The Gujarat High Court’s acquittal in this murder appeal reasserts foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence: conviction cannot rest on suspicion, presence, or inadmissible police statements. The judgment reinforces that the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains absolute, even in cases involving close family members and circumstantial evidence.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Khorban @ Kurbal @ Dinesh @ Sardar Lalubhai Nayak, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his wife, Kinjaliben, on 25 September 2013. The prosecution alleged that while the couple was working in a cotton field, the appellant inflicted fatal axe blows to her head. The weapon was recovered, and a post-mortem confirmed homicidal death due to head trauma and fracture of the atlanto-occipital joint.
Procedural History
The case progressed through the following stages:
- 2013: FIR registered at Kalavad Police Station based on complaint by the victim’s mother
- 2014: Chargesheet filed after forensic and investigative proceedings
- 2017: Additional Sessions Judge, Jamnagar, convicted the appellant based on testimonies of hostile witnesses and the Investigating Officer’s narration of police statements
- 2017: Appeal filed before the Gujarat High Court
Relief Sought
The appellant sought acquittal, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, that all material witnesses turned hostile, and that the trial court improperly relied on inadmissible police statements under Sections 161 and 162 CrPC.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether conviction under Section 302 IPC can be sustained solely on the accused’s presence at the scene, when all eyewitnesses turn hostile and the prosecution relies on the Investigating Officer’s narration of statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC, without any corroborative evidence.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant
The defense argued that:
- All close relatives and eyewitnesses - including the victim’s mother, daughter, son, and brother-in-law - denied the appellant’s involvement during trial, despite having made incriminating statements to police
- The trial court erred in treating the Investigating Officer’s testimony as substantive evidence of the crime, when he was not a witness to the incident
- Reliance on Section 106 of the Evidence Act to draw adverse inference was misplaced, as the prosecution had not established a prima facie case
- The judgment violated the principle that Section 161 CrPC statements are inadmissible as evidence except for contradiction under Section 145 Evidence Act (Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025)
For the Respondent
The State contended that:
- The appellant and victim were alone in the field at the time of the incident
- The absence of any alternative explanation for the death justified an adverse inference under Section 106 Evidence Act
- The Investigating Officer’s testimony, though not direct, provided a coherent narrative consistent with forensic evidence
- The hostile nature of witnesses was due to family pressure, and their prior statements to police should be considered credible
The Court's Analysis
The Court undertook a rigorous review of evidentiary standards in criminal trials. It emphasized that mere presence of the accused at the scene, without proof of active participation, cannot establish guilt. The Court noted that even if the witnesses were hostile, their testimony could not be used to fill evidentiary gaps left by the prosecution.
"The statements under Section 161 and 162 CrPC are not admissible in evidence except for the limited purpose as provided in Section 157 of the Evidence Act... courts cannot use such statements as a corroboration of the statement made in the court."
The Court squarely rejected the trial court’s reliance on the Investigating Officer’s narration of police statements as a substitute for live testimony. It cited Renuka Prasad v. State (2025) to affirm that such statements, even when repeated by the IO, carry no legal sanctity and cannot be used to establish motive, conspiracy, or the act itself.
Regarding Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the Court held that it cannot be invoked to shift the burden of proof to the accused unless the prosecution has first established a chain of circumstances pointing exclusively to the accused’s guilt. Here, the prosecution failed to prove even the basic facts of the crime through credible testimony.
"Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt... the section cannot be used to support conviction unless the prosecution has discharged its burden."
The Court concluded that the trial court’s conviction was based on legally inadmissible evidence and speculative inferences, violating the cardinal principle that reasonable doubt must benefit the accused.
The Verdict
The appellant won. The Gujarat High Court acquitted him of all charges under Section 302 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was ordered released from custody, subject to no other pending cases.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Presence Is Not Proof
- Practitioners must challenge convictions based solely on the accused’s presence at the scene, especially in cases with hostile witnesses
- Courts must distinguish between opportunity and intent; presence alone is insufficient for murder convictions
- Defense counsel should move for acquittal at the close of prosecution evidence if no direct or credible circumstantial evidence links the accused to the act
Police Statements Cannot Substitute for Testimony
- Section 161 CrPC statements are not evidence; their use by the prosecution through the IO is legally impermissible
- Prosecutors must ensure that key facts are established through witnesses who testify under oath, not through investigative summaries
- Any reliance on police statements to reconstruct the crime narrative invites reversal on appeal
Section 106 Cannot Be a Backdoor for Conviction
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The burden of proof remains with the prosecution at all stages
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Adverse inference under Section 106 Evidence Act is only permissible when the prosecution has established a prima facie case through admissible evidence
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Courts must not use Section 106 to compensate for weak prosecution evidence
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Defense lawyers should file applications under Section 227 CrPC to discharge accused where prosecution evidence is legally insufficient
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Prosecutors must avoid over-reliance on forensic or circumstantial evidence without corroborative eyewitness or documentary proof
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Judges must scrutinize whether the chain of circumstances is complete, unbroken, and exclusive to the accused
