
The Allahabad High Court has clarified that an order granting bhumidhari rights under Section 122-B(4-F) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 does not operate as an absolute bar to a rival claimant instituting a declaratory suit under Section 229-B read with Section 122-B(4-D). The Court quashed the Board of Revenue's dismissal of a second appeal and remitted four consolidated suits for fresh adjudication, holding that the statutory remedy under Section 122-B(4-D) remains available to a person aggrieved by a Section 122-B(4-F) order, and that a revision under Section 333 cannot trigger the bar under Section 122-B(4-E).
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioners, Ram Palat and four others, claim to be agricultural labourers belonging to the Scheduled Caste community who have been in possession and cultivation of land comprised in Gata No. 455 Mi, measuring 0.202 hectare, situated in Village Para, Pargana Mahul, Tehsil Phoolpur, District Azamgarh, for a period exceeding fifty years. The contesting private respondents (respondents 6 to 9) obtained the benefit of Section 122-B(4-F) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 through orders dated 29.01.1991 and 15.03.1991. The petitioners allege that the private respondents were not in actual possession of the disputed land at the relevant time and were ineligible for the statutory benefit - specifically, that respondent Raja Ram was employed as a primary school teacher while the petitioners were agricultural labourers dependent on cultivation, and that the other contesting respondents were economically better placed and possessed other agricultural land.
Key Facts
- The disputed land: Gata No. 455 Mi, 0.202 hectare, Village Para, Pargana Mahul, Tehsil Phoolpur, District Azamgarh
- Petitioners claim possession and cultivation for over 50 years; belong to Scheduled Caste community; agricultural labourers
- Orders granting benefit under Section 122-B(4-F) to private respondents: 29.01.1991 and 15.03.1991
- Petitioners' restoration/recall application filed: 06.06.1991; rejected: 29.01.1996
- Revision proceedings before Additional Commissioner, Azamgarh Division: dismissed 05.07.1996
- Four suits instituted under Section 229-B (Suit Nos. 352, 353, 354, 355) seeking declaration of bhumidhari rights with non-transferable rights and removal of private respondents' names from revenue records
- Suits consolidated and decided by common order of Sub-Divisional Officer/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur: 23.07.1998
- Appeal dismissed by Additional Commissioner, Azamgarh Division: 06.11.2000
- Second Appeal No. SA/24/2000-2001 preferred before Board of Revenue
- Board of Revenue formulated five substantial questions of law: 04.08.2022
- Board of Revenue dismissed second appeal by judgment: 06.08.2026
- Board's interim order directing status quo: 20.02.2021 (vacated upon dismissal)
Procedural History
- 29.01.1991 & 15.03.1991: Orders passed under Section 122-B(4-F) in favour of private respondents
- 06.06.1991: Petitioners file restoration/recall application
- 29.01.1996: Restoration/recall application rejected
- 05.07.1996: Revision proceedings under Section 333 before Additional Commissioner dismissed
- 1997: Four suits (Nos. 352, 353, 354, 355) instituted under Section 229-B
- 23.07.1998: Consolidated suits decided by SDO/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur
- 06.11.2000: Appeal dismissed by Additional Commissioner, Azamgarh Division
- Second Appeal No. SA/24/2000-2001 filed before Board of Revenue
- 04.08.2022: Board formulates five substantial questions of law
- 20.02.2021: Board passes interim order for status quo
- 06.08.2026: Board dismisses second appeal (impugned judgment)
- 30.10.2026: Writ petition reserved for judgment
- 06.11.2026: Writ petition allowed, impugned orders quashed, suits remitted
Relief Sought
The petitioners sought quashing of the Board of Revenue's judgment dated 06.08.2026, the Additional Commissioner's judgment dated 06.11.2000, and the SDO's order dated 23.07.1998; restoration of the four consolidated suits for fresh adjudication on merits under Section 229-B read with Section 122-B(4-D); and a direction for expeditious disposal.
The Legal Issue
The central questions were: (1) Whether earlier orders passed under Section 122-B(4-F), followed by unsuccessful restoration/recall and revision proceedings, constitute an absolute bar to adjudication of subsequent suits under Section 229-B without examining the statutory remedy under Section 122-B(4-D); and (2) Whether the principle in Manorey alias Manohar (2003) 5 SCC 521 - that an eligible occupant need not institute a suit for declaration of rights under Section 122-B(4-F) - precludes a rival claimant from instituting a declaratory suit under Section 229-B.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioners
Learned counsel submitted that Section 122-B(4-D) expressly provides a remedy to a person aggrieved by an order under Section 122-B to institute a suit before a competent court for establishing the right claimed in the property, and Section 229-B provides the appropriate statutory forum for adjudication of bhumidhari claims. The revision proceedings decided on 05.07.1996 were under Section 333 before the Additional Commissioner, not under Section 122-B(4-A) before the Collector; consequently, the statutory restriction under Section 122-B(4-E) was not attracted. An order under Section 122-B(4-F) is not revisable under Section 122-B(4-A) or Section 333. The earlier proceedings were summary in nature and could not conclusively determine inter se rights of rival claimants asserting competing claims founded on possession; the petitioners' independent claim required adjudication in the suits under Section 229-B.
For the Respondents
Learned counsel for the private respondents contended that the benefit under Section 122-B(4-F) had been extended by orders in 1991, which were challenged through restoration/recall and revision proceedings that were dismissed. The orders thereby attained finality and could not be reopened through subsequent suits under Section 229-B. Section 122-B(4-F) confers a statutory right of bhumidhari with non-transferable rights upon fulfilment of prescribed conditions; once recognised by the competent authority, a subsequent suit cannot be maintained merely to secure a contrary declaration. Reliance was placed on Manorey alias Manohar (2003) 5 SCC 521 and Smt. Ram Piyari v. Board of Revenue 1991 RD 192.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the statutory scheme of Section 122-B. Sub-section (4-F) carves out an exception for agricultural labourers of Scheduled Castes or Tribes satisfying prescribed conditions, conferring a positive statutory right of bhumidhari with non-transferable rights by operation of law (Manorey alias Manohar). However, the principle that an eligible occupant need not institute a suit cannot be read as a prohibition against a rival claimant instituting a suit to establish his own independent right. The absence of necessity for a suit by the beneficiary is not an express statutory bar against a suit by another claimant.
"The expression that an eligible occupant need not institute a suit for declaration of his rights cannot be read as a prohibition against institution of a suit by another person who is aggrieved by an order passed under Section 122-B and seeks to establish his own right in the property."
The Division Bench in Sushila v. State of U.P. (2015) 9 ADJ 589 held that revision under Section 122-B(4-A) lies only against orders under sub-sections (3) or (4), not (4-F), and the general revisional jurisdiction under Section 333 is excluded by Section 122-B(4-C) operating notwithstanding Sections 333 and 333-A. The revision dismissed on 05.07.1996 under Section 333 cannot be equated with a revision under Section 122-B(4-A) and therefore cannot attract the bar under Section 122-B(4-E).
Section 122-B(4-C) makes finality subject to sub-sections (4-A) and (4-D). Sub-section (4-D) preserves the remedy of a suit for establishment of the right claimed. In Ishlam v. State of U.P. (Second Appeal No. 172/2021, decided 02.01.2023), this Court held that a suit under Section 122-B(4-D) is an independent suit to establish the right of the person claiming title, not a judicial review or appeal; if the right is established on trial, it prevails over the summary proceedings. Such a suit for declaration of bhumidhari rights is cognizable by the revenue court under Section 229-B.
The Court also relied on Nand Lal @ Nand Kumar (Writ-C 27204/2018, 22.11.2018), Barendra (Writ-C 29430/2018, 11.09.2018), and Katwaru (Writ-C 9013/2003, 21.08.2019), which recognise that the summary machinery under Section 122-B(4-F) lacks the mechanism to adjudicate competing claims of possession between private parties, leaving them to approach the competent court under the relevant land law.
The Board of Revenue erred by treating the earlier orders and the Section 333 revision dismissal as an absolute bar without examining the statutory remedy under Section 122-B(4-D) and the binding interpretation in Sushila. The questions of res judicata, issue estoppel, actual possession, eligibility, and documentary evidence are left open for the revenue court to decide on the original record.
The Verdict
The writ petition was allowed. The judgment and order dated 06.08.2026 of the Board of Revenue in Second Appeal No. SA/24/2000-2001, the judgment and order dated 06.11.2000 of the Additional Commissioner in Appeal No. 261/A/1998, and the order dated 23.07.1998 of the SDO/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur, were quashed. The four consolidated suits (Nos. 352, 353, 354, 355) were restored to their original numbers and remitted to the court of the SDO/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur, District Azamgarh, for fresh adjudication under Section 229-B read with Section 122-B(4-D). The court below was directed to afford all parties reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and decide all issues by a reasoned judgment, without treating any observation in this judgment as a finding on merits. The court was requested to decide the suits expeditiously, preferably within one year from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. No order as to costs.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Section 122-B(4-D) Preserves Independent Suit Remedy
The statutory scheme of Section 122-B expressly preserves the right of a person aggrieved by an order under the provision to file a suit for establishment of his claimed right in the property. This remedy under Section 122-B(4-D), read with Section 229-B, is independent of the summary proceedings under Section 122-B(4-F) and is not extinguished merely because an order has been passed in favour of another claimant.
- Practitioners must invoke Section 122-B(4-D) and Section 229-B when a rival claimant has obtained benefit under Section 122-B(4-F)
- The suit is not an appeal or judicial review but an original proceeding to establish title
- If the right is established on trial, it prevails over the conclusion in the summary proceedings
Revision Under Section 333 Does Not Trigger Section 122-B(4-E) Bar
The bar on suits under Section 122-B(4-E) applies only when a revision is preferred to the Collector under Section 122-B(4-A). A revision under Section 333 before the Additional Commissioner against an order under Section 122-B(4-F) - which is not revisable under Section 122-B(4-A) - cannot be treated as a revision under Section 122-B(4-A) to attract the statutory bar.
- The dismissal of a Section 333 revision does not constitute a statutory revision under Section 122-B(4-A)
- The Board of Revenue cannot treat such dismissal as creating finality that bars a Section 122-B(4-D) suit
- Sushila (2015) 9 ADJ 589 is binding on this point
Summary Machinery Cannot Adjudicate Competing Private Claims
The administrative machinery under Section 122-B(4-F) lacks the procedural framework to conclusively determine which of competing private claimants is in actual possession. Where rival claims exist, the parties must seek adjudication before the competent revenue court under Section 229-B or general law.
- Manorey protects the statutory benefit of the eligible occupant but does not extinguish the rival claimant's right to sue
- Nand Lal, Barendra, and Katwaru affirm that competing possession claims require judicial adjudication
- The revenue court must independently examine res judicata, issue estoppel, and other bars on the original record
Expeditious Disposal Expected for Long-Pending Suits
The Court emphasised that suits instituted in 1997 and pending for decades should be decided expeditiously, preferably within one year of production of the certified copy of the judgment, subject to cooperation of parties. This signals judicial intolerance for inordinate delay in land revenue disputes.






