected by the investigating agency.
- Caste certificates of both parties were obtained and verified by competent authorities.
- The petitioner was not arrested but applied for pre-arrest bail, which was dismissed by the trial court on 21.01.2026.
Procedural History
- 08.01.2026: Alleged incident during road inauguration at Kastigarh.
- 09.01.2026: FIR No. 09 of 2026 registered at Police Station Doda.
- 26.01.2026: Accused Swarn Veer Singh Jaral arrested.
- 30.01.2026: Swarn Veer Singh Jaral released on bail by the trial court.
- 21.01.2026: Petitioner’s application for pre-arrest bail dismissed by Principal Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Bhadewah.
- 24.03.2026: Case reserved for judgment.
- 02.04.2026: Judgment pronounced by the High Court.
The Parties' Positions
For the Petitioner
- Argued that "chinal" is not a caste name but a term referring to a person who handles religious paraphernalia in Doda district.
- Contended that the term is not listed in the Constitution (J&K) Scheduled Castes Order, 2019, and therefore cannot be a caste-based slur.
- Asserted that the FIR was filed with malice to settle political scores, as the complainant had physically obstructed her during the inauguration.
- Relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, Keshaw Mahto v. State of Bihar, and Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India to argue that Section 3(1)(s) requires intentional humiliation by caste name, not mere utterance.
- Emphasized that the video evidence does not clearly capture the utterance of "chinal" or its context.
For the Respondents
- Argued that the term "chinal" is locally understood as a derogatory slur against the ‘Megh’ community, as confirmed by Lumberdar and Chowkidar.
- Contended that the petitioner’s use of the term in public view, coupled with assault, satisfies the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act.
- Asserted that the statutory bar under Sections 18 and 18A of the SC/ST Act precludes anticipatory bail.
- Cited a press statement by the petitioner as admission of caste-based abuse.
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought anticipatory bail in the event of arrest, with conditions, and prayed for quashing of the trial court’s order dated 21.01.2026.
The Legal Issue
Whether the utterance of the term "chinal" by the petitioner against the complainant, a member of the ‘Megh’ Scheduled Caste, in public view, prima facie constitutes an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, given the petitioner’s claim that the term is not a caste name but a religious reference, and whether the bar under Sections 18 and 18A of the Act applies.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, Keshaw Mahto v. State of Bihar, and Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India to argue that Section 3(1)(s) requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste "by the caste name" with intent to humiliate. The term "chinal" was not listed in the 2019 SC Order, and local usage as a religious attendant does not equate to a caste slur. The video evidence did not clearly capture the utterance, and the press statement did not admit to caste-based abuse. The FIR was politically motivated, and the court must not accept allegations at face value.
For the Respondent/State
The State contended that the term "chinal" was locally recognized as a derogatory slur against the ‘Megh’ community, as confirmed by independent witnesses. The use of the term in public view, coupled with assault and the petitioner’s caste status, satisfies the requirements of Section 3(1)(s). Sections 18 and 18A of the SC/ST Act bar anticipatory bail where the offence is prima facie made out. The electronic evidence and witness statements were sufficient to trigger the statutory bar.
The Court's Analysis
The Court emphasized that the threshold for granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC in cases under the SC/ST Act is not absolute, despite the bar under Sections 18 and 18A. As held in Shajan Skaria, if the prima facie allegations do not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence under the Act, the bar does not apply.
"In a given case, an accused may argue that although the allegations levelled in the FIR or the complaint do disclose the commission of an offence under the Act, 1989, yet the FIR or the complaint being palpably false on account of political or private vendetta, the court should consider the plea for grant of anticipatory bail despite the specific bar of Section 18 of the Act, 1989."
The Court examined the video recordings and press conference of the petitioner. While the video showed commotion and physical altercation, it did not clearly capture the utterance of "chinal" or its context. The press statement, where the petitioner admitted to assault in self-defence, contained no admission of caste-based abuse.
The Court rejected the argument that the term "chinal" must be listed in the SC Order to qualify as a caste name. It noted that local witnesses, including the Lumberdar and Chowkidar, had confirmed its derogatory connotation against the ‘Megh’ community. However, the Court held that the mere existence of a local slur does not, by itself, establish the necessary intent to humiliate on account of caste.
"The requirement of law is that it is not a generic abuse or insult, but accused must know that victim belongs to an SC/ST community and the utterance specifically targets that identity in public view."
The Court further held that even a single word can constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) if it is used as a caste name with intent to humiliate. However, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish that intent from the face of the FIR and available evidence. In this case, the Court found no prima facie evidence that the petitioner used "chinal" with the intent to humiliate the complainant because of his caste identity.
The Court distinguished Kiran v. Raj Kumar Jivraj Jain, where the term "Mangtyano" was clearly a caste slur against the Matang community. Here, the term’s meaning was contested, and the evidence did not conclusively establish its caste-based derogatory intent.
The Verdict
The petitioner succeeded. The High Court allowed the petition and directed that in the event of her arrest, she be released on bail upon furnishing a surety bond of Rs. 25,000 and a personal bond of the same amount. The conditions of bail include: (i) not leaving the territorial jurisdiction of the police station without permission; (ii) cooperating with the investigation; (iii) attending court as required; (iv) not committing similar offences; and (v) not tampering with evidence or intimidating witnesses. The Court clarified that this order does not prejudge the merits of the case.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Caste-Based Intent Must Be Clearly Established
- Practitioners must now demonstrate that the alleged slur was used with the specific intent to humiliate based on caste identity, not merely because it was uttered in a dispute.
- Mere association of a word with a community is insufficient; the context, tone, and surrounding circumstances must show targeted humiliation.
- Defence counsel should challenge the prosecution’s assertion of caste-based intent by requesting independent verification of local usage and cross-examining witnesses on their knowledge of the term’s meaning.
Video Evidence Alone May Not Sustain SC/ST Charges
- Courts will not rely on ambiguous or inaudible video footage to infer caste-based abuse.
- Prosecution must provide clear, unambiguous audio or contextual evidence linking the utterance to caste humiliation.
- Where the video shows general commotion without clear verbal content, courts may find the ingredients of Section 3(1)(s) not prima facie made out.
Pre-Arrest Bail Remains Available Where Allegations Are Vague
- Even under Sections 18 and 18A of the SC/ST Act, courts retain discretion to grant anticipatory bail if the FIR does not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of the offence.
- Courts are not bound to accept the FIR as gospel truth and may conduct a preliminary scrutiny of the allegations.
- Political vendetta or malice, if plausibly alleged and supported by evidence, may justify bail despite statutory bars.
