Case Law Analysis

Right of Appeal Under Section 16 Senior Citizens Act | Aggrieved Persons Include Children and Relatives : Bombay High Court

Bombay High Court refers conflicting judgments on whether children or relatives can appeal under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to a larger bench.

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Jan 24, 2026, 10:37 PM
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Right of Appeal Under Section 16 Senior Citizens Act | Aggrieved Persons Include Children and Relatives : Bombay High Court

The Bombay High Court has referred a critical question on the scope of appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to a larger bench, resolving a deepening conflict between two Division Benches. The issue - whether children or other relatives may file appeals against tribunal orders - has far-reaching implications for family law practitioners, senior citizen welfare bodies, and administrative tribunals across Maharashtra.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, which limits the right to appeal to "any senior citizen or a parent" aggrieved by a tribunal order. The petitioner argued that this exclusion violates principles of natural justice and equal protection, as children and other relatives often bear direct legal and financial consequences of tribunal decisions. In the alternative, the petitioner sought a purposive interpretation to extend appeal rights to any person aggrieved.

Procedural History

  • 2017: Writ Petition No. 1974 of 2017 filed seeking declaration that Section 16(1) is unconstitutional.
  • 2023: Division Bench in Jagdish Pitamber Pawar v. Pitamber Pundalik Pawar held that the omission of "children or relatives" in Section 16(1) is a casus omissus, and applied purposive interpretation to allow appeals by any aggrieved person.
  • 2024: Another Division Bench in Dinesh Bhanudas Chandanshive v. State of Maharashtra held that Section 16(1) is not unconstitutional merely because it does not grant appeal rights to children; only the legislature may confer such rights.
  • 2025: A third Division Bench acknowledged the conflict but declined to resolve it, instead allowing the writ petition to proceed before a Single Judge.
  • 2026: The present Bench, confronted with irreconcilable precedents, referred the matter to a larger bench.

Relief Sought

The petitioner sought either a declaration that Section 16(1) is unconstitutional or, alternatively, a purposive interpretation extending appeal rights to any person aggrieved by the tribunal’s order, including children and other relatives.

The central question is whether Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act permits appeals only by senior citizens or parents, or whether it may be interpreted to include any person aggrieved by the tribunal’s order, such as children or other relatives.

Arguments Presented

For the Petitioner

The petitioner relied on Jagdish Pitamber Pawar v. Pitamber Pundalik Pawar, arguing that the exclusion of children and relatives from the right of appeal constitutes a casus omissus - a legislative oversight. The petitioner cited parliamentary intent, referencing the 2019 Amendment Bill that proposed inserting "children or relatives" into Section 16(1), as evidence that the legislature itself recognized the omission. The petitioner further contended that denying appeal rights to those directly affected violates natural justice and the principle of proportionality under Article 14.

For the Respondent/State

The respondents argued that the right to appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be expanded by judicial interpretation. They relied on Dinesh Bhanudas Chandanshive v. State of Maharashtra, asserting that the legislature deliberately confined appeal rights to senior citizens and parents, reflecting policy considerations such as preventing frivolous litigation by descendants. They maintained that any expansion of appeal rights must come from Parliament, not the judiciary, and that writ jurisdiction remains available as an alternative remedy.

The Court's Analysis

The Court undertook a rigorous examination of the conflicting precedents and the doctrine of per incuriam. It noted that the 2023 judgment in Jagdish Pitamber Pawar was delivered after a formal reference to resolve a conflict among Single Judges, making it an authoritative pronouncement on the interpretation of Section 16(1). In contrast, the 2024 judgment in Dinesh Bhanudas Chandanshive failed to consider this binding precedent, rendering it potentially per incuriam.

"Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of difference of opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled."

The Court quoted Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey to underscore the necessity of uniformity in judicial interpretation. It emphasized that allowing conflicting interpretations to persist would create chaos in the functioning of appellate tribunals under the Act, where identical facts might yield opposite outcomes depending on the presiding officer’s view.

The Court rejected the notion that the availability of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 substitutes for a statutory right of appeal. It held that statutory remedies must be preserved and made accessible, not sidelined by judicial fiat. The purposive interpretation adopted in Jagdish Pitamber Pawar was found to be more aligned with the Act’s objective of ensuring welfare and justice for senior citizens, as it prevents unjust outcomes that may arise when children - who often manage financial and legal affairs - are barred from challenging erroneous orders.

The Verdict

The petitioners did not obtain direct relief, but the Court held that the conflict between the two Division Benches must be resolved by a larger bench. The Court referred the matter for authoritative determination on whether Section 16(1) permits appeals by any aggrieved person, including children and relatives.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Appeals by Relatives Are Not Automatically Barred

  • Practitioners must now argue that Section 16(1) permits appeals by children or relatives under a purposive interpretation, citing Jagdish Pitamber Pawar as binding precedent until overruled.
  • Tribunals must not summarily dismiss appeals filed by non-parental parties without examining the nature of aggrievement.

Legislative Silence Does Not Equal Prohibition

  • The Court’s reasoning reinforces that legislative omission may be remedied through purposive construction, especially where the statute’s purpose is welfare-oriented.
  • This principle applies beyond the Senior Citizens Act to other social welfare statutes with similar drafting gaps.

Precedent Hierarchy Must Be Respected

  • Courts must ensure that subsequent benches consider prior Division Bench rulings before delivering contrary opinions.
  • Failure to do so may render judgments per incuriam, inviting referral to a larger bench.
  • Practitioners should flag non-consideration of binding precedents in written submissions to preserve appellate rights.

Case Details

Kiran Surendra Lakhani v. Union of India and Others

2026 SCC OnLine Bom 123
Court
High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Date
23 January 2026
Case Number
Writ Petition No. 1974 of 2017
Bench
Manish Pitale, Shreeram V. Shirsat
Counsel
Pet: Rahul Kadam, Vedant Babar
Res: Ashish Mehta, Yash Palan, N. C. Walimbe, R. S. Pawar

Frequently Asked Questions

According to the Bombay High Court’s analysis in *Jagdish Pitamber Pawar*, a child or relative may file an appeal under Section 16 if they are aggrieved by the tribunal’s order, as the exclusion of such persons is a casus omissus that may be remedied by purposive interpretation. This view remains binding until overruled by a larger bench.
A *casus omissus* is a legislative omission-where the law fails to address a situation that was clearly intended to be covered. The Court held that the exclusion of children and relatives from Section 16(1) is such an omission, as the Act’s welfare purpose and the 2019 Amendment Bill suggest the legislature intended broader appeal rights.
No. The Court held that mere absence of a remedy for a particular class does not render a provision unconstitutional. However, the Court found that denying appeal rights to aggrieved persons without a rational basis undermines the Act’s purpose and justifies a purposive interpretation.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.