The Jharkhand High Court allowed a criminal appeal and set aside a conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredient of a false promise made with no intention to fulfil it at the time of the promise. The Court emphasized that a mere breach of promise does not amount to misconception of fact vitiating consent under Section 90 IPC unless the promise was false from its inception and the sexual act was directly traceable to such promise without influence of other considerations.
Background & Facts
The Dispute
The appellant, Anup Ekka, a teacher at Rajkiya High School, Pelol, was accused of rape under Section 376 IPC based on the allegation that he induced the victim to engage in sexual relations by falsely promising to marry her. The victim, a resident of Village-Dorma, Futkal Toli, P.S.-Torpa, District-Khunti, claimed that the appellant made a promise of marriage in January 2015, which induced her to accompany him to his house where he forcibly committed rape.
Key Facts
- The victim passed her Matriculation examination in the year 2010.
- The appellant had been working as a teacher at Rajkiya High School, Pelol since 2014.
- In January 2015, the appellant expressed his desire to marry the victim.
- On 25.01.2015, the victim was taken to the appellant's house on the assurance to her father that she would be brought back after meeting his mother; after dinner, the appellant allegedly forcibly committed rape upon her and, when she started weeping, assured her he would marry her.
- On 10.02.2015 and 11.02.2015, the victim was kept at the appellant's house and physical relations were established against her will; she was not allowed to return to her home.
- The victim stated that her parents had already come to know about the relationship and requested the appellant to speak to her parents regarding marriage.
- In May 2015, the appellant visited the victim's house and told her father that he would marry the victim.
- On 18.06.2015, the appellant flatly refused to marry the victim; it was alleged that his mother dissuaded him from marrying her.
- A written report dated 20.06.2015 formed the basis of FIR Murhu P.S. Case No.49/2015 registered under Sections 376/417 IPC.
- After investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted on 18.09.2015 against the appellant under Sections 376/419 IPC and against Jesinta Ekka (mother of the appellant) under Section 109 IPC.
- The Magistrate took cognizance and committed the case to the Court of Sessions, where it was registered as Sessions Trial Case No. 12 of 2016.
- Charges were framed against the appellant for offences under Sections 376 and 419 IPC and against the mother under Section 109 IPC.
- The prosecution examined 11 witnesses; the defence examined none.
- Statements of the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded on 23.11.2016, wherein they gave simple denials.
- The trial court acquitted Jesinta Ekka under Section 109 IPC, convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC, sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs 25,000, and directed that in default of payment of the fine he undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Procedural History
- 20.06.2015: FIR registered (Murhu P.S. Case No.49/2015).
- 18.09.2015: Charge-sheet submitted.
- 23.11.2016: Statements of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. recorded.
- 19.12.2016: Trial court judgment of conviction and sentence passed by District & Additional Sessions Judge-I, Khunti.
- 2017: Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 157 of 2017 filed before the High Court of Jharkhand.
- 14.01.2026: C.A.V. (likely case admission).
- 21.09.2026: Judgment under analysis pronounced.
Relief Sought
The appellant sought setting aside of the conviction and sentence, acquittal, and discharge from bail bonds.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether, to attract liability under Section 376 IPC on the basis of a false promise of marriage, the prosecution must prove that the accused made the promise with no intention to fulfil it at the time it was made and that the sexual relationship was directly traceable to such promise without being influenced by other considerations.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant/Petitioner
The appellant contended that the victim’s testimony contained material contradictions, showing that she had voluntarily accompanied him to his house and that the physical relations were consensual. He argued that a mere breach of promise to marry does not constitute a false promise under Section 90 IPC, relying on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar (2005) 1 SCC 88, which held that to establish a false promise the promisor must have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of making it. He further submitted that the victim’s subsequent conduct - visiting his house with consent, seeking parental approval for marriage, and the family’s opposition to the marriage - demonstrated a genuine intention to marry, thus negating the ingredient of mala fide intention.
For the Respondent/State
The State maintained that the trial court rightly convicted the appellant because the victim had not consented to the sexual act; the promise of marriage was made while committing rape and without any intention to fulfil it, thereby vitiating consent under Section 90 IPC. It emphasized the victim’s statement that she was gagged to prevent her from raising an alarm and that the appellant’s mother dissuaded him from marrying her only after the act, indicating that the promise was false from inception.
The Court's Analysis
The Court examined the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on false promise to marry and consent under Section 375 IPC. It observed that consent involves an active and reasoned deliberation; a promise to marry is false only if made with mala fide intention and the promise itself bears an immediate relevance or direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act. The Court quoted from Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675:
"There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence."
It further relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 11 SCC 398 and Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 15 SCC 385, which held that unless the physical relationship can be shown to be purely because of the promise of marriage and without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact. The Court noted that the victim’s evidence revealed that after the alleged incident she visited the appellant’s house with consent, the appellant sought her father’s consent for marriage, and the family members of the appellant opposed the marriage. This indicated a genuine intention to marry, which was thwarted by familial opposition, not by a clandestine motive to deceive. Consequently, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had made a false promise with no intention to fulfil it at the time of the promise, and that the sexual act was directly traceable to such promise.
The Verdict
The appellant succeeded. The Court set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 19.12.2016 passed by the District & Additional Sessions Judge-I, Khunti in Sessions Trial Case No. 12 of 2016. The Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 157 of 2017 was allowed. Since the appellant was on bail, he was discharged from the liability of his bail bonds. The trial court record was directed to be sent back to the court concerned forthwith. The fine of Rs 25,000 and the default imprisonment of one year were thereby vacated.
What This Means For Similar Cases
Burden of Proof Lies on Prosecution to Show Mala Fide Intention
Practitioners must note that the prosecution now bears the burden to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused made a promise of marriage with no intention to fulfil it at the time of the promise. Mere evidence of a subsequent breach of promise is insufficient. Evidence of the accused’s genuine intention to marry, such as seeking parental consent or family opposition to the marriage, can defeat the charge.
False Promise Requires Direct Nexus to Sexual Act
The Court clarified that the sexual relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise and not qualified by other circumstances or considerations. If the woman maintains the relationship for reasons such as personal liking or independent decision, the promise cannot be said to have vitiated consent. Defence teams should highlight any independent motives or circumstances that influenced the victim’s decision.
Genuine Intention to Marry Negates False Promise Claim
Where evidence shows that the accused genuinely intended to marry but was prevented by external factors (e.g., family opposition), the offence under Section 376 IPC is not made out. Courts will look for indicia of bona fide intention, including attempts to formalise the marriage, communication with the victim’s family, and lack of deceit at the time of the promise.
