Case Law Analysis

Section 11(6) Application Confined to Prima-Facie Test; Limitation Defences Excluded & Non-Signatory Promoters Treated as Parties | Bombay HC

A Section 11(6) petition is limited to a prima-facie test of the arbitration agreement, with limitation defences outside the court’s jurisdiction. The court also held that non-signatory promoters can be treated as parties to the arbitration. This narrows Section 11 scope and extends arbitral reach to promoters.

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Aug 14, 2026, 6:11 PM(Updated: Nov 3, 2026)
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Section 11(6) Application Confined to Prima-Facie Test; Limitation Defences Excluded & Non-Signatory Promoters Treated as Parties | Bombay HC

The Bombay High Court’s decision in Commercial Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2016 refines the scope of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that the referral court must only examine the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement and may include non-signatory parties, while limitation questions lie beyond its jurisdiction.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The applicant, Urban Infrastructure Trustees Limited (UITL), a public company and sole trustee of the Urban Infrastructure Venture Capital Fund (UIVCF), filed an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment of an arbitral tribunal pursuant to Clause 41 of a Term Sheet dated 21 February 2007. The Term Sheet recorded the investment of Rs 51.50 crore by UITL in Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd. (the “Company”) for a bungalow project in Kihim, Alibaug. The promoters of the Company - the Bhimjiyani family members - were alleged to have breached the investment commitments.

Key Facts

  • 24 August 2006: Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd. incorporated.
  • 21 February 2007: Term Sheet executed between UITL (as investor) and the Company (as investee). Signed by Mr. Bhavik Bhimjiyani on behalf of the Company and as promoter.
  • 23 October 2007 & 28 March 2008: Two Amendment Notes signed, extending the deadline for execution of definitive agreements.
  • 2007: UITL invested Rs 51.50 crore in the Company; the Company purchased ~82 acres of land for the project.
  • 28 August 2008: Letter from the Company (signed by Respondent No.3) confirming the group acted collectively.
  • 29 January 2009: UITL’s demand letter to Respondent No.1 for repayment with 24 % interest per annum.
  • 10 April 2009: UITL’s notice invoking arbitration under Clause 41.
  • 24 March 2011: Letter from Respondent No.2 to a third-party mediator regarding joint investment.
  • 31 March 2011 & 31 March 2014: Financial statements of the Company reflected UITL’s investment.
  • 5 April 2011: UITL’s letter demanding documents from the Company.
  • 30 October 2012: Settlement-agreement proposal letter from UITL to the promoters.
  • 27 February 2016: UITL invoked arbitration under Clause 41, seeking appointment of a retired judge as sole arbitrator.
  • 28 March 2016 & 5 April 2016: Respondents denied maintainability of the arbitration.
  • 14 June 2016: Application filed under Section 11.
  • 20 August 2018: NCLT ordered winding up of Respondent No.5 (the Company).
  • 12 August 2026: Judgment reserved and pronounced by Justice Arun R. Pedneker.

Procedural History

  • 14 June 2016: Section 11 application filed by UITL.
  • 28 March 2016 & 5 April 2016: Respondents filed replies denying maintainability.
  • 20 August 2018: NCLT winding-up order against Respondent No.5; Respondent No.5 dropped from proceedings.
  • 12 August 2026: High Court reserved and pronounced judgment.

Parties' Positions

  • Applicant (UITL): Asserted that the Term Sheet contains a valid arbitration clause; the promoters acted as a single group; UITL, as trustee of UIVCF, has locus to invoke the arbitration agreement.
  • Respondent No.1 (Mr. Bhavik Bhimjiyani): Contended he signed the Term Sheet only as a director of the Company, not in personal capacity; argued the Term Sheet is a preliminary document, not a concluded contract; claimed the claim is time-barred under the Limitation Act.
  • Respondents No.2-4: Maintained they are non-signatory parties and therefore cannot be bound by the arbitration clause; argued the claim is hopelessly time-barred.

Relief Sought

UITL sought appointment of a sole arbitrator under Clause 41 to adjudicate all disputes arising from the Term Sheet and the related investment, along with directions for the parties to cooperate with the arbitrator.

Whether, for a Section 11(6) application, the referral court may (i) examine limitation defenses and (ii) refuse to refer non-signatory parties to arbitration, or whether its inquiry is confined strictly to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Arguments Presented

For the Applicant

  • The Term Sheet contains an express arbitration clause (Clause 41) and the parties have acted upon it, evidencing a binding agreement.
  • The applicant, as sole trustee of UIVCF, has locus to enforce the arbitration agreement despite the winding-up of UIOF.
  • Reliance on Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd. that the referral court’s duty is limited to checking the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement and not to adjudicate limitation or merits.
  • Citing Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re for the limited scope of Section 11(6-A).
  • Invoking the “veritable party” doctrine from Cox and Kings Ltd. v. Sap India Pvt. Ltd. and KKH Finvest Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashiesh Shukla to treat the promoters as parties to the arbitration agreement despite not being signatories.

For the Respondents

  • Argued that the Term Sheet is a preliminary document; no definitive agreement was ever executed, so no enforceable arbitration clause exists.
  • Contended that the claim is barred by limitation (more than three years from the date of the notice invoking arbitration), relying on State of West Bengal v. BBM Enterprises and Arif Azim.
  • Maintained that non-signatory promoters cannot be bound by the arbitration clause and that the referral court should not entertain such parties.
  • Emphasised that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies and the referral court must reject time-barred claims at the Section 11 stage.

The Court's Analysis

The Court began by examining the nature of the Term Sheet. It noted that Clause 1 expressly identified the parties - the Urban Infrastructure Opportunities Fund (UIOF) as investor and Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd. as the company - and that Clause 41 unambiguously provided for arbitration of any dispute arising therefrom. The Court observed that the parties had performed under the Term Sheet: UITL transferred Rs 51.50 crore, the Company purchased land, and the promoters acknowledged the investment in multiple correspondences (see letters dated 28 August 2008, 29 January 2009, 10 April 2009, etc.).

"The Court appointed Mr. S. C. Gupte, Former Judge of this Court as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes and differences between the parties arising out of and in connection with the Agreement referred to above."

The Court held that the Term Sheet, although described as a “preliminary document” by the respondents, had been acted upon to the extent that the arbitration clause became operative. It distinguished PSA Mumbai Investments Pte. Ltd. v. Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust where a mere reference to a future contract did not create an arbitration agreement, emphasizing that here the parties’ conduct demonstrated a clear intention to be bound.

On the limitation issue, the Court reiterated the principle from Arif Azim and Interplay that the referral court’s jurisdiction under Section 11(6-A) is confined to a prima facie test of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The Court stated that the Limitation Act, 1963 governs the filing of Section 11 applications, but the court cannot delve into whether the substantive claim is time-barred; that inquiry is reserved for the arbitral tribunal.

Regarding non-signatory parties, the Court applied the “veritable party” doctrine articulated in Cox and Kings and KKH Finvest. It observed that the promoters had signed the Term Sheet on behalf of the Company and had subsequently acted as the promoters in all communications, thereby satisfying the test of participation in the performance of the underlying contract. Consequently, they could be treated as parties to the arbitration agreement.

The Court also addressed the argument that the applicant, as trustee of a wound-up fund, lacked locus. It concluded that the winding-up of UIOF did not affect UITL’s right to enforce the arbitration clause because UITL remains the trustee of the continuing UIVCF.

In sum, the Court found that:

  1. A prima facie arbitration agreement exists in the Term Sheet.
  2. The limitation defence is outside the scope of the Section 11(6-A) enquiry.
  3. Non-signatory promoters qualify as “veritable parties” and may be referred to arbitration.

The Verdict

The Court appointed Mr. S. C. Gupte, former Judge of the Bombay High Court, as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes arising out of the Term Sheet. It directed the parties to communicate the arbitrator’s contact details within one week of the order, ordered equal sharing of arbitration costs in the first instance, and directed that all further procedural directions be issued by the arbitrator. The application under Section 11(6) was therefore allowed, and the referral to arbitration was confirmed.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Section 11(6) Limited to Prima Facie Arbitration Agreement

Referral courts must restrict their inquiry to whether an arbitration agreement exists on its face. They cannot examine the substantive merits, including limitation defenses, which are for the arbitral tribunal.

  • Practitioners should frame Section 11 applications to focus on the existence of a written arbitration clause.
  • Any argument on limitation must be raised before the arbitrator, not the referral court.

Non-Signatory Parties May Be Treated as Parties

A party that has not signed the agreement but has participated in the performance of the underlying contract can be deemed a “veritable party” and bound by the arbitration clause.

  • Evidence of conduct, such as signing on behalf of the company, correspondence, and participation in negotiations, is crucial.
  • Counsel should gather documentary proof of the non-signatory’s involvement to support inclusion.

Limitation Is Not Within Referral Court’s Purview

The Limitation Act applies to the filing of Section 11 applications, but the court cannot decide whether the underlying claim is time-barred.

  • Ensure that the notice invoking arbitration is served within three years of the cause of action accruing.
  • If the notice is timely, the court must refer the matter irrespective of the claim’s substantive limitation status.

Actionable Takeaways

  • Draft arbitration clauses clearly and ensure they are signed or evidenced by conduct.
  • When invoking Section 11, attach the notice of arbitration to demonstrate the commencement of the limitation period.
  • Prepare comprehensive documentary evidence of any non-signatory’s participation to argue “veritable party” status.

Case Details

URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE TRUSTEES LIMITED vs BHAVIK BHIMJIYANI AND 4 ORS

PDF
Court
Bombay High Court
Date
2026-08-12
Case Number
CARAP/14/2016
Bench
ARUN R. PEDNEKER
Counsel
Pet: Sharan Jagtiani, Senior Advocate, Siddharth Joshi, Hamd Bhati, Mumtaz Bandukwala
Res: Prateek Seksaria, Senior Advocate, Gulnar Mistry, Saket More, Rohit Agarwal, Shrey Shah, Mitali Dhoble, Gulnar Mistry, Aksha Hudda, Rubin Vakil, Aniket Malu, Prasad Nikale, Dev Mehta

Frequently Asked Questions

The court may only examine whether a prima facie arbitration agreement exists and whether the application is filed within the three-year limitation period. It cannot adjudicate the merits or limitation of the underlying claim.
Yes, if the non-signatory is a “veritable party” - i.e., has participated in the performance of the contract and its conduct indicates an intention to be bound by the arbitration clause, as held in Cox and Kings and KKH Finvest.
It starts from the date a valid notice invoking arbitration is sent to the other party, and the other party fails to comply, per Arif Azim.
No. The court held that the winding-up of UIOF did not affect UITL’s locus as the sole trustee of the continuing UIVCF.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.