The High Court of Himachal Pradesh has affirmed that prolonged pre-trial detention, even in cases involving serious drug offences under the NDPS Act, cannot be sustained when the State fails to ensure a speedy trial. The judgment reasserts that the constitutional right to life and liberty under Article 21 supersedes statutory restrictions on bail, particularly where the accused has already served a period of incarceration comparable to the likely sentence.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The petitioner, Ram Chander, was arrested on 19 December 2024 in connection with FIR No. 249 of 2024, registered at Police Station Sadar Solan, for possession of 6.19 grams of heroin under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act. The prosecution claims the drug was recovered during a search based on secret information, with an independent witness present. The petitioner contends he was falsely implicated and has no prior involvement in drug trafficking.
Procedural History
- 19 December 2024: Arrest of petitioner and co-accused Happy Singh
- 20 December 2024: FIR registered
- 07 April 2025: First bail petition dismissed
- 26 August 2025: Second bail petition dismissed
- 2025: Charge sheet filed; co-accused Happy Singh released on bail on 7 May 2025
- November - December 2025: Co-accused failed to appear; NBWs issued but not executed; trial stalled
- January 2026: Third bail petition filed before Vacation Judge
Relief Sought
The petitioner sought regular bail on grounds of prolonged incarceration exceeding one year, absence of trial progress, his status as sole breadwinner, and no risk of absconding. He offered to comply with stringent bail conditions.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether Article 21’s guarantee of a speedy trial can override the stringent bail restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act when an accused has been detained for over a year without trial progress, and whether repeated denial of bail without material change in circumstances bars a fresh application.
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
Counsel Ms. Kanta Thakur relied on Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), and Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra to argue that the State’s failure to conclude trial within a reasonable time violates Article 21. She emphasized that the petitioner’s incarceration of over one year exceeds the likely sentence for possession of 6.19 grams of heroin, and that the co-accused’s non-appearance - beyond the petitioner’s control - has stalled proceedings. She further cited Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan to contend that criminal antecedents cannot override the right to liberty in cases of inordinate delay.
For the Respondent
The State, through Deputy Advocate General Mr. Ajit Sharma, opposed the petition on procedural grounds, citing prior dismissals of two bail applications and arguing that no material change in circumstances had occurred. He relied on State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan to assert that successive bail applications require substantial new facts, not mere repetition of earlier pleas.
The Court's Analysis
The Court acknowledged the general rule that successive bail applications require a material change in circumstances, as established in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar and Ajay Rajaram Hinge. However, it held that the absence of trial progress constitutes a change in circumstance of constitutional magnitude.
"If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious."
The Court emphasized that Section 37 of the NDPS Act, while imposing strict bail conditions, operates on the implicit condition that trials will be concluded expeditiously, as affirmed in Mohd. Muslim and Kartar Singh. Where this condition is breached, the statutory bar cannot be used to perpetuate unlawful detention.
The Court further noted that the petitioner had already spent one year in custody - a period exceeding the minimum sentence for possession of intermediate quantities under the NDPS Act. The co-accused’s non-appearance, resulting in stalled proceedings, was not attributable to the petitioner. The Court rejected the State’s reliance on prior bail rejections, holding that the failure of the system to conduct trial constitutes a new and compelling circumstance.
The Court also dismissed the relevance of the petitioner’s prior criminal antecedents, citing Ayub Khan, and underscored that presumption of innocence remains intact until conviction. The prolonged detention, the Court observed, risks "prisonisation" and irreversible harm to the accused’s dignity, livelihood, and family.
The Verdict
The petitioner won. The Court held that inordinate delay in trial, even under stringent statutes like the NDPS Act, violates Article 21 and justifies bail. The petitioner was granted regular bail with a bond of ₹1,00,000 and one surety of like amount, subject to strict conditions ensuring trial participation and non-interference.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Speedy Trial Trumps Statutory Bail Bars
- Practitioners must now argue that prolonged pre-trial detention under NDPS, UAPA, or similar statutes constitutes a violation of Article 21, irrespective of offence severity
- The burden shifts to the prosecution to explain delays; silence or inaction by the State becomes a ground for bail
- Courts must assess whether the accused’s incarceration period is disproportionate to the likely sentence
Criminal Antecedents Are Not Dispositive
- Prior convictions or FIRs cannot be used to mechanically deny bail where delay is the primary issue
- Courts must conduct a balancing test: length of detention vs. nature of antecedents
- Default bail under Section 167 CrPC and Article 21-based bail are distinct but complementary remedies
Trial Delays Are Systemic, Not Accused’s Fault
- Delays caused by co-accused non-appearance, court backlogs, or prosecution inaction cannot be imputed to the accused
- Petitioners may cite trial diary entries, NBW non-execution records, and adjournment logs to prove systemic delay
- Courts should proactively monitor trial progress in cases where accused have been detained beyond 12 months
