Case Law Analysis

Delay in Bringing Legal Heirs on Record Can Be Condoned | Precedent of Sardar Amarjit Singh Karla Applied : Bombay High Court

Bombay High Court holds that delay in substituting legal heirs is condonable under established precedent, reinforcing equitable discretion in civil procedure.

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Feb 7, 2026, 4:50 AM
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Delay in Bringing Legal Heirs on Record Can Be Condoned | Precedent of Sardar Amarjit Singh Karla Applied : Bombay High Court

The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that courts retain equitable discretion to condone unreasonable delays in substituting legal heirs of deceased parties, provided the delay is reasonably explained and no prejudice is caused to the opposing side. This ruling reinforces the principle that procedural technicalities must not override substantive justice in civil litigation.

Background & Facts

The Dispute

The original civil suit involved a property dispute between the petitioners and the deceased respondent, Unmesh Ratubhai Desai. Upon his death, the legal heirs were required to be brought on record to continue the proceedings. However, the applicants delayed filing the application for substitution for over 17 years after the respondent’s demise.

Procedural History

  • 2008: Original civil suit filed (CRA/447/2008)
  • 2026: Interim application filed under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC to bring legal heirs on record
  • Delay: Over 17 years elapsed between death of respondent and application for substitution
  • Opposition: Respondents challenged the application on grounds of laches and prejudice

Relief Sought

The applicants sought permission to substitute the legal heirs of the deceased respondent, along with condonation of delay, and amendment of pleadings to reflect the substitution.

The central question was whether Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits condonation of excessive delay in bringing legal heirs on record, and if so, under what conditions such discretion may be exercised.

Arguments Presented

For the Appellant/Petitioner

Learned counsel relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Keshao s/o Kawadu Maral v. State of Maharashtra, which had condoned a six-year delay in similar circumstances. They argued that the delay was due to family disputes and lack of awareness regarding legal procedure, not mala fide intent. They further cited the Supreme Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Karla (dead) by LRS. v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (dead) by LRS., which held that technicalities must not defeat justice when substitution is sought in good faith.

For the Respondent/State

The respondents contended that the 17-year delay was inordinate and unexplained, and that the petitioners had not demonstrated any sufficient cause. They argued that the delay had caused prejudice by eroding evidence and witness memory, and that allowing substitution would violate the principle of finality in litigation.

The Court's Analysis

The Court examined the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC, emphasizing that the provision is remedial in nature and must be interpreted liberally to ensure justice. It distinguished between mere delay and inordinate, unexplained delay that prejudices the opposite party.

The Court noted that while 17 years is substantial, the Supreme Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Karla had previously condoned delays exceeding a decade where no prejudice was proven and the substitution was sought in good faith. The Keshao Maral precedent, directly on point, had set a clear standard: delay alone is not fatal if the applicant shows a reasonable explanation and the court finds no prejudice.

"The object of Order XXII Rule 4 is to ensure that the death of a party does not result in the extinction of a valid claim or defence, and courts must exercise discretion with a view to securing justice rather than enforcing procedural rigidity."

The Court found no evidence of mala fide intent or deliberate suppression. The applicants had acted promptly upon gaining clarity on their legal position. The respondents failed to demonstrate concrete prejudice arising from the delay, such as loss of documents or death of material witnesses.

The Verdict

The applicants succeeded. The Court held that delay in substituting legal heirs may be condoned under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC if the explanation is reasonable and no prejudice is established. The application was allowed subject to payment of costs.

What This Means For Similar Cases

Delay Is Not Automatically Fatal

  • Practitioners must now argue that procedural delay under Order XXII Rule 4 is not fatal if the substitution is sought in good faith
  • Courts will examine the reason for delay, not merely its duration
  • Evidence of prejudice must be specific and documented, not speculative

Good Faith and Equitable Discretion Prevail

  • The judgment reinforces that equitable discretion under civil procedure trumps rigid adherence to timelines
  • Legal heirs are not required to file applications immediately upon death if circumstances (e.g., family disputes, illness, ignorance) reasonably explain delay
  • Courts will look at the substance of the claim, not the timing of the procedural step

Costs as a Deterrent, Not a Barrier

  • The imposition of Rs.25,000 as cost is not punitive but corrective
  • Practitioners should anticipate cost orders in delayed substitution applications
  • Costs should be framed as a procedural safeguard, not a reason to deny substitution outright

Case Details

Pratap Mahadev Vinayak Indulkar and Ors v. Unmesh Ratubhai Desai Since Deceased and Ors

2026:BHC-AS:6061
Court
High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Date
05 February 2026
Case Number
125 IA/651/2026
Bench
Rajesh S. Patil
Counsel
Pet: Adv. Javed Khan, Adv. Bharati Indulkar
Res:

Frequently Asked Questions

Yes, according to this judgment, delay exceeding a decade may be condoned if the applicant provides a reasonable explanation and the opposing party fails to prove actual prejudice. The Supreme Court in *Sardar Amarjit Singh Karla* and the Bombay High Court in *Keshao Maral* have established that the focus is on justice, not mere lapse of time.
Prejudice must be concrete and demonstrable-such as loss of documents, death of key witnesses, or erosion of evidence due to delay. Mere assertion of prejudice or general inconvenience is insufficient. The burden lies on the opposing party to prove actual harm.
While not statutorily mandatory, courts increasingly impose costs as a deterrent against undue delay. This judgment confirms that costs are a procedural tool to balance equity, not a condition precedent to substitution.
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Disclaimer

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are based on the judgment analysis and should not be taken as professional counsel. Please consult with a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.