The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that a sentencing court’s negative opinion under Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, or Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, cannot be mechanical or based on blanket rules. The opinion must reflect independent application of mind to statutory factors, and failure to do so renders it legally unsustainable.
The Verdict
The petitioner won. The Chhattisgarh High Court set aside the sentencing court’s negative opinion denying remission of sentence, holding that it was mechanical, unreasoned, and contrary to settled law. The Court directed the authorities to reconsider the petitioner’s remission application afresh, applying the Laxman Naskar factors and considering his conduct during incarceration and parole. A reasoned order must be passed within four weeks.
Background & Facts
The petitioner, convicted under Sections 302/34 and 323/34 IPC, has been in continuous custody since 2010, with a life sentence affirmed by this Court in 2017. In August 2025, he applied for premature release under Section 473 BNSS read with Section 432 CrPC. The State sought the opinion of the sentencing court, which, on September 25, 2025, issued a negative opinion solely on the ground that Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prison Rules, 1968, bars consideration of life convicts for remission.
The petitioner challenged this opinion in a writ petition, arguing that Rule 358 does not impose an absolute bar, and that the sentencing court ignored his exemplary conduct during multiple parole periods. He also contended that the opinion failed to address the mandatory factors laid down by the Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India. Despite the opinion being issued in September 2025, no further action was taken by the Remission Board, leaving his application in limbo.
The petitioner had undergone over 14 years of incarceration and had never violated parole conditions. His application was pending for over five months without any substantive decision, raising concerns about procedural delay and denial of statutory rights.
The Legal Issue
Can a sentencing court’s opinion under Section 473(2) BNSS or Section 432(2) CrPC deny remission based solely on a blanket rule, without applying the mandatory factors laid down in Laxman Naskar? Is such an opinion legally sustainable if it is mechanical, unreasoned, and ignores the convict’s conduct during incarceration and parole?
Arguments Presented
For the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel argued that Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prison Rules, 1968, does not prohibit consideration of life convicts for remission; it merely provides a guideline. The sentencing court’s opinion was perverse because it ignored the petitioner’s consistent good conduct during parole, which demonstrated reformation. The opinion failed to analyze the five Laxman Naskar factors: nature of the offence, probability of recurrence, potential for future offences, utility of continued incarceration, and socio-economic condition of the family. Counsel relied on Supreme Court judgments in Ram Chander, Jaswant Singh, and Rajo @ Rajwa, which hold that such opinions must be reasoned and not stereotyped. This Court’s own precedents in Madari Abrar Ahmad and Puniram were cited to reinforce that unreasoned opinions cannot defeat statutory remission rights.
For the Respondent
The State contended that the sentencing court’s opinion was lawful, as life convicts are ordinarily not recommended for remission under Rule 358. It argued that the court had exercised its discretion properly and that the gravity of the offence - murder under Section 302 IPC - justified the negative opinion. No independent reasoning was offered beyond the rule, and no counter-evidence was presented regarding the petitioner’s conduct.
The Court's Analysis
The Court found that the sentencing court’s opinion was legally flawed on multiple grounds. First, it erred in treating Rule 358 as an absolute bar, when the rule itself contains no such prohibition. The Court emphasized that prison rules cannot override statutory rights under Section 473 BNSS and Section 432 CrPC.
"The opinion negativing the petitioner’s claim for pre-mature release/remission of the remainder of his sentence is found to be perverse, legally unsustainable, and in violation of settled law."
The Court further held that the opinion was mechanical and devoid of independent reasoning. It did not address any of the five Laxman Naskar factors, which the Supreme Court has consistently held are mandatory for consideration. The failure to consider the petitioner’s parole conduct - where he had demonstrated responsibility and reformation - was a critical omission.
The Court relied on Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh, where the Supreme Court held that the opinion under Section 432(2) CrPC is not a formality but a determinative step that must be reasoned. Similarly, in Jaswant Singh, the Court reiterated that mechanical opinions vitiate the remission process. The Chhattisgarh High Court affirmed that such opinions must be "speaking orders" that reflect judicial application of mind.
The Court also noted that the delay in deciding the remission application, coupled with the reliance on a legally invalid opinion, amounted to a violation of the petitioner’s right to fair procedure under Article 21. The State’s inaction, influenced by a flawed opinion, could not justify continued detention beyond what the law permits.
What This Means For Similar Cases
This judgment establishes a binding precedent for all remission applications under Section 473 BNSS and Section 432 CrPC. Practitioners must now ensure that sentencing court opinions are not merely boilerplate or rule-based. Any opinion denying remission must explicitly address the Laxman Naskar factors and reference the convict’s conduct, rehabilitation, and family circumstances.
The ruling also clarifies that prison rules cannot override statutory rights. Authorities cannot refuse to consider life convicts for remission merely because of the nature of the offence. The burden is on the sentencing court to justify denial with specific, individualized reasoning.
Future applications must be processed expeditiously. Delays beyond reasonable timelines, especially when influenced by invalid opinions, may now attract writ jurisdiction. The four-week deadline set by the Court signals that remission decisions must be treated as time-sensitive rights, not administrative formalities.
This judgment reinforces that remission is not a privilege but a statutory entitlement, subject to reasoned exercise of discretion. Lawyers representing life convicts should now routinely demand compliance with Laxman Naskar and challenge unreasoned opinions as legally void.
